Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 2, Cleveland Cnty. v. Crowder

• Decision Date: 05 May 1925
• Docket Number: Case Number: 14849
• Citation: 111 Okla. 125,238 P. 405,1925 OK 342
• Parties: CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2, CLEVELAND COUNTY, v. CROWDER.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1925 OK 342

238 P. 405

111 Okla. 125

CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2, CLEVELAND COUNTY, v. CROWDER.

Case Number: 14849

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: May 5, 1925

Syllabus

¶0 Schools and School Districts -- Removal of Teachers--Causes--Statutes.

In the absence of an express agreement in a contract, entered into by a school board and a teacher, authorizing the board to remove the teacher for causes other than those expressed in the statute, and in such manner as the contract may provide, the board cannot remove the teacher except by acting in conjunction with the county superintendent, as provided by section 10367, Comp. St. 1921.

Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 3.

Error from County Court, Cleveland County: Geo. Allen, Judge.

Action by Ella Crowder against Consolidated School District No. 2, Cleveland County. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Ben F. WIlliams and John E. Luttrell, for plaintiff in error.

Thos. W. Mayfield, for defendant in error.

JONES, C.

¶1 This action was instituted by the defendant in error, as plaintiff, in the county court of Cleveland county, Okla., against the plaintiff in error, as defendant, to recover the sum of $ 400, which plaintiff alleges was due her under a written contract of employment as a school teacher for the defendant, school district No. 2, Cleveland county, state of Oklahoma.

¶2 Plaintiff alleges that she was employed to teach the school for a term of nine months at a salary of $ 1,200 for the term, and that after having taught six months she was arbitrarily discharged by the school board without legal cause or authority; that she has at all times been willing, ready, and able to perform her duty, and to have taught the remainder of the term, and that she is entitled to recover the sum sued for.

¶3 The defendant answered by a general denial, and on the trial of the case to the court and jury a verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff for the sum sued for, from which judgment the appellant prosecutes this appeal, and assigns as error the giving of certain instructions by the court to the jury, and in their brief call attention to instruction No. 6, wherein the jury was instructed:

"That to constitute a legal discharge said discharge would have to be made by the school board acting in conjunction with the county superintendent."

¶4 And the appellant contends that this mode of discharging a teacher, as provided by section 10367, Comp. St. 1921, is not the exclusive method by which a school board may discharge a teacher, and contends that the appellee was derelict in her duty as teacher and violated certain terms and provisions of the contract under which she was employed, other than the specific reason or conditions set forth in the statute, to wit, "incompetency, cruelty, negligence, and immorality," which authorize removal by the school board, and cites in support of this contention, School District v. olvin, 10 Kan. 283, wherein the Supreme Court of Kansas held that the board and teacher might enter into a contract specifying other conditions which would authorize the removal or discharge, other than the...