Continental Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank

• Decision Date: 08 March 1902
• Citation: 68 S.W. 497,108 Tenn. 374
• Parties: CONTINENTAL NAT. BANK OF MEMPHIS v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF NASHVILLE.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

68 S.W. 497

108 Tenn. 374

CONTINENTAL NAT. BANK OF MEMPHIS v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF NASHVILLE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

March 8, 1902

Appeal from chancery court, Davidson county; H. H. Cook, Chancellor.

Suit by the Continental National Bank of Memphis against the First National Bank of Nashville. From a judgment for defendant plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Pierson & Ewing and Jas. A. Harris, for appellant.

Stokes & Stokes, for appellee.

WILKES J.

The bill in this case seeks to hold the First National Bank of Nashville liable to the Continental National Bank of Memphis for about $30,000. The ground of liability, as claimed, is that the Nashville bank, in its own interest and for its own benefit, falsely and fraudulently represented to the Memphis bank that certain parties on paper presented to it for discount were good and solvent, when, as a matter of fact they were insolvent, and the Memphis bank, in consequence lost the greater part of the money loaned. The Nashville bank denied all allegations that tended to show liability on its part. A jury was demanded for the trial of issues of fact by the complainant, Memphis bank, and a large number were presented. They were finally narrowed down to six on the part of the complainant and two on the part of defendant. The jury returned a finding upon most of the issues, but reported that as to the first issue, upon which the other four submitted by complainant were based, they could not agree. The six issues presented by complainant were interdependent; that is, all of them were dependent upon the first, and to some extent on each other. The first issue was, in substance, did the Nashville bank represent that the parties inquired about (Duncan, Gaines, and Morrow) were solvent, and that a loan to them was desirable? The second was, did the Memphis bank make the loan upon the faith of these representations? The third, were they false? The fourth, did the Nashville bank know they were false when made? The fifth, was the Nashville bank interested in the loan procured? And, sixth, did it receive the proceeds or any part of the loan for its own benefit? The jury having been unable to find that the Nashville bank ever represented the solvency of the parties, the other issues dependent on it failed with it. Taken together, these issues did not present the case made out by the bill, of fraudulent concealment and procurement of the loan; and the judge so stated, and added that, if they were all found for complainant, he would not give a decree upon them in complainant's favor, but he said that the two issues submitted by the defendant were decisive of the case. He, however, permitted all of the issues to go to the jury. The trial judge ought to have excluded such as he deemed immaterial, but this is not an error of which complainant can complain.

The first issue submitted by the defendant was whether the Nashville bank procured a broker in Nashville to negotiate the loan for its benefit; and the second was, did the Nashville bank make false and fraudulent representations to the Memphis bank in order to effect this loan for its own benefit? These two issues presented all the features necessary for a decision of the case upon its merits, and covered the charges in the bill, and were determinative of the questions involved. The jury answered both in the negative, and, under the facts thus developed, there could not be liability on the part of the Nashville bank.

We need not go into the details of the exceptions made as to the findings of the jury on complainant's issues, as all of them might have been disregarded by the court below, and judgment rendered alone upon the issues as presented by defendant; and the court, no doubt, did base its judgment upon the latter, disregarding complainant's issues.

It is said that the court below erred in excluding an opinion claimed to have been expressed by Dr. Morrow, and his apparent contradiction by Mr. Watts. The statement of Dr. Morrow was first called for by defendant's counsel. He, however, abandoned and withdrew it, and it was then reintroduced by the complainant's counsel. We need not go into the details of this matter. The opinion and statement of Dr. Morrow was, in the first instance, incompetent, and should not have been introduced. It was merely his opinion that the present suit was a blackmailing scheme. It was properly withdrawn by defendant's counsel. It was improperly reintroduced by complainant's counsel. Its contradiction by Mr. Watts, if it is a contradiction, was unimportant, and as to a collateral and immaterial matter which complainant's counsel had himself improperly placed in the record.

It is said the court below erred in allowing evidence of the good character of W. M. Duncan,--as to his business character, and standing for honor and integrity. The court of chancery appeals finds there was no error in this, since the business honor and integrity of Mr. Duncan was...