Conroy v. City of Philadelphia
| Decision Date | 15 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 03-4240.,Civ.A. 03-4240. |
| Citation | 421 F.Supp.2d 879 |
| Parties | Lisa CONROY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA and Philadelphia Police Department, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Faye Riva Cohen, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.
Daniel L. Garry, City of Philadelphia Law Department, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.
In or about August 2002, plaintiff Lisa Conroy filed a Charge of Discrimination against the City of Philadelphia ("City") and the Philadelphia Police Department with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging sex-based discrimination. In April 2003, the EEOC issued Ms. Conroy a right-to-sue letter.1 Ms. Conroy then initiated this action by filing a pro se complaint in July 2003 against the City and the Philadelphia Police Department. In March 2005, the Philadelphia Police Department was dismissed as a defendant. In April 2005, Ms. Conroy, represented by counsel, filed an amended complaint against the City, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ("State"), the Pennsylvania State Police ("State Police"), and the Municipal Police Officers' Education and Training Commission ("MPOETC" or "Commission"). The amended complaint alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as well as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and adds a state tort claim.
On May 2, 2005, the City filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Conroy's amended complaint. On August 19, 2005, the State, State Police, and Commission (collectively "Commonwealth defendants") also filed a motion to dismiss. Those two motions, and Ms. Conroy's responses, are presently before this court.
Ms. Conroy's amended complaint makes the following allegations, which must be accepted as true in deciding defendants' motions to dismiss: Ms. Conroy applied for a position as a police officer with the City of Philadelphia's Police Department. On October 12, 2001, she was accepted into a training program ("Police Academy") operated by the Philadelphia Police Department as a recruit.
On June 6, 2002, she was dismissed from the Police Academy because she failed a required portion of the standard physical fitness examination—the "sit-and-reach" flexibility test. Ms. Conroy contends that she passed all other portions of the examination, and that her failure of the sit-andreach test was the only factor leading to her dismissal.
Ms. Conroy alleges that "the standards to pass the sit-and-reach test were higher for women than for men."2 In addition, she argues that the sit-and-reach test is not predictive of job performance, and states that the test was subsequently removed as a requirement for police recruits. Amended Complaint ("Am.Complaint") ¶¶ 25-26. Finally, Ms. Conroy alleges that while other "Police Officer Recruits who failed aspects of the physical examination were offered the opportunity to retest, no such opportunity was offered to Plaintiff or, to the best of Plaintiffs knowledge and belief, to other failing female Police Officers Recruits." Id. ¶ 34.
Upon plaintiffs dismissal from the Police Academy, Lieutenant Christopher Boyle of the Academy allegedly suggested to Ms. Conroy that she should find a job more suitable for a female. Am. Complaint ¶ 27. Ms. Conroy was subsequently offered a position as a Correctional Officer, a position she says "entail[s] a significantly lower rate of pay and prestige than that of a Police Officer." She states that "compelled by financial need, [she] accepted the position." Id. ¶ 23.
The first count of Ms. Conroy's amended complaint contends that the sit-and-reach portion of the examination was non-predictive of job performance, unlawfully discriminatory against women, and therefore improper. She contends that her resulting termination was unlawful and constituted denial of equal protection, resulting in significant loss of income and earning potential. Ms. Conroy also contends that the defendants'"actions were malicious, intentional, and willful and were done with deliberate indifference" to her rights, causing her "embarrassment, public humiliation, damage to her personal and professional reputation, and loss of respect among her class members." Am. Complaint ¶¶ 38-39. The City of Philadelphia's motion to dismiss characterizes this as a Fourteenth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In light of Ms. Conroy's complaint to the EEOC, I presume this is also intended as a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
In count two, Ms. Conroy reiterates these allegations but adds a conspiracy element and cites 42 U.S.C. § 1985. See Am. Complaint ¶¶ 41-42. I understand this to be a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
In count three, Ms. Conroy alleges that the defendants "knew or should have known of the violations of [her] constitutional rights" and "had the power and/or authority to prevent" these violations. She then restates the claim that the defendants' actions were "malicious, intentional, and willful" and done with "deliberate indifference," and restates her alleged pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses. Am. Complaint ¶¶ 46-49. This appears to be a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
The fourth count of Ms. Conroy's amended complaint asserts that defendants' conduct violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985,1986. This count essentially restates allegations contained in the first, second, and third counts. Ms. Conroy also reiterates the alleged comment by Lieutenant Christopher Boyle. Am. Complaint ¶¶ 51-55.
