Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Smith
| Decision Date | 30 April 1987 |
| Docket Number | Cause No. S85-89,S85-661 and S86-214. |
| Parties | CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORP., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Dennis SMITH, et al., Defendants. CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY CO., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LaPORTE, Defendant. CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY CO., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MICHIGAN CITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Harold Abrahamson, Hammond, Ind., for Consolidated Rail Corp., et al.
Donald E. Baugher, LaPorte, Ind., for Smith, et al.
Gilbert F. Blackmun, Leonard M. Holajter, Highland, Ind., Sally J. Kircher, Cleveland, Ohio, for Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.
Donald W. Pagos, Deputy City Atty., Michigan City, Ind., for the City of Michigan City.
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
The plaintiff railroad corporations' summary judgment motions in these actions present the common issue of whether federal law preempts municipal ordinances regulating train speeds within the Indiana cities of LaPorte and Michigan City, rendering the ordinances void under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. VI, Cl. 2. For convenience and economy of administration, this single memorandum addresses the identical legal issues raised in these three actions. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a).
The court concludes (1) that it has jurisdiction over these cases; (2) that in light of the nature of the challenges to the Ordinances, the plaintiffs need not exhaust their state remedies; (3) that abstention is not warranted; (4) that federal law preempts the field of train speed regulations so as to preclude any attempt by Indiana to delegate to municipalities the power to set train speed regulations; and (5) that, accordingly, the Ordinances are null and void.
Plaintiffs Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") and National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak") filed their original complaint in Cause No. S85-89 on January 29, 1985, naming as defendants three members of the City of LaPorte Board of Public Works.1 Conrail and Amtrak alleged that they run daily freight and passenger trains through the City of LaPorte.
In 1952, the City of LaPorte enacted an ordinance that provided, "It shall be unlawful for any person to run a locomotive or steam railway car at a greater speed than fifteen miles per hour within the city." City of LaPorte's Municipal Ordinance section 17-2. In letters to Conrail from the LaPorte City Attorney on March 6, 1984 and April 2, 1984, LaPorte announced intent to enforce section 17-2.
Conrail and Amtrak assert that federal regulations2 that address train speed limits would allow them to travel at much greater speeds through LaPorte. The railroads assert that the federal regulations preempt municipal train speed ordinances, and that these ordinances unduly burden interstate commerce. The railroads seek a declaratory judgment that the local ordinances are unconstitutional and injunctive relief against their enforcement.
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the LaPorte Common Council had repealed Municipal Ordinance section 17-2 on March 4, 1985 by Ordinance 1742, which provided in section 2 that:
The LaPorte officials further stated that Conrail and Amtrak had petitioned the Indiana Public Service Commission to challenge Ordinance 1742, pursuant to IND. CODE § 8-3-20-3. These facts, the LaPorte officials asserted, rendered the railroads' lawsuit moot.
Plaintiff Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co. (hereafter referred to as "Chessie") filed its complaint in Cause No. S85-611 on November 18, 1985 against LaPorte. Chessie alleged that it operated trains through LaPorte, and asserted that the Supremacy Clause rendered LaPorte Ordinance 1742 unconstitutional. Chessie requested a declaratory judgment to that effect and an injunction against the enforcement of Ordinance 1742. Chessie further asserted that it had submitted the issue of the ordinance's constitutionality to the Indiana Public Service Commission, which had issued an order on October 28, 1985 stating that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of IND. CODE §§ 8-3-20-1 to 8-3-20-3, but that the Commission would address the ordinance's reasonableness.
On December 10, 1985, Conrail and Amtrak moved for leave to amend their complaint to avoid mootness by renewing their arguments against Ordinance 1742. The proposed amended complaint alleged that the Indiana Public Service Commission had postponed its review indefinitely. In their supporting brief, Conrail and Amtrak asserted that the matter was not moot because it was capable of repetition, and that the action should not be dismissed or stayed under any abstention principles.
The court held a joint status conference in Cause Nos. S85-89 and S85-611 on February 20, 1986. At the close of the conference, the court granted Conrail and Amtrak's motion for leave to amend their complaint and ordered the actions consolidated under Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a).
The court also notified the Attorney General of the State of Indiana of the pendency of these actions in light of Chessie's attack on the constitutionality of IND.CODE §§ 8-3-20-1 to 8-3-20-3. On April 9, 1986, William E. Daily, Chief Counsel for the Indiana Attorney General's Office, informed the court that his office would not exercise its right to be heard in this matter despite Chessie's challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute.
