Consolidated Credit Corp. of Athens, Inc. v. Peppers, 54903

Decision Date05 December 1977
Docket NumberNo. 54903,No. 1,54903,1
Citation144 Ga.App. 401,240 S.E.2d 922
PartiesCONSOLIDATED CREDIT CORPORATION OF ATHENS, INC. v. Buddy PEPPERS et al
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Stanley R. Durden, Athens, for appellant.

Marcus B. Brown, Jr., Jane E. Ferguson, Gainesville, Charles M. Baird, Atlanta, for appellees.

W. Rhett Tanner, Atlanta, amicus curiae.

SHULMAN, Judge.

Appellant filed suit against appellees on a note governed by the Industrial Loan Act. Appellees failed to answer the suit and a default judgment issued against them. When appellant caused a levy to be made on certain personalty of appellees, a motion was made to set aside the judgment, claiming that appellant charged an excessive loan fee, making the loan usurious, and therefore void. This appeal is from the granting of that motion. We affirm.

The sole issue for our determination is the meaning of the phrase, " face amount of the contract" (hereinafter, FAC), as used in Code Ann. § 25-315(b). The phrase is used in subsections (a) and (b) of § 25-315, setting out permissible charges on loans governed by the Industrial Loan Act: "(a) Basic interest; advance discounts. Charge, contract for, receive and collect interest at a rate not to exceed eight per cent. per annum of the face amount of the contract, whether repayable in one single payment or repayable in monthly or other periodic installments. On loan contracts repayable in 18 months or less, the interest may be discounted in advance, and on contracts repayable over a greater period, the interest shall be added to the principal amount of the loan . . . (b) Fee for making loan. In addition thereto, charge, contract for, receive, or collect at the time the loan is made, a fee in an amount not greater than eight per cent. of the first $600 of the face amount of the contract, plus four per cent. of the excess: . . ."

Although subsection (a) expresses the authorized interest rate as a percentage of a computational base, the FAC, this court has required the use of different computational bases depending on the length of the note's term. Robbins v. Welfare Finance Corp., 95 Ga.App. 90, 95, 96 S.E.2d 892, involved a note repayable in 18 months. It was there held that the FAC was the total payback amount of the loan. Ten years later, in McDonald v. G.A.C. Finance Corp., 115 Ga.App. 361(2) 154 S.E.2d 825, involving a note repayable in more than 18 months, Judge Eberhardt refused to overturn Robbins. He also used the phrase "face amount of the contract" as meaning the total payback figure of the loan. However, he held that the computational base for calculating interest on the loan was the "principal amount," of the FAC exclusive of interest.

We have, therefore, the anomalous situation of a statute giving a single computational base for determining authorized interest and judicial decisions requiring the use of two different bases. There is, however, a definition of FAC provided in Robbins which resolves the tensions inherent in this situation, reconciles the holdings in Robbins and McDonald with each other and with the statute, and provides a basis for our decision in this case.

The Robbins court was faced with a case in which a borrower was contending that the note was usurious because interest was charged on the fees, the insurance premium and on the interest itself. The court approved the method used to compute the interest and held: "The contract is for not only the amount the debtor desires for his own use, but for the amount it is necessary for him to borrow in order to obtain what he needs for his own use." Id. 95 Ga.App. at 95, 96 S.E.2d at 895. Since the note was repayable in 18 months, the interest was discounted (see subsection (a) ), the effect of which was to lend the amount of the interest. The interest was therefore, to be included in "the amount it is necessary . . . to borrow."

In applying the above definition of FAC to the $984.00 note in McDonald, we look to see what the debtor had to borrow to get what he wanted. He wanted to obtain $627.48. To do so, he had to borrow an additional $220.80 to pay the fees and insurance premiums. "Since the lender is entitled to his fees for making the loan, and does not receive them at that time, but by means of instalment payments during the (term of the loan), he is entitled to charge interest thereon." Robbins, supra at 95, 96 S.E.2d at 896. The debtor, therefore, had to borrow $848.28 in order to obtain what he needed for his own use. For purposes of calculating interest, then, the FAC (as...

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22 cases
  • State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bates
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • June 30, 1982
    ...Inc. v. McDougal, 154 Ga.App. 820, 270 S.E.2d 40 (1980). In Financeamerica, the court refused to follow Consolidated Credit Corporation v. Peppers, 144 Ga.App. 401, 240 S.E.2d 922 (1977), insofar as it gave retroactive effect to the permissible charges on loans used in Ga.Code Ann. § In Che......
  • State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Sweat
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • March 11, 1982
    ...Services, 154 Ga.App. at 821, 270 S.E.2d 40. The issue in Financeamerica was the retroactive effect of Consolidated Credit Corp. v. Peppers, 144 Ga.App. 401, 240 S.E.2d 922 (1977); the court refused to give retroactive effect to Peppers. Peppers, it held, had overruled the tacit holdings of......
  • FinanceAmerica Corp. v. Drake
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • September 2, 1980
    ...amicus curiae. CARLEY, Judge. This case again presents for review the propriety of our decision in Consolidated Credit Corp. v. Peppers, 144 Ga.App. 401, 240 S.E.2d 922 (1977). The sole issue in that Industrial Loan Act (ILA) case was the meaning of the phrase "face amount of the contract" ......
  • Ector v. Southern Discount Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • August 1, 1979
    ...violated the Georgia Industrial Loan Act ("GILA"), 25 Ga.Code Ann. § 315. Plaintiff relies on Consolidated Credit Corporation v. Peppers, 144 Ga.App. 401, 240 S.E.2d 922 (1977), to support that contention. Under 25 Ga.Code Ann. § 315(b), a lender may charge a fee of eight percent on the fir......
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