Consumer Party v. Davis
Decision Date | 12 February 1986 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 85-0836. |
Citation | 633 F. Supp. 877 |
Parties | CONSUMER PARTY, Max Weiner, Lance Haver, William Thorn, and Lisa Brannan v. William R. DAVIS, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Richard Anderson, Bureau of Legislation, Commissions and Elections; Margaret Tartaglione, Marion Tasko and John Kane, Commissioners of the City of Philadelphia. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
David Kairys, Kairys & Rudovsky, Stefan Presser, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs.
Carl Vaccaro, Deputy Atty. Gen., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants Davis and Anderson.
Ralph J. Teti, Divisional Deputy City Sol., Philadelphia, Pa., for other defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This action is before the court following a final hearing. The court's earlier order granting the plaintiffs preliminary relief was vacated by the Court of Appeals on November 27, 1985, 778 F.2d 140. Plaintiffs contend that Act 190, 25 P.S. § 2872.1 ("Act 190"), enacted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly to solve the "ballot clutter" problem in Democratic Party primary elections in Philadelphia is unconstitutional as applied to the Consumer Party and its members. Act 190 markedly increased the number of signatures necessary to secure a place on the primary ballot of a political party.
Consumer Party v. Davis, 778 F.2d 140, 142 (3d Cir.1985) (footnote omitted).
After an evidentiary hearing and argument on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the application of Act 190 to the Consumer Party, the court found that while Act 190 might be constitutional alone, the Election Code as a whole now required the Consumer Party to nominate by primary but, because of Act 190's raised signature requirements, made it effectively impossible for Consumer Party candidates to appear on either the primary or general election ballots. A political body not qualifying for party status would find it much easier to place candidates on primary and general election ballots. Thus, the Consumer Party's success in achieving political party status resulted in its greater difficulty in electing candidates. The court found that this electorial scheme violated the rights of plaintiffs. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968).
This court then applied the balancing test set forth in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), and found that:
The court then considered four alternative forms of relief that might be afforded the Consumer Party to ensure its candidates access to the general election ballot:
The court found that providing the Consumer Party political body status for nomination purposes only was the most appropriate court-enforced remedy. The Consumer Party had not then attempted to use the political body nominating method but its availability as a solution was the underlying predicate to the court's refusal to enjoin Act 190 as unconstitutional. Although the court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to prohibit the enforcement of Act 190 as to the Consumer Party, it retained jurisdiction to ensure that members of the Consumer Party had access to the general election ballot through the political body rather than the political party nominating procedure. However, nothing in the court's action was intended to effect a change in the then status of the Consumer Party as a political party. The defendants were enjoined from removing the Consumer Party name from the primary election ballot in the 1985 Spring Primary or preventing party members from voting by write-in or sticker.
778 F.2d at 148 (footnote omitted).
Accordingly, this court ordered that the evidence presented at the hearing on preliminary relief would be incorporated into the record for purposes of final judgment and scheduled a further evidentiary hearing and final argument. All of the parties originally declined the opportunity to present additional evidence at the final hearing. At the insistence of the court, because the original hearing was confined almost exclusively to the Consumer Party's problems incident to the 1985 Spring Primary in Philadelphia County, plaintiffs offered brief testimony on the state-wide impact of Act 190 and the defendants offered current party registration figures. Plaintiffs called plaintiff Max Weiner to testify briefly on the Consumer Party's current registration and ability to nominate candidates outside of Philadelphia. Plaintiffs also referred to registration figures submitted by exhibit at the hearing on preliminary relief, now incorporated as evidence for purposes of a final adjudication.
Plaintiffs then proposed that the court make findings of fact and conclusions of law as set out in the district court opinion: Consumer Party v. Davis, 606 F.Supp. 1008, 1010-20 (E.D.Pa.1985). Defendants, contrary to the assumption of the Court of Appeals, refused to concede the unconstitutionality of Act 190, even as to the Consumer Party, but they offered no evidence or argument sufficient to convince the court that Act 190 is constitutional as applied to the Consumer Party.
Plaintiffs, the Consumer Party and several of its officers, candidates and members, seek preliminary and permanent injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting the enforcement of Act 190 of 1984, 25 P.S. § 2872.1, against the Consumer Party.
Plaintiffs contend that the challenged state legislation, substantially increasing the number of signatures required to nominate candidates in the primary election, unconstitutionally deprives the Consumer Party of the right to participate in elections.
Defendants City and Commonwealth have responded that the Consumer Party has or will have a sufficient number of registered party members to place candidates for primary nomination in the Consumer Party name or to write them in on the primary ballot; if the number of registered party members is insufficient for these purposes, defendants state that Consumer Party members and supporters can write-in their preferred candidates on the general election ballot.
The Pennsylvania Election Code, 25 P.S. § 2600 et seq, establishes a two-tiered system of political associations for electoral purposes: political parties and political bodies. A state-wide...
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