Continental Life Ins Co. v. Searing

• Decision Date: 09 March 1917
• Docket Number: 2130.,2129
• Citation: 240 F. 653
• Parties: CONTINENTAL LIFE INS. CO. v. SEARING. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC. OF UNITED STATES v. SAME.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

240 F. 653

CONTINENTAL LIFE INS. CO. v. SEARING.

EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC. OF UNITED STATES v. SAME.

Nos. 2129, 2130.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

March 9, 1917

Ruby R Vale, of Philadelphia, Pa., and William F. Kurtz, of Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff in error Continental Life Ins. Co.

George Douglas Hay, B. Gordon Bromley, and Thomas De Witt Cuyler all of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff in error Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States.

Wm. W Porter and Sidney E. Smith, both of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant in error.

Before BUFFINGTON, McPHERSON, and WOOLLEY, Circuit Judges.

BUFFINGTON Circuit Judge.

In this case Mrs. Nancie M. Searing, a citizen of Pennsylvania brought suit against each of the defendant insurance companies, corporate citizens of other states, to recover on a policy on the life of her husband. On trial by the court below she recovered verdicts, and on entry of judgment thereon each company sued out a writ of error.

As the alleged errors are the same in both cases, we dispose of both in this opinion. The questions here involved are: First, whether the court erred in refusing the companies' request for binding instructions; and, secondly, whether, if the case was one for a jury, the court erred in the admission of certain testimony and in certain language used in its charge.

Turning to the first and underlying question, we are of opinion that under the evidence the issue here involved was one which fell within the province of a jury, and not the court, to determine. Turning to such evidence, we find, for example, that on November 10, 1914, the defendant the Continental Life Insurance Company executed and delivered its policy here sued on, whereby it covenanted to insure the life of Frederick Roe Searing and 'to pay at its home office $5,000 immediately on receipt of due proof of the death of the insured, Frederick Roe Searing, of Philadelphia, Pa., while this policy is in force to the beneficiary, Nancie M. Searing, wife of the insured,' etc. The allegations of the plaintiff, the beneficiary, were that her husband died on August 17, 1915, at Atlantic City; that due proofs of his death were furnished the company; that thereby a right of action had accrued to her. The defendant denied the insured's death, and also the furnishing of due proofs of death by the beneficiary. Much of the confusion in this case arises from the course pursued in the trial, and, as there must be a retrial, we indicate the course to which the plaintiff's case should be directed on a retrial.

The policy provides the beneficiary furnish due proofs of death of the insured as a condition precedent to a right of action. When, therefore, proofs of death are offered in evidence, they are received by the court to enable it to determine whether the condition precedent to suit had been met. The jury have nothing to do with that question or with the contents of such proofs. The preparatory question of the sufficiency of the proofs should be so disposed of by the court itself that the contents of the proofs are not disclosed to the jury. If the court is satisfied the proofs fulfill the requirements of the policy, it is its duty to allow the case to proceed, and thereafter the jury's province begins to consider such pertinent evidence as may thereafter be produced. If the court is of opinion the proofs offered are not in due form and substance, the court so holds, and there is no issue for the jury to try. It will thus be seen that in the ordinary case the proofs are for the consideration of the court alone, and having satisfied their purpose, namely, the fulfillment of a step precedent to the right of action, they have served their purpose, and for jury purposes they disappear from the case.

They are in their nature ex parte, self-serving statements, and to permit their ex parte statements to influence a jury is so clearly at variance with the principles of evidence that a court cannot too carefully in the trial of insurance cases keep wholly to itself, and keep wholly from a jury, proofs of loss. The danger of departure from this safe course is well evidenced by the record in this case, where, for example letters of plaintiffs' counsel, which summed up the plaintiff's case and argued it in detail, were considered by the jury. So, also, affidavits of other persons, which accompanied the proofs of death, matters proper enough in themselves for the information of the company, were read to the jury, when all such matters were for the consideration of the court alone. Of course, cases may arise where a court might have to submit to a jury some issue connected with the proofs of death, and therefore the proofs themselves would be received and considered; but it suffices to say the present was not such a case. Under the course this trial took we think it clear that substantial harm was done to the defendants' case by permitting proofs and the accompanying documents which were solely for the consideration of the court, to be also given to the jury. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that they were meant to influence, and naturally would influence,...