Container Technology Corp. v. J. Gadsden Pty., Ltd.

• Decision Date: 18 May 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88CA0235,88CA0235
• Parties: CONTAINER TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J. GADSDEN PTY., LTD., Defendant-Appellee. . V
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 119

781 P.2d 119

CONTAINER TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J. GADSDEN PTY., LTD., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 88CA0235.

Colorado Court of Appeals Div. V.

May 18, 1989.

Rehearing Denied June 15, 1989.

Certiorari Denied Oct. 10, 1989.

Butler, Landrum & Pierce, P.C., Robert G. Pierce, Lakewood, for plaintiff-appellant.

Grant, McHendrie, Haines and Crouse, P.C., Richard A. Marsh, Denver, for defendant-appellee.

Opinion by Judge METZGER.

Plaintiff, Container Technology Corporation (Container), appeals the summary judgment confirming an arbitration award entered in favor of defendant, J. Gadsden Pty., Ltd. (Gadsden). We affirm.

The parties' contract dispute was submitted to arbitration and the arbitrators awarded Gadsden $44,937. Container filed an application to set aside the award, asserting that the arbitrators failed to follow the terms of the parties' contract, gave undue weight to hearsay testimony, and thus, violated the Uniform Arbitration Act (the Act). Sections 13-22-201, et seq., C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A).

Container then sought to depose the arbitrators, and Gadsden objected, contending that Container's proposed inquiry into the thought processes of the arbitrators was not authorized by the Act. The trial court refused to allow the arbitrators to be deposed and granted summary judgment confirming the arbitration award in favor of Gadsden. This appeal followed.

It has long been the policy of this state to foster and encourage the use of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. See Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 3; Judd Construction Co. v. Evans Joint Venture, 642 P.2d 922 (Colo.1982). The Uniform Arbitration Act, adopted to establish a statutorily based scheme of arbitration, states as its purpose: "To validate voluntary written arbitration agreements, make the arbitration process effective, provide necessary safeguards, and provide an efficient procedure when judicial assistance is necessary." Section 13-22-202, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A).

Judicial confirmation of an arbitration award is an often-used method of judicial assistance and usually includes only a few, relatively simple procedures. See C.R.C.P. 109. And, for several reasons, confirmation is the rule rather than the exception.

An arbitration award is tantamount to a judgment and is entitled to be given such status by the court which reviews it. Columbine Valley Construction Co. v. Board of Directors, 626 P.2d 686 (Colo.1981). Thus, when a party attacks the validity of an arbitration award, he bears the burden of sustaining the attack. Ormsbee Development Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140 (10th Cir.1982).

The issues before the court in a confirmation proceeding are limited by the terms of the Act. Judd Construction Co. v. Evans Joint Venture, supra. Parties who agree to submit matters to arbitration are presumed to have agreed that everything, both as to law and fact, necessary to render an ultimate decision, is included in the authority of the arbitrator. Continental Materials Corp. v. Gaddis Mining Co., 306 F.2d 952 (10th Cir.1962).

Thus, an arbitration award is not open to review on the merits. Checkrite of San Jose, Inc. v. Checkrite, Ltd., 640 F.Supp. 234 (D.Colo.1986). This includes asserted errors in determining the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the determination of factual issues. Sterling Colorado Beef Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 767 F.2d 718 (10th Cir.1985).

Also, the merits of the award include the arbitrators' interpretation of the contract. The rationale for vesting contract interpretation in the province of the arbitrators is expressed in United Steel Workers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960): "It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his."

With these principles in mind, we address Container's assertions of error.

Relying on Twin Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Platt Rogers, Inc., 112 Colo. 155, 147 P.2d 828 (1944), Container first argues that the trial court erred in prohibiting it from taking the depositions of the arbitrators. We disagree.

The court in Twin Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Platt Rogers, Inc., supra, held that the testimony of arbitrators may be admitted in a confirmation hearing to determine "what took place before the arbitrators, what was in controversy and what matters entered into the decision." Container asserts that this language authorizes it to inquire into the arbitrators' assessment of the evidence and their thought processes...