Conradi v. Arnold

Decision Date03 September 1949
Docket Number30905.
Citation34 Wn.2d 730,209 P.2d 491
PartiesCONRADI v. ARNOLD et ux.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Department 1

Ida Mae Conradi, as executrix of the estate of William E. Conradi deceased, brought a death action against Grant Arnold and Elizabeth Arnold, his wife.

The Superior Court, King County, J. T. Ronald, J., dismissed action with prejudice, and plaintiff appealed.

The Supreme Court, Beals, J., affirmed the judgment, holding that the record disclosed no evidence that fall of deceased down a flight of stairs leading from apartment he and plaintiff rented from defendants was due to any negligent act or omission of defendants.

Peyser Bailey & Cartano, Seattle, for appellant.

Rode Cook & Watkins, Frederick J. Orth, Seattle, for respondents.

BEALS Justice.

Ida Mae Conradi, as executrix of the will of William E. Conradi, deceased, and personally, instituted this action against Grant Arnold and Elizabeth Arnold, his wife, asking for judgment for damages on each of two separate causes of action stated in the second amended complaint, hereinafter referred to as the complaint.

The first cause of action was brought under the survival statute, Rem.Rev.Stat. § 194, as set forth in the complaint, plaintiff demanding judgment against the defendants for $10,380, on account of pain and suffering sustained by her deceased husband during his lifetime because of the alleged negligence of defendants, together with expenses incurred during the last illness of the deceased.

By her second cause of action, plaintiff demanded judgment against defendants for $15,000, on account of the loss of prospective earnings by Mr. Conradi during his reasonable life expectancy, for the benefit of plaintiff and Mr. Conradi's surviving daughter, together with $10,000 by way of damages suffered by plaintiff and Mr. Conradi's daughter, occasioned by the death of Mr. Conradi. Plaintiff also demanded judgment in the further sum of $500 on account of the expenses of Mr. Conradi's funeral, making a total of $25,500, based upon her second cause of action.

In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that, prior to January 23, 1948, plaintiff and the late William E. Conradi were husband and wife, residing as tenants in a third-floor apartment in a building owned and operated by defendants Arnold; that, on October 7, 1947, at about ten minutes after six o'clock a. m., Mr. Conradi proceeded to leave the apartment and was about to descend the stairway leading therefrom to the second floor; that the entire stairway was under the control of defendants; that, due to the negligence of defendants in maintaining the stairway, it was in a dangerous and unsafe condition; and that Mr. Conradi slipped and fell from the top of the stairway down approximately sixteen steps to the landing beyond the lower step thereof.

Plaintiff pleaded certain ordinances of the city of Seattle relating to buildings, the construction and lighting thereof, and the maintenance of a healthful temperature therein, and alleged that the stairway was defective in certain named particulars (hereinafter referred to); that, as a result of the fall, Mr. Conradi suffered severe injuries and thereafter endured great pain; that the fall was the proximate cause of Mr. Conradi's death, which occurred January 23, 1948, and that Mr.

Conradi's suffering and death proximately resulted from defendants' negligence.

Plaintiff also alleged in her complaint that, about the middle of December, 1947, defendants served upon Mr. Conradi and the plaintiff notices terminating their tenancy and requiring them to surrender possession of the apartment January 15, 1948; that she and her husband complied with this notice; and that, in moving, Mr. Conradi lifted many heavy boxes and other articles, to his further injury.

By their answer to plaintiff's complaint, the defendants admitted the existence of the ordinances of the city of Seattle pleaded by plaintiff; that Mr. and Mrs. Conradi were their tenants; that Mr. Conradi fell and was injured; and that he died on the date alleged, but denied the other material allegations of the complaint and particularly that plaintiff had suffered damage as the result of any negligence on the part of the defendants.

By way of an affirmative defense, the defendants alleged that any injuries sustained by Mr. Conradi or by the plaintiff were solely caused by and resulted from Mr. Conradi's own contributory neglignece.

By her reply, plaintiff denied the affirmative allegations contained in defendants' answer.

The action was tried to the court, sitting without a jury, and, after having personally inspected the premises, the trial judge entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of the defendants, followed by the entry of a judgment in favor of defendants, dismissing plaintiff's action with prejudice. From this judgment, plaintiff has appealed, making the following assignment of errors:

'(1) The Superior Court erred in finding that William E. Conradi was fully familiar with the condition of the hallway, including the rug or strip of carpet, the bare floor and the conditions thereof (Finding No. III).

'(2) The Superior Court erred in finding that William E. Conradi was guilty of contributory negligence (Findings No. IV and V).

'(3) The Superior Court erred in finding that there is no evidence that any negligent or unlawful act on the part of the respondents was a proximate cause of Conradi's death (Finding No. VII).

'(4) The Superior Court erred in making its Conclusion of Law that the respondents were guilty of no negligent or unlawful act which was a proximate cause of the death of Conradi (Conclusion No. I).

