Continental Cas. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co.
Decision Date | 13 February 1984 |
Citation | 461 N.E.2d 209,391 Mass. 143 |
Parties | CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY v. GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY et al. 1 |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Thomas D. Burns, Boston (Charles Mark Furcolo and Steven H. Goldberg, Boston, with him) for plaintiff.
Anthony M. Feeherry, Boston (Ceris H. Lim Epstein, Boston, with him) for H.H. Robertson Co.
Francis J. Sally, Boston, for Gilbane Building Co.
Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.
Continental Casualty Company (Continental) brought an action for a declaratory judgment against Gilbane Building Company (Gilbane) and H.H. Robertson Company (Robertson) to determine whether Continental had a duty to defend Gilbane and Robertson in actions brought by John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company (Hancock) and Mamma Leone's of Boston, Inc. (Mamma Leone), claiming damages from Gilbane and Robertson for the faulty design 2 of the John Hancock Tower (Tower). A judge of the Superior Court, on Continental's motion for a judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, and on Robertson's cross-motion for summary judgment, ruled against Continental and declared that Continental had a duty to defend Gilbane in the Mamma Leone action and Robertson in both actions. Continental appealed the judge's order for summary judgment and renewed its notice of appeal after judgment was entered in the Superior Court as to Robertson. 3 We granted Continental's application for direct appellate review. We affirm.
We summarize the facts. 4 In 1968, Hancock purchased two insurance policies from Continental pursuant to specifications outlined in the construction contract for the Tower. The comprehensive general liability policy provided personal injury and property damage coverage for, among others, Hancock, the owner, Gilbane, the general contractor, and Robertson, the curtain wall subcontractor. At Hancock's insistence, the printed policy was amended to read: "The insurance afforded applies separately to each insured against whom claim is made or suit is brought." 5
In 1975, Hancock sued Gilbane, Robertson, and others associated with the design and construction of the Tower curtain wall. In relevant part, the action alleged that in 1972 significant numbers of glass panels failed in the Tower's curtain wall. As a consequence, the Tower was not weathertight "and could not withstand the forces and conditions to which it was subjected." Hancock further alleged that the problem was the result of negligent design and construction by Gilbane and Robertson, and that Hancock sustained substantial damages, including "the deprivation of the use of the Tower, diminution in value of the Tower, and lost income on rentals for the Tower."
1. The duty to defend. 6 (footnote omitted). Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 17 Mass.App. 316, 318, 458 N.E.2d 338 (1983). See Terrio v. McDonough, supra, 16 Mass.App. at 169, 450 N.E.2d 190. We turn to the allegations of the underlying complaints to determine whether they are or may be envisioned to be within the provisions of the policy.
2. "Property damage" under the insurance policies. Continental argues that the loss of use of property is not covered by the policy unless there is physical injury to tangible property. The comprehensive general liability policy defines property damage as "injury to or destruction of tangible property." See, e.g., Hamilton Die Cast, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 508 F.2d 417, 419-420 (7th Cir.1975). The judge ruled that because the complaints may be read to allege "both physical injury to and loss of use of the John Hancock Tower, the claims for damages result from 'property damage' " and were within the coverage of the policy. We agree.
We read the policy as written. We are not free to revise it or change the order of the words. 3 R. Long, The Law of Liability Insurance, App.B, § 6 (1981). We, like a majority of courts considering this issue, conclude that "the term property damage does not require actual physical damage but can include intangible damage such as the diminution in value of tangible property." McDowell-Wellman Eng'g Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 711 F.2d 521, 525-526 n. 7 (3d Cir.1983). See Sola Basic Indus., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 90 Wis.2d 641, 653-654, 280 N.W.2d 211 (1979); Pittway Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 56 Ill.App.3d 338, 342, 13 Ill.Dec. 244, 370 N.E.2d 1271 (1977), and cases cited.
