Consedine v. Portville Cent. School

• Decision Date: 07 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. 30,30
• Citation: 907 N.E.2d 684,12 N.Y.3d 286
• Parties: John R. CONSEDINE, Respondent, v. PORTVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

907 N.E.2d 684

12 N.Y.3d 286

John R. CONSEDINE, Respondent, v. PORTVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants.

No. 30

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 7, 2009.

Hodgson Russ LLP, Buffalo (Hugh M. Russ, III, and Julia M. Hilliker of counsel), for appellants.

Office of General Counsel, School Administrators Association of New York State, Latham (John F. Kershko and Arthur

P. Scheuermann of counsel), for respondent.

Jay Worona, Latham, and Kimberly A. Fanniff, for New York State School Boards Association, Inc., amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JONES, J.

This appeal requires us to determine: (1) whether a school district can waive its statutory right to discharge a probationary school administrator at any time during the three-year probationary term (see Education Law § 3012[1][b]) by entering into a durational, three-year employment contract; and (2) if so, whether defendant Portville Central School District in fact waived that statutory right by executing the contract at issue here. We conclude that the first question should be answered in the affirmative, but hold, under the facts and circumstances of this case, that defendant school district did not waive its statutory right under section 3012(1)(b).

In 2002, defendant school district created a new assistant principal position and appointed plaintiff, a tenured teacher in another school district, to the post for a probationary period of three years (January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2005). In December 2002, plaintiff and defendant school district executed an employment contract, which, in relevant part, stated, "[t]he District shall pay [plaintiff] for his services an annual salary of $52,000[,] for the period of January 1, 2003 through December 31, 200[5]." In accordance with the foregoing, plaintiff began working as an assistant principal within the school district. Approximately six months later (in July 2003), defendant school district, citing budget constraints, eliminated plaintiffs assistant principal position and advised him that he would not be working in that capacity in the fall.

After serving a notice of claim, plaintiff commenced this breach of contract action against defendants seeking damages. Motion practice not relevant to resolution of this appeal ensued. After defendants answered, plaintiff moved (1) for summary judgment on his cause of action, (2) to dismiss defendants' defenses and (3) for sanctions. Defendants likewise moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint. Supreme Court denied the motions and ruled that a trial must be held to determine the intent of the parties.

After a bench trial, Supreme Court ruled that the employment contract was unambiguous, rendered judgment in plaintiff's favor and awarded him damages. The court stated, "as a matter of law, ... the employment agreement between the parties is a contract for a three year period of employment beginning January 1, 2003 and ending on December 31, 2005." Further, the court stated, "notwithstanding Education Law § 3012, nothing prevented the [B]oard from extending plaintiff a three year contract ... [A] school district is free to offer an administrator a three year probationary contract which cannot be terminated until the three years is over, and that is what occurred here." Supreme Court alternatively ruled that "[e]ven if the court could not make this determination as a matter of law, the verdict would be the same" because "the extrinsic evidence here demonstrates that a three year period was intended." The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion (49 A.D.3d 1290, 852 N.Y.S.2d 886 [2008]). This Court granted defendants leave to appeal (10 N.Y.3d 925, 862 N.Y.S.2d 328, 892 N.E.2d 394 [2008]), and we now reverse.

On appeal to this Court, defendants contend that plaintiff cannot maintain a breach of contract claim because Education Law § 3012(1)(b) expressly prohibits a school district from entering a contract guaranteeing a nontenured administrator employment for a certain duration. Defendants further argue that even if no statutory prohibition existed, the contract at issue does not guarantee plaintiff employment for a set duration. In their view, the contract merely established the terms and conditions of plaintiff's probationary appointment. Countering defendants, plaintiff argues, in spite of the elimination of his position due to budget constraints, that defendant school district must pay plaintiff's annual salary for the specified three year period because the contract, by its plain terms, clearly and unambiguously accords plaintiff the right to such payments.

