Conservatorship of Johnson

• Decision Date: 30 September 1991
• Citation: 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 46,235 Cal.App.3d 693
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The CONSERVATORSHIP OF the Person and Estate of Linda JOHNSON. John F. CODY, as Public Guardian, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. Linda JOHNSON, Objector and Appellant. Civ. C009527.

Page 46

1 Cal.Rptr.2d 46

235 Cal.App.3d 693

The CONSERVATORSHIP OF the Person and Estate of Linda JOHNSON John F. CODY, as Public Guardian, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. Linda JOHNSON, Objector and Appellant.

Civ. C009527.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Sept. 30, 1991.

Certified for Partial Publication ^*

Nielsen & Tustin, Karen Tustin, Placerville, for objector and appellant.

David E. Whittington, County Counsel, and Bruce A. Kimzey, Deputy County Counsel, Placerville, for petitioner and respondent.

SCOTLAND, Associate Justice.

Linda Johnson appeals from the order reappointing the Public Guardian of El Dorado County as conservator of her person and estate under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act). (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 5000, et seq.; further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.) She contends (1) the evidence does not support the finding of grave disability; (2) the trial court erred by failing to consider alternatives to conservatorship; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to justify the placement power granted to the Public Guardian and the special disabilities imposed upon appellant. ¹ We shall affirm the judgment (order of reappointment). ²

DISCUSSION

I

A conservatorship may be established under the LPS Act for any person who is gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder. (§ 5350.) "Gravely disabled" is defined as a condition in which, as a result of a mental disorder, a person is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing or shelter. (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1).)

Appellant concedes the trial court did not err in finding that she suffers from a mental disorder. However, she claims the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that she is gravely disabled as a result of this mental disorder. We disagree.

Grave disability must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to establish and to renew LPS conservatorships. (Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 225-226, 152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1; Conservatorship of Pollock (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1406, 1411, 257 Cal.Rptr. 14.) On review, we apply the substantial evidence test to determine whether the record supports a finding of grave disability. (Conservatorship of Walker (1989) 206 Cal.App.3d 1572, 1577, 254 Cal.Rptr. 552.) The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support the trial court's finding. (In re Marriage of Scherr (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 314, 320, 222 Cal.Rptr. 872; 9 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 282, p. 293.)

Dr. Stanley Wang, chief psychiatrist for the county psychiatric health facility (PHF), testified regarding appellant's psychiatric history, including 11 involuntary admissions to PHF over the two and one-half year period between February 1988 and the time of trial in August 1990. During her initial hospitalization, appellant was diagnosed as suffering from an acute adjustment disorder in reaction to the breakup of her relationship with her boyfriend, David. At that time, she was hallucinating and reported hearing David's voice commanding her to commit suicide. Each subsequent admission to PHF related to the same condition, with appellant's pathology becoming more serious in nature, causing Dr. Wang to conclude that appellant was not merely suffering from a simple adjustment disorder but had sustained a "major psychotic breakdown." He amended his diagnosis to "schizophrenia with several depressive features [of] suicidal proportion."

In November 1989, appellant was admitted to PHF after a nearly successful suicide attempt. While Dr. Wang believed appellant no longer was suicidal at the time of trial, he had observed no improvement in her condition with respect to her emotional maturity and her ability to cope, make logical decisions and defer gratification. He testified that appellant displayed no insight into these problems or her need for psychiatric treatment, noting that she had a history of noncompliance with taking medications prescribed for her mental illness after being released from treatment facilities. Dr. Wang concluded that appellant's mental disorder made her incapable of caring for her own food, shelter and clothing.

Dr. Wang was qualified to render an opinion on the issue. Although he was not appellant's attending psychiatrist at the time of trial, he had treated her during her previous admissions to PHF and was familiar with her history. Dr. Wang was the psychiatrist who originally recommended that an LPS conservatorship be established for appellant, and he had submitted a declaration in support of the initial reestablishment petition filed by the conservator. Moreover, Dr. Wang personally examined appellant the day before trial and found no substantial improvement in her condition which had prompted his initial conservatorship recommendation. Appellant called no expert witness to controvert the testimony of Dr. Wang on the issue of grave disability, nor did she attack his conclusion during cross-examination. Accordingly, we conclude that Dr. Wang's testimony is sufficient to support the trial court's finding of grave disability. ³ (Cf. In re Marriage of Scherr, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at p. 320, 222 Cal.Rptr. 872.)

Nevertheless, citing section 5350, subdivision (e), appellant contends the gravely disabled finding cannot be sustained because appellant's mother was "willing and able to assist [appellant] in meeting her personal needs." We disagree.

Section 5350, subdivision (e)(1), provides: "[A] person is not 'gravely disabled' if that person can survive safely without involuntary detention with the help of responsible family, friends, or others who are both willing and able to help provide for the person's basic personal needs for food, clothing and shelter."

Appellant's mother, Sarah Cornelius, testified she was willing to provide a home for appellant, to care for her, and to see that she obtained appropriate therapy and took the medication prescribed to treat her psychiatric condition. However, despite Ms. Cornelius' laudable intentions, there was substantial evidence to support a conclusion that the assistance she offered fell short of that required under section 5350, subdivision (e)(1). As the trial court observed, appellant's condition was "beyond an ordinary person's ability to deal with, ... [requiring] expert assistance...." Dr. Wang testified that the most appropriate placement for appellant was a locked psychiatric facility due to her need for a "structured place that has [a] high level of professional staffing ... [and] supervision." Any less restrictive placement was rejected by Dr. Wang as unsuitable.

Considering the evidence, the trial court reasonably could conclude that, even with the best of intentions, Cornelius would be unable to provide the type of structured environment appellant required. Cornelius had six other children in the home and was employed four days a week. While she testified that a friend would care for appellant when Cornelius was at work, there was no evidence this person was qualified to assume such a responsibility. Moreover, Cornelius' ability to ensure her daughter's participation in treatment is questionable given appellant's lack of insight into her condition. Even as a patient in a locked facility, appellant refused to participate actively in the therapy offered...