(a) Hancock complaint. The Hancock complaint alleges "substantial damages, including the cost of labor and materials for removing and replacing the glass units, additional design, engineering and construction costs, increased operating expenses and other costs for the Tower, the deprivation of the use of the Tower, diminution in value of the Tower, and lost income on rentals for the Tower." The complaint also alleges that the defects were not apparent until after the wall had been "completed and been subjected to normal forces and conditions." Further, the complaint suggests that Gilbane and Robertson fraudulently lulled Hancock into a false sense of security by assuring Hancock that the curtain wall would not fail once it "was completed and sealed" in the Tower.
Continental argues that the curtain wall was not integrated into the Tower, 7 and therefore damages were limited to the curtain wall itself and the cost of repair and replacement. Such damages are explicitly excluded from coverage by exclusion (1) and (m). See 216 infra. As we read the Hancock complaint, we think the allegations are "reasonably susceptible of an interpretation" that Hancock suffered its damages after the curtain wall was "completed and sealed" in the Tower. The allegations of damages are not limited to repair and replacement or intangible damages. They also encompass damage to the Tower itself after installation of the curtain wall.
Since the complaint may be read as claiming damages after integration of the defective curtain wall into the Tower, the allegations are sufficient to trigger the duty to defend. Dakota Block Co. v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 81 S.D. 213, 218, 132 N.W.2d 826 (1965). See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 169 Ind.App. 1, 345 N.E.2d 267 (1976). See also Beacon Textiles Corp. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 355 Mass. 643, 646, 246 N.E.2d 671 (1969); Sturges Mfg. Co. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 69, 371 N.Y.S.2d 444, 332 N.E.2d 319 (1975); Lipton, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 356, 357 N.Y.S.2d 705, 314 N.E.2d 37 (1974). 8
(b) Mamma Leone's complaint. The judge, citing R. Long's treatise, found that Mamma Leone's complaint alleged property damage within the policy because 3 R. Long, The Law of Liability Insurance, App. B, § 6, 38-39 (1981). Accord: R. Elliot, The New Comprehensive General Liability Policy 12-6 ) .
Mamma Leone's allegations also are "reasonably susceptible of an interpretation" that the falling glass caused the area surrounding...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day School, Inc.
...to characterize seemingly discrete events as emanating from a single, ongoing cause. See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 391 Mass. 143, 151, 461 N.E.2d 209 (1984) (rejecting insurer's interpretation that a second episode of structural damage to a building was an extens......
-
Rubenstein v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 98-P-1650
...of an interpretation that they state or adumbrate a claim covered by the policy terms...." Continental Cas. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 391 Mass. 143, 146, 461 N.E.2d 209 (1984), quoting from Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 17 Mass.App.Ct. 316, 318, 458 N.E.2d 338 (1983). SMLP's comp......
-
American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Beatrice Companies, Inc., 86 C 1874.
...that they state a claim covered by the policy, the insurer has a duty to defend. Id. (citing Continental Casualty Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 391 Mass. 143, 461 N.E.2d 209, 212 (1984)); Landauer, Inc., 628 N.E.2d at 1302 n. 12. In other words, the court should consider "`what kinds of losses ......
-
A.W. Chesterton v. Mass. Insurers Insolv.
...court. We look to the policy as written; we neither "revise it or change the order of the words." Continental Cas. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 391 Mass. 143, 147, 461 N.E.2d 209 (1984). See Somerset Sav. Bank v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 420 Mass. 422, 427-428, 649 N.E.2d 1123 (1995). If in dou......
-
The Wacky World of Collision and Comprehensive Coverages: Intentional Injury and Illegal Activity Exclusions
...Southwest La. Grain, Inc. v. Howard A. Duncan, Inc., 438 So. 2d 215 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Continental Cas. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 461 N.E.2d 209 (Mass. 1984); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Vector Constr. Co., 460 N.W.2d 329 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); American State Ins. Co. v. Slogar, No. C7-9......