Conservatorship Of The Estate Of Robert Baird Moor v. State Of Miss.
| Decision Date | 02 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2009-CA-01077-COA,2009-CA-01077-COA |
| Parties | CONSERVATORSHIP OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT BAIRD MOOR, BY BETTY PEARSON MOOR, ROBERT BAIRD MOOR, JR., CO-CONSERVATORS, AND JANIE LOGAN MOOR, APPELLANTS v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, MISSISSIPPI WILDLIFE, FISHERIES AND PARKS; LEFLORE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; AND LEFLORE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, APPELLEES |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. J. DEWAYNE THOMAS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: DONALD W. BOYKIN
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: PETER W. CLEVELAND WILLIE JAMES PERKINS SR. JOYCE IVY CHILES LEM E. MONTGOMERY III DESHANDRA LALAYNE ROSS LEANN W. NEALEY KYLE VERNON MILLER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL-REAL PROPERTY
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: GRANTED S UMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' DECLARATORY-JUDGMENT ACTION CONCERNING THE TITLE TO THE FLOREWOOD PLANTATION STATE PARK
BEFORE LEE, P.J., ISHEE AND MAXWELL, JJ.
MAXWELL, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. In 1973, R.B. Moor, Charles H. Moor, and Marion M. Moor conveyed real property to the state, which promised to fulfill three conditions: to (1) utilize the property to construct a state park, (2) expend $2 million or more in constructing the park, and (3) begin construction before July 1, 1976. The state began construction of the Florewood River Plantation Park (Florewood Plantation) in 1974, spending more than $2 million on the project over the next decade. The state operated Florewood Plantation as a state park until 2005, when it leased the park to Leflore County based on the Legislature's 2004 authorization to close, transfer, lease, or sell. Aggrieved because the state is no longer operating Florewood Plantation, the successors of R.B., Charles, and Marion1 filed a declaratory action, seeking reversion based on the state's failures to (1) use the property as a state park and (2) spend $2 million in "construction."
¶2. In granting summary judgment and dismissing the Moors' claim, the chancellor declared the state owner of the property in fee simple, holding the 1973 deed contained no reversionary language and no requirement the state continue to use the property as a historical state park. The chancellor also found the state undisputedly had met all three deed conditions. On de novo review, we find the deed unambiguous. The deed did not require perpetual operation of a state park, and it did not limit the $2 million "construction" expenditures to buildings and fixtures. Therefore, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.
FACTS
¶3. In May 1973, R.B. Moor, Charles H. Moor, and Marion M. Moor entered an optionscontract with Leflore County to purchase more than 100 acres of real property for the purpose of building a state park or "Living Historical Plantation." In August 1973, trustees for the Leflore County School District purchased the property from R.B., Charles, and Marion. As part of the consideration, the school district agreed to the following three conditions in the warranty deed:
The above described property is conveyed to the grantees herein [1] subject to the condition that the said grantees or their successors in title utilize said property for the construction of a Historical Park, and [2] subject to the condition that $2,000, 000.00 or a greater sum, will be expended in constructing said Historical Park on the property herein conveyed, and [3] subject to the condition that said construction shall begin on or before July 1, 1976.
¶4. To further encourage timely construction of the historical park, the deed contained the following clause:
In the event construction is not begun on the Historical Park within the time specified, the grantors, their heirs or assigns, shall have the exclusive option to purchase said property for the sum of $750.00 per acre for a period of 120 days from the first breach of the foregoing conditions, which privilege shall be binding on the grantees, their successors or assigns, it being hereby agreed that the cash consideration to be paid hereunder in the event of breach of these conditions is substantially less than the present market value of said property and that the moving consideration is to aid in the construction of a Historical Park.
¶5. The school district later transferred the property to Leflore County, which in December 1973 transferred the property to the state (through Mississippi Parks Commission, now Mississippi Wildlife, Fisheries, and Parks). These later deeds transferring the property to the county and the state contained essentially the same three conditions about the park's construction.
¶6. The state began constructing Florewood Plantation before July 1, 1976. From 1974to 1985, the state spent more than $2 million on the park's site planning, museum buildings, museum exhibits, furniture, equipment, picnic area, and tram system.
