Connor v. Town of Niskayuna

• Decision Date: 03 March 2011
• Parties: In the Matter of John CONNOR et al., Appellants, v. TOWN OF NISKAYUNA et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

917 N.Y.S.2d 759 82 A.D.3d 1329 In the Matter of John CONNOR et al., Appellants, v. TOWN OF NISKAYUNA et al., Respondents. Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York. March 3, 2011.

Lombardi, Walsh, Wakeman, Harrison, Amodeo & Davenport, Albany (Paul E. Davenport of counsel), for appellants.

Paul Briggs, Town Attorney, Niskayuna, for Town of Niskayuna, respondent.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Julie M. Sheridan of counsel), for Thomas DiNapoli, respondent.

Before: MERCURE, J.P., PETERS, SPAIN, MALONE JR. and McCARTHY, JJ.

PETERS, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Platkin, J.), entered October 28, 2009 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, dismissed the petition.

Petitioners began employment as police officers with respondent Town of Niskayuna between September 1997 and July 2000. Prior to their first day of work, each submitted to the New York State and Local Retirement System an application for enrollment that included an election form advising them of the availability of two optional retirement plans provided by Retirement and Social Security Law §§ 384 and 384-d. Such application stated that an election to become a member of either optional retirement plan must be filed within one year of becoming a police officer or member of the Retirement System, as required by statute ( see Retirement and Social Security Law § 384 [b]; 384-d[a] ). As none of the petitioners filed an election to become a member of either of the two optional plans when they submitted their applications, they were automatically enrolled in the retirement plan provided by Retirement and Social Security Law § 375-c.

In 2008, each petitioner filed an application for enrollment in the section 384-d retirement plan. Respondent Comptroller thereafter issued to each petitioner a written determination declining to process his application because the statutory one-year election period had expired. Petitioners then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to compel the Comptroller to accept their applications and to make all contributions required in connection with their membership in the section 384-d retirement plan. Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, prompting this appeal.

We affirm. "It is hornbook law that one who objects to the act of an administrative agency must exhaust available administrative remedies before being permitted to litigate in a court of law" ( Watergate II Apts. v. Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 N.Y.2d 52, 57, 412 N.Y.S.2d 821, 385 N.E.2d 560 [1978]; see Young Men's Christian Assn. v. Rochester Pure Waters Dist., 37 N.Y.2d 371, 375, 372 N.Y.S.2d 633, 334 N.E.2d 586 [1975] ). Pursuant to the Retirement and Social Security Law, the procedure for challenging a retirement benefit determination made by the Comptroller is to request a hearing and redetermination and, upon final determination of the Comptroller, to commence a CPLR article 78 proceeding ( see Retirement and Social Security Law § 374[d]; Matter of Cole-Hatchard v. McCall, 4 A.D.3d 715, 715-716, 772 N.Y.S.2d 415 [2004]; Matter of Motta v. McCall, 300 A.D.2d 803, 804, 750 N.Y.S.2d 796 [2002] ).

Here, despite dissatisfaction with the Comptroller's decision to reject their applications as untimely, petitioners failed to avail themselves of the requirements ofRetirement and Social Security Law § 374(d). Contrary to petitioners' contention, the Comptroller's written refusal to process their applications constituted a "determinatio...