Consolidated Engineering Co. v. Cooper, 501

Decision Date05 May 1967
Docket NumberNo. 501,501
Citation246 Md. 610,228 A.2d 823
PartiesCONSOLIDATED ENGINEERING CO., Inc., et al. v. Sullie W. COOPER.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Paul V. Niemeyer and Philip T. McCusker, Baltimore (Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants.

Maurice J. Pressman, Baltimore, for appellee.

Before HAMMOND, C.J., and HORNEY, MARBURY, BARNES, McWILLIAMS, and FINAN, JJ.

HORNEY, Judge.

A determination of the novel question presented by this case, 1 as to whether compensation for a serious disability is payable at the rate of forty dollars per week for the entire award or only for the so-called extra award, depends on the intention of the legislature in enacting § 36(3a) of Article 101 of the Code of 1957.

The facts are not in dispute. As the result of an injury on July 15, 1965, the claimant (Sullie W. Cooper) sustained a total loss of vision in his left eye. On March 29, 1966, the Workmen's Compensation Commission found that the claimant had been temporarily totally disabled until September 26, 1965, and directed the employer (Consolidated Engineering Company) and the insurer (Maryland Casualty Company) to pay the claimant permanent partial disability at the rate of $40 weekly, beginning as of September 27, 1965, for a period of 267 weeks.

The employer and insurer, claiming that the commission had misinterpreted the meaning of § 36(3a), appealed to the Baltimore City Court. There being no dispute as to the facts, the opposing parties filed motions for summary judgment. The lower court (Sklar, J.), in interpreting the subsection as had the commission, granted the motion of the claimant for summary judgment. And the employer and insurer appealed to this Court.

The appellants, contending that the decision of the lower court was erroneous, claim that the basic award of 200 weeks should be paid at the $25 rate provided in § 36(3)(a) and that only the extra award of 67 weeks allowed by § 36(3a) should be paid at the $40 rate-a total of $7680. The appellee, on the other hand, contends that the entire award of 267 weeks for a serious disability is payable at the rate of $40 per week-a total of $10,780.

In support of his position in the lower court, the claimant sought to introduce the testimony of certain members of the Workmen's Compensation Commission and the Governor's Study Commission on Workmen's Compensation as to the motive and intention of the legislature in enacting § 36(3a), but the lower court refused to receive such testimony as evidence. The claimant, claiming error, filed a cross-appeal. The employer and insurer, besides claiming that the cross-appeal was filed too late, contend that such evidence was inadmissible to show legislative intent.

The pertinent parts of § 36 of Article 101 provide-

'(3) Permanent Partial Disability- Specific injuries.-(a) In case of disability partial in character but permanent in quality, the compensation shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of the average weekly wages, in no case to exceed twenty-five dollars per week and not less than a minimum of fiteen dollars per week unless the employee's established weekly wages are less than fifteen dollars per week at the time of the injury, in which event he shall receive compensation equal to his full wages, but in no case to exceed twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500) in the aggregate and shall be paid to the employee for the period named in the schedule as follows:

'(b) * * *.

Eye-For the loss of an eye, two hundred weeks.

'(3a) Same-Same-Serious disability.-A person who receives under subsection (3) of this section an award for a period of one hundred and seventy-five weeks or more is thereby considered to have a serious disability. He automatically shall be entitled to (in addition to the award under subsection (3)) an extra award of a number of weeks equal to one third (computed to the nearest whole number) of the number of weeks awarded under subsection (3); and the award of compensation to him in no case shall exceed forty dollars per week; and as to him the maximum limitation of $12,500 shall not apply. This subsection, to the extent of any inconsistency, prevails over subsection (3); but otherwise subsection (3) applies to persons covered by this subsection. Provided, however, that any additional compensation for permanent partial disability on a petition to reopen shall not increase the amount of compensation previously awarded and paid.'

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9 cases
  • Smith v. Wakefield, LP, 28, Sept. Term, 2018
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 27 d3 Fevereiro d3 2019
    ...state legislature, the ultimate power to enact and amend such statutes rests with the General Assembly. Consolidated Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Cooper , 246 Md. 610, 615, 228 A.2d 823 (1967) ; Lickle v. Boone , 187 Md. 579, 585, 51 A.2d 162 (1947) ("This Court cannot enact legislation, but can only......
  • Supermarkets General Corp. v. State
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 24 d1 Dezembro d1 1979
    ...v. State, 281 Md. 217, 230, 378 A.2d 1326 (1977); Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 624, 366 A.2d 21 (1976); Consolidated Eng. Co. v. Cooper, 246 Md. 610, 615, 228 A.2d 823 (1967); McGowan v. State, 220 Md. 117, 124, 151 A.2d 156 (1959), Aff'd, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (19......
  • Stapleford Hall Joint Venture v. Hyatt, 126
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 1 d2 Setembro d2 1992
    ...241 A.2d 392 (1968); King Furniture v. Thompson, 248 Md. 682, 685-86, 238 A.2d 231, 232-33 (1968); Consolidated Engineering Co. v. Cooper, 246 Md. 610, 612 n. 1, 228 A.2d 823, 823 n. 1 (1967). The new sections followed the permanent partial disability sections, 36(3) (addressing specific in......
  • Smith v. Wakefield, LP
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 27 d3 Fevereiro d3 2019
    ...by the state legislature, the ultimate power to enact and amend such statutes rests with the General Assembly. Consolidated Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Cooper, 246 Md. 610, 615 (1967); Lickel v. Boone, 187 Md. 579, 585 (1947) ("This Court cannot enact legislation, but can onlyadminister justice acco......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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