'(5) The Superior Court erred in making its Conclusion of Law that the complaint of appellant should be dismissed with prejudice and that respondents should be allowed judgment against appellant for their costs (Conclusion No. II).

'(6) The Superior Court erred in entering judgment in favor of respondents and against appellant, dismissing appellant's complaint and awarding costs against her.

'(7) The Superior Court erred in overruling appellant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the oral decision.

'(8) The Superior Court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial.'

The late William E. Conradi and the appellant herein, Ida Mae Conradi, were for many years husband and wife, and were the parents of Mrs. Thomas Long.

The respondents Grant and Elizabeth Arnold are husband and wife, and, as a marital community, owned an apartment building known as No. 5808 Fifteenth avenue northeast in the city of Seattle. They occupied an apartment in the building and rented the other apartments.

During the month of April, 1947, Mrs. Conradi, on behalf of the community composed of herself and her husband, rented from respondents apartment No. 9, on a month-to-month basis, it being understood that respondents would supply electricity and heat. Mr. and Mrs. Conradi took possession of their apartment, which they occupied until January 15, 1948, when they departed, as will be hereinafter set forth.

Apartment No. 9 was on the third floor of the building and was accessible only by way of a rather steep flight of stairs, consisting of sixteen steps. In this opinion, we shall refer to the left and right sides of the stairway from the standpoint of a person leaving the apartment to descend the stairs. On the left-hand side of the stairway was a vertical wall, and on the right-hand side was a bannister. The flight of stairs ended at the top at the door opening into the apartment. There was no stair landing whatever on the outside of this door. One leaving the apartment to go downstairs would step from the floor in the doorway down the first step of the stairway. The door to the apartment opened inward, to the left of one leaving the apartment. The floor of the apartment was of hardwood, and was bare for a distance of ten or twelve inches on the approach to the door from within the apartment. The floor extended under the door and for a distance of only two or three inches beyond the door toward the stairway. The edge of the floor next to the stairway consisted of a narrow strip of hardwood, and there was testimony to the effect that this portion of the floor was somewhat loose and would tilt a little when a person placed his weight thereon. Respondents' testimony was to the effect that the strip referred to was not loose.

There was also testimony to the effect that the bare portion of the apartment floor was somewhat slippery. Appellant testified that she kept the hardwood floor of the apartment, between the end of the rug or carpet and the door to the apartment, cleaned and polished, and that, on several occasions, she had observed that someone was cleaning or polishing that portion of the floor which projected beyond the door.

On the staircase wall, to the right of a person leaving the apartment and at a convenient elevation above the bannister rail, was short handrail, to be used until the person descending the stairs reached a position where use of the bannister rail was convenient. It appeared that, at the time of Mr. Conradi's accident, this handrail was somewhat loose. However, it may be noted that it does not appear that, on the occasion of the accident, Mr. Conrari took hold of this rail.

There was an electric light on the first floor at the foot of the second flight of steps, when descending, but this light could be turned on only by a switch on the ground floor. It also appears that this light was generally not turned on.

Upon the ceiling of the apartment, just inside the door, was an electric light which was controlled by a push button on the wall of the stairway, outside the door of the apartment. Consequently, anyone desiring to...

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10 cases
  • Cherberg v. Peoples Nat. Bank of Washington
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • June 2, 1977
    ...premises absent an express covenant requiring such action. Feigenbaum v. Brink, 66 Wash.2d 125, 401 P.2d 642 (1965); Conradi v. Arnold, 34 Wash.2d 730, 209 P.2d 491 (1949); Cordes v. Guy Inv. Co., 146 Wash. 143, 262 P. 131 (1927). While it is true this lease did not contain an express coven......
  • Feigenbaum v. Brink
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • April 29, 1965
    ...part of the landlord to repair. Hughes v. Chehalis School Dist. No. 302, 61 Wash.2d 222, 377 P.2d 642 (1963); Conradi v. Arnold, 34 Wash.2d 730, 743 et seq., 209 P.2d 491 (1949). The tenant assumes the risk of apparent deficiencies in the leased In the instant case, the common walkway, alth......
  • Cherberg v. Peoples Nat. Bank of Washington, 2089--II
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • April 16, 1976
    ...under no duty to make repairs to the demised premises, even if they become defective through decay or deterioration. Conradi v. Arnold, 34 Wash.2d 730, 209 P.2d 491 (1949); Clarke v. Yukon Invest. Co., 83 Wash. 485, 145 P. 624 (1915); 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 774 (1970); 1 America......
  • Teglo v. Porter
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • February 25, 1965
    ...Flannery v. Nelson, 59 Wash.2d 120, 366 P.2d 329 (1961); Bidlake v. Youell, Inc., 51 Wash.2d 59, 315 P.2d 644 (1957); Conradi v. Arnold, 34 Wash.2d 730, 209 P.2d 491 (1949); Howard v. Washington Water Power Co., 75 Wash. 255, 134 P. 927, 52 L.R.A.,N.S., 578 To this general rule certain modi......
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