Following the status conference, the LaPorte officials moved to dismiss the consolidated actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As Chessie had alleged, an administrative law judge for the Commission ruled on October 28, 1985 that he lacked authority to rule on the constitutionality of the state statute and local ordinances, but that he could address the ordinances' reasonableness under IND.CODE § 8-3-20-3. On December 4, 1985, the administrative law judge granted Conrail's motion for an indefinite continuance of the matter. Conrail petitioned the Commission for a review of its administrative law judge's order, arguing that the Commission had authority to address the preemption issue. On February 19, 1986, the Commission affirmed the administrative law judge's order in all respects, holding that under Sunshine Promotions, Inc. v. Ridlen, 483 N.E.2d 761 (Ind.App.1985), the Commission lacked authority to address the constitutional issue. On February 19, 1986, the Commission issued an appeal order affirming its administrative law judge's ruling.
Conrail, Amtrak and Chessie moved for summary judgment. Conrail and Amtrak contend that Ordinance 1742 is unconstitutional because it is preempted by federal statutes and regulations and because it places an undue burden on interstate commerce. Chessie attacks both Ordinance 1742 and IND.CODE § 8-3-20-1 et seq., claiming that federal statutes and regulations preempt both the ordinance and the statute.
In its response to the LaPorte officials' dismissal motion, Chessie contends that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply to this action and that abstention is unwarranted.
The LaPorte officials have filed no response to the summary judgment motions. District Rule 9(b) subjects the motions to summary ruling.
Chessie filed its complaint in Cause No. S86-214 on April 9, 1986, naming the City of Michigan City, Indiana as the defendant and alleging that section 97.05 of the 1980 Municipal Code of the City of Michigan City, Indiana is unconstitutional. Section 97.05 provides:
No person shall operate any locomotive engine, electric engine, railroad, or interurban passenger car or train, or any freight car or train of any kind or description upon any railroad track, interurban track, switch track, or siding within the city at a speed greater than 25 miles per hour.
Chessie maintains that federal regulations would allow its freight trains to travel at fifty miles per hour, and its passenger trains to travel at sixty miles per hour, through Michigan City. Chessie asserts that federal statutes and regulations preempt Michigan City's Municipal Ordinance section 97.05. Chessie seeks a declaratory judgment to that effect and an injunction against enforcement of section 97.05.
Michigan City answered with admissions and denials. Chessie has moved for summary judgment, asserting the same arguments as it did against LaPorte. Michigan City filed no response to Chessie's motion, subjecting it to summary judgment. District Rule 9(b).
The LaPorte officials rely upon two arguments. First, they contend that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies bars these suits. According to the LaPorte officials, the matter pends with the Indiana Public Service Commission; the federal action should not be allowed to proceed until Conrail exhausts its remedies with the Indiana Public Service Commission. Second, the LaPorte officials assert that the railroads' continual switching between federal court and the Indiana Public Service Commission places an undue burden upon them. According to the LaPorte officials, the parallel litigation warrants dismissal of the federal action.
Chessie responds that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, and 1337 vest this court with subject matter jurisdiction, and that neither exhaustion nor abstention impairs that jurisdiction. The Federal Railway Safety Act ("FRSA") does not mandate presentment of controversies to state agencies for resolution; even if it did, the FRSA preempts railroad safety ordinances. Pendency of the state litigation does not warrant abstention, because Indiana's Public Service Commission lacks the authority to address the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Csx Transp., Inc. v. City of Plymouth
...limiting train speed to twenty-five miles per hour because 49 CFR § 213.9 covers the same subject matter); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Smith, 664 F.Supp. 1228 (N.D.Ind.1987)(finding ordinances regulating local train speed limit preempted, and stating that "separate regulation by every city, ......
-
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. City of Bridgman
...more stringent train speed limits than those set out in 49 C.F.R. § 213. Donelon, supra, 474 F.2d at 1112; Consolidated Rail Corp v. Smith, 664 F.Supp. 1228 (N.D.Ind.1987); Johnson, supra, 654 F.Supp. at 122-23; Sisk v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 647 F.Supp. 861, 865 (D.Kan.1986). I......
-
Wabash & Western Ry. v. City of Kendallville, Ind.
...a declaration of Congressional intent to preempt state and local law in the area of railroad safety. E.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Smith, 664 F.Supp. 1228, 1236 (N.D.Ind. 1987). However, the test of whether a state or local regulation "covers the same subject matter" as a federal regulat......
-
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. City of Bayonne
...806 (E.D.Ky.1989); Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Town of Baldwin, 685 F.Supp. 601 (W.D.La.1987); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Smith, 664 F.Supp. 1228 (N.D.Ind.1987). A state's actions under its Occupational Safety and Health Act, banning creosote-coated railroad ties out of concern f......