¶7. The state operated the park for twenty years. But in 2004 the Legislature authorized Mississippi Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks to "close, transfer, lease or sell" Florewood Plantation. 2004 Miss. Laws H.B. 1741 § 21. So in 2005 the state leased the park to Leflore County.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶8. Upset by the state's leasing the property, the Moors2 filed for declaratory judgment against the State of Mississippi, Leflore County, and Leflore County School District (collectively, the state), claiming the deed's conditions "were not satisfied, or have otherwise ceased to exist." The Moors asked the chancery court to declare the property had reverted back to the Moors or, alternatively, grant the Moors the right to repurchase the property for $750 per acre.
¶9. On cross summary-judgment motions, the chancellor denied the Moors' motion and granted the state's, dismissing the Moors' declaratory-judgment action with prejudice and declaring the state fee-simple owner of the property. The Moors now appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10. We review summary-judgment motions de novo. Robinson v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 732 So. 2d 204, 207 (¶12) (Miss. 1999). "[A] motion for summary judgment is grantedonly when the trial court finds that the plaintiff would be unable to prove any facts to support his claim." Id. "On appeal, the lower court's decision is reversed only if it appears that triable issues of fact remain when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. An ambiguous contract raises questions of fact, making summary judgment inappropriate. Shelton v. Am. Ins. Co., 507 So. 2d 894, 896 (Miss. 1987) ().
DISCUSSION
¶11. The Moors argue the state violated the intended purpose of the property's transfer by failing to (1) continue to use the property as a historical state park and (2) expend $2 million on the park's buildings and fixtures. Our concern is not "what the parties may have meant or intended but what they said, for the language employed in a contract is the surest guide to what was intended." Williams v. Williams, 37 So. 3d 1196, 1200 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Ivison v. Ivison, 762 So. 2d 329, 335 (¶17) (Miss. 2000)); see Gordon v. McGee, 966 So. 2d 906, 908 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Rogers v. Morgan, 250 Miss. 9, 21, 164 So. 2d 480, 484 (1964)) ("[T]he intent of the parties [is] gathered from the plain and unambiguous language contained therein.").
¶12. We construe deeds like contracts, first looking to the "four corners" of the deed and the language the parties used to express their agreement. Williams, 37 So. 3d at 1200 (¶10); Martin v. Fly Timber Co., Inc., 825 So. 2d 691, 696 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). "When the language of the contract is clear or unambiguous, we must effectuate the parties' intent." Williams, 37 So. 3d at 1200 (¶10) (citing Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 349, 352 (Miss. 1990)). If the parties' intent is still uncertain, we next employ, with discretion, the canons of contract construction. Id. Then, if necessary, we consider parol or extrinsic evidence. Id.
¶13. We begin by looking to the "four corners" of the August 1973 warranty deed to the school district, the only deed signed by the R.B., Charles, and Marion. This deed extinguished, or merged, the provisions in the prior options contract. See Knight v. McCain, 531 So. 2d 590, 595 (Miss. 1988) (). We would only consider as parol evidence the provisions of the options contract or the two subsequent deeds from school district to county and county to state if we found the August 1973 deed ambiguous.
¶14. The Moors argued the intended purpose for transferring their property was for its use as a historical state park. Because the state no longer uses the property as a historical state park, but instead leases the property to the county, the Moors reasoned it should revert to them. Alternatively, they request the option to repurchase the property for $750 an acre. But the Moors asked the chancellor to enforce a restriction on the state's use of the property that cannot be found or inferred from the language of the deed.
¶15. "[T]here [can] be no reversion unless the grantor intended the deed should have that effect, and the deed so provided in plain terms[.]" Nicholson v. Myres, 170 Miss. 441, 449, 154 So. 282, 283 (1934). Similarly, "[r]estrictions intended to limit the use of property to a particular purpose should not be left to implication, but should be clearly defined and understood by the parties." Frederic v. Merchants & Marine Bank, 200 Miss. 755, 766, 28 So. 2d 843, 847 (1947). "In the absence of a reverter clause, a mere statement in a deed that the land is to be used for a specified purpose is merely a declaration of the purpose of the conveyance, and does not in any way limit the grant." Id. (citation omitted).
¶16. The Moors' deed had no reverter clause. There is no provision that the...
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