Connor v. Sewell
| Decision Date | 10 December 1896 |
| Citation | 38 S.W. 35 |
| Parties | CONNOR v. SEWELL. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Action by F. M. Sewell against R. E. Connor. There was a judgment of the court of civil appeals (23 S. W. 555) reversing a judgment for defendant, and he applies for a writ of error. Dismissed.
J. M. Moore, for applicant.
This suit was brought by F. M. Sewell in the district court, alleging, in substance, that he and Connor entered into a contract to carry on a newspaper, in which it was agreed that the latter was to furnish the capital; that he was to furnish his skill and labor in promoting the enterprise, and that the profits were to be equally divided between them. He also alleged, in effect, that after the business had been established and carried on for about 5 months and 21 days the defendant forcibly and unlawfully entered upon and took possession of the office and property of the firm, and excluded him from the possession, and that thereby he was caused great humiliation and mental distress. He averred further that during the time he was engaged in carrying on the business his services were of the value of $100 per month, amounting to $575, and he claimed that sum as actual, and the further sum of $1,000 as exemplary, damages.
Without the claim for exemplary damages, it is clear that this court would be without jurisdiction to grant the writ of error in this case, and this presents the question, does the petition allege facts which would justify a judgment for such a recovery? To authorize a judgment for punitory damages, the case must contain some element of fraud, malice, or oppression. The act which constitutes the cause of action must be actuated by or accompanied with some evil intent, or must be the result of such gross negligence—such disregard of another's right—as is deemed equivalent to such intent; and, where the bad intent is not a necessary inference from the act charged, it must be alleged. The trespass in this case is alleged to be forcible and unlawful, but that may be technically said of most trespasses. The circumstances which are averred to have accompanied the ouster may be some evidence of malice, but are not such that malice must be necessarily inferred from them. We therefore conclude that the averments in the petition do not authorize a recovery of exemplary damages. It results that, so far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned, ...
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Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Hurlbut
...malice, where the defendant's acts are accompanied by fraud. Clements v. Winters, 437 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex.1969); Connor v. Sewell, 90 Tex. 274, 38 S.W. 35 (Tex.1896); Woo, 565 S.W.2d at 299. In this case, the record contains ample evidence that defendants' actions toward plaintiffs were in......
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Phœnix Furniture Co. v. McCracken
...or grossly negligent, and in our opinion there is no evidence tending to show such. Bradshaw v. Buchanan, 50 Tex. 492; Connor v. Sewell, 90 Tex. 275, 38 S. W. 35; Bassham v. Evans (Tex. Civ. App.) 216 S. W. We come now to discuss the proposition as to whether appellee is entitled to recover......
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Bybee v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.
...In other words, is the absence of an exception a controlling factor in the jurisdictional problem? In the case of Connor v. Sewell, 1896, 90 Tex. 275, 38 S.W. 35, it appeared that the District Court had sustained a general demurrer to plaintiff's petition. The Court of Civil Appeals reverse......
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Bassham v. Evans
...to such intent; and, where the bad intent is not a necessary inference from the act charged, it must be alleged." Connor v. Sewell, 90 Tex. 275, 38 S. W. 35. It may be that the allegations of the petition are sufficient to charge a willful or evil intent, and a gross disregard of the appell......