Finally, Ms. Conroy's fifth count makes a state tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Am. Complaint ¶¶ 57-60.
As to the relief sought, Ms. Conroy requests "full reinstatement as a Police Officer with the Philadelphia Police Department3 or, in the alternative ... readmi[ssion] to the Philadelphia Police Academy." Am. Complaint at 7-8. Ms. Conroy also seeks categories of damages, without elaboration, as follows: "frontpay, if appropriate; ... backpay, if appropriate; ... [compensation] for the wages and benefits of employment lost due to Defendant's unlawful conduct; . . . compensatory damages for future pecuniary losses, pain and suffering, convenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses as allowable." Id. at 8. Finally, Ms. Conroy seeks punitive damages, as well as interest, costs, fees, and expenses. Id.
Ms. Conroy now voluntarily withdraws Count V of her amended complaint—the state tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress—as to the City of Philadelphia, as well as her claim of punitive damages against the City of Philadelphia. In light of the State's sovereign immunity, Ms. Conroy also voluntarily withdraws her 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 claims against the Commonwealth defendants.
First, defendant City of Philadelphia ("City") argues that Ms. Conroy has failed to state any claim against the City. See City's Mot. to Dismiss ("MTD") at 2; Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). The City contends that it was required by the State to administer the sit-and-reach test and to reject any recruits who failed the examination. The City maintains that the State has sole responsibility for setting the standards, which led to the rejection of Ms. Conroy, and therefore Ms. Conroy's claims are only properly made against the State.
Second—if its first argument does not prevail—the City advances the narrower contention that Ms. Conroy's 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claims are based on overly vague and conclusory allegations, and should be dismissed for failure to state a conspiracy claim.
While I agree with the City's second argument and therefore will dismiss Ms. Conroy's § 1985(3) and § 1986 claims, I reject the City's first argument and conclude that dismissal of Ms. Conroy's Title VII and § 1983 claims against the City would be improper.
Ms. Conroy's amended complaint takes issue with the use of the sit-and-reach test on the ground that it is not job predictive, and impliedly contests the legality of the age-and gender-specific standards used to determine if one has passed the test. See Am. Complaint ¶¶ 25-26. Examination of relevant statutes and regulations supports the City's position that it was required to comply with the State's minimum training qualifications for police officers and to apply the State's minimum standards for physical fitness. However, the City has not shown where it is that the State officially set forth the specific requirement under which Ms. Conroy was dismissed. Moreover, as explained infra, even if the City's actions were compelled by the State's rules, the City would not be immunized from suit.
Ms. Conroy may also have a claim against the City if the test was improperly applied to her—that is, if the City conducted the process in a gender-discriminatory fashion in refusing to let her retake the sit-and-reach portion of the test. See Am. Complaint ¶ 34 (). It is not clear that the City was required to reject Ms. Conroy without giving her another opportunity to pass the sit-and-reach test.
The Municipal Police Education and Training Act, 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 2161 et seq. (Pennsylvania Act 120), provides that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Municipal Police Officers' Education and Training Commission must establish a training program for all municipal police officers. See 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 2161.4 The Commission is further tasked with promulgating minimum training qualifications, including mandatory minimum standards for physical fitness. See 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 2164(1), (8), (14).5
Under 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 2167(a), all...
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