Conradi v. Boone

Decision Date15 September 1970
Docket NumberCiv. No. 3-881-D.
Citation316 F. Supp. 918
PartiesDonald O. CONRADI and Gwen Conradi, Plaintiffs, v. Larry F. BOONE et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

George E. Wright, Fort Madison, Iowa and James R. Bettenburg, St. Paul, Minn., for plaintiffs.

Thomas F. Daley, Jr., Davenport, Iowa, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STEPHENSON, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of the defendants, Larry F. Boone, Leiman-Scott, Inc., and Western Auto Rentals, to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. An oral hearing on this matter was held on May 26, 1970.

This lawsuit arises out of an automobile accident in Henry County, Iowa, on March 7, 1966. By their complaint filed on October 27, 1969, plaintiffs, husband and wife, and residents of Minnesota, seek damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in the aforementioned accident from defendants, two of whom are from Illinois and the other from Colorado. None of the parties to this action are residents of Iowa.

The defendants have moved to dismiss this action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The thrust of defendants' contention is that plaintiff's right of recovery, if any, is barred by the Iowa statute of limitations. Iowa Code Annotated § 614.1, limits actions for damages for personal injury to two years. Plaintiffs resist this motion on the ground that the doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes defendants from interposing the statute of limitations as a bar to their recovery. In connection with this claim, plaintiffs, by affidavit, point to a series of negotiations and other transactions between themselves and the Allstate Insurance Company, the bulk of which were conducted in the State of Minnesota. The Allstate Insurance Company, insurer of one of the defendants herein, allegedly caused plaintiffs to believe that a prompt settlement would be made of their claim, and for this reason, continuously dissuaded them from securing the services of an attorney. Plaintiffs contend that this alleged conduct of the insurer estops defendants from asserting or raising the statute of limitations as a defense. Since matters outside the pleadings in the form of affidavits and depositions have been taken into account by this Court, defendants' motion to dismiss is regarded as one for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).

This Court has before it a tort case involving multistate facts in which federal jurisdiction is premised upon diversity of citizenship. In such a case, this Court is to apply the law of the State under the rule of Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 67, 68, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). The presence of multistate facts, however, requires this Court to determine the State whose law should guide it in resolving the issues presented. In making this determination this Court recognizes, and will be bound by, the well-established principle that a federal court must follow the conflicts of law rules of the state in which it is sitting. Klaxon Company v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941), accord, Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 628, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964). Hence, to determine the state whose law is dispositive, this Court looks to the Iowa conflicts of law rules.

The first issue to be resolved concerns itself with the applicable statute of limitations. There is no doubt but that here, the Iowa statutes of limitation are controlling. Barrett v. Burt, 250 F.Supp. 904, 905 (S.D. Iowa 1966). That is, the Iowa conflicts rule calls for the application of its own limitation. See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Company, 345 U.S. 514, 73 S.Ct. 856, 97 L.Ed. 1211 (1953); Burkhardt v. Bates, 191 F.Supp. 149 (N.D. Iowa 1961); Restatement of Conflict of Law, § 603 (1934).

The second issue of importance relates to the applicable substantive law. The Supreme Court of Iowa has held that the law of the place of the wrong shall not invariably control the substantive rights and liabilities arising out of a tortious occurrence. See Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 278-279, 132 N. W.2d 410, 416; Flogel v. Flogel, 257 Iowa 547, 548-551, 133 N.W.2d 907, 908-910; and Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N. W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968). This is the view of the American Law Institute as announced in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, Tentative Draft No. 9, § 379. These decisions recognize that there are situations in which jurisdictions other than the one where a tort occurs have interests in the resolution of particular issues. To accommodate this view, the Iowa courts have adopted the rule of most significant relationships as articulated in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N. Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279, 95 A.L.R.2d 1 (1963), Noted 49 Iowa L.Rev. 934 (1964). This rule requires that the substantive rights and liabilities arising out of a tortious occurrence be determinable by the law of the jurisdiction which has the most substantial number of contacts with the litigants and the matter in dispute. This Court then, must compare the relative contacts and interests in this litigation vis-a-vis the issues presented; it must determine how much interest it has in applying Iowa law rather than that of Minnesota, Illinois or Colorado.

Applying these tests to the factual situation here, it is obvious that neither Illinois nor Colorado, the residence of the defendants, have any significant relationship with the parties nor any issue herein presented which would compel the application by this Court of either Illinois or Colorado law. Minnesota, the residence of plaintiffs, is the scene of the alleged negotiations between plaintiffs and the Allstate Insurance Company which gives rise to the claim of equitable estoppel. While the relationship which that state bears to these issues cannot...

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4 cases
  • Beeck v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 16 Mayo 1984
    ...224 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 1974); L & W Construction Co. v. Kinser, 251 Iowa 56, 66, 99 N.W.2d 276, 282 (1959); Conradi v. Boone, 316 F.Supp. 918, 920 (S.D.Iowa 1970). In its opinion in the Beecks' litigation the federal district court considered the possibility of a fraud case against the t......
  • Sedco Intern., SA v. Cory
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa
    • 21 Agosto 1981
    ...v. Smith, 185 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Iowa 1971); cf. Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); Bankord v. DeRoch, supra; Conradi v. Boone, 316 F.Supp. 918 (S.D. Iowa 1970); Restatement (Second) of Conflicts (1971). This rule does, however, have its limitations, as will be A. Sedco's "standing......
  • Lehman v. Humphrey Cayman, Ltd.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • 19 Julio 1983
    ...Iowa has adopted the "most significant relationship" approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Conradi v. Boone, 316 F.Supp. 918, 920 (S.D.Iowa 1970); Cole v. State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters, 296 N.W.2d 779, 781 (Iowa 1980); Zeman v. Canton State Bank, 211 N.W.2d at......
  • Melhorn v. Amrep Corporation
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • 19 Abril 1974
    ...must "lull" the plaintiff into not timely pursuing his legal rights. Glus, supra; Scarborough, supra. See generally, Conradi v. Boone, 316 F.Supp. 918 (S.D.Iowa 1970). It follows that there cannot be estoppel by inference. Mescall v. W. T. Grant Co., 133 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1943). The plaint......

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