The current version of Education Law § 3012(1)(b), enacted in 1975, provides:

"Principals, administrators, supervisors and all other members of the supervising staff of school districts ... shall be appointed by the board of education ... upon the recommendation of the superintendent of schools for a probationary period of three years.¹ The service of a person appointed to any of such positions may be discontinued at any time during the probationary period on the recommendation of the superintendent of schools, by a majority vote of the board of education."

In construing a statute,

"[t]he primary consideration of courts ... is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. Of course, the words of the statute are the best evidence of the Legislature's intent. As a general rule, unambiguous language of a statute is alone determinative. Nevertheless, the legislative history of an enactment may also be relevant and is not to be ignored, even if words be clear. When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no rule of law which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on superficial examination. Pertinent also are the history of the times, the circumstances surrounding the statute's passage, and ... attempted amendments. Varying concerns may bear on the weight to be given legislative history, but they do not justify abandoning this Court's long tradition of using all available interpretive tools to ascertain the meaning of a statute" (Riley v. County of Broome, 95 N.Y.2d 455, 463-464, 719 N.Y.S.2d 623, 742 N.E.2d 98 [2000] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d 577, 583, 673 N.Y.S.2d 966, 696 N.E.2d 978 [1998]).

Although the language of Education Law § 3012(1)(b) plainly states that the service of an appointed school administrator may be discontinued by a board of education at any time during his or her probationary period, it does not, as defendants argue, expressly prohibit a board of education from entering into a durational, three-year employment contract with a probationary school administrator. Nor does the legislative history of section 3012(1)(b) clearly indicate whether the Legislature intended to allow boards of education to (1) enter into durational contracts during the three-year probationary term or (2) waive their statutory right to discontinue a probationary appointee's service during the probationary term for any reason or no reason.

The legislative history of Education Law § 3012(1)(b) primarily addresses whether school principals, administrators and supervisory personnel should have tenure. Prior to 1971, teachers, principals and other supervisors had the same tenure rights. Between 1971 and 1975, the Legislature, in an attempt to replace the tenure system, amended the statute three times (see L. 1971, ch. 116 [boards of education no longer authorized to grant tenure to school administrators]; L. 1972, ch. 953, § 3 [boards of education have discretion to enter into employment contracts "with any principal, supervisor, or member of the supervising staff for a period of from one to five years"]; L. 1974, ch. 952 [boards of education required to enter into employment contracts with administrative and supervisory personnel (other than superintendents) for one to three years for the first three years of employment in the position and from three to five years thereafter]).

In 1975, Education Law § 3012(1)(b) was amended to its current version (see L. 1975, ch. 468, § 3). These amendments marked the removal of the language relating to employment contracts (id.) and reinstated a tenure-based system. Beyond the general objective of restoring tenure, there is nothing (such as a memorandum from an Assembly or Senate sponsor) to indicate any other legislative purpose of these amendments (see Bill Jacket, L. 1975, ch. 468). Stated differently, from the legislative history of the 1975 amendments, we cannot glean a clear legislative intent to prohibit school boards and districts from entering durational employment contracts with nontenured, probationary school administrators or supervisors.

After the Legislature adopted the 1975 amendments, the Commissioner of Education issued several decisions stating that Education Law § 3012(1)(b)—and statutes with identical language pertaining to city school districts—only authorized school boards and districts to contract for terms of employment, not employment for a specific duration (see Matter of Charland, 32 Ed. Dept. Rep. 291, 294 [1992;] Matter of Savino, 18 Ed. Dept. Rep. 485 [1979]; Matter of Hoffman, 18 Ed. Dept. Rep. 466, 468 [1979]). However, we do not view the Commissioner's decisions as persuasive because (1) the text and legislative history of section 3012(1)(b) do not clearly support the Commissioner's conclusions and (2) they either do not reference and/or are inconsistent with this Court's relevant precedent construing other Education Law provisions (see e.g. Matter of Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Assn., 40 N.Y.2d 774, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53, 358 N.E.2d 878 [1976]; Matter of Candor Cent. School Dist. [Candor Teachers Assn.], 42 N.Y.S.2d 266, 397 N.Y.S.2d 737, 366 N.E.2d 826 [1977]).

In Cohoes, we stated that "[w]hile a [school] board...