Continental National Bank of Memphis v. Buford

• Decision Date: 16 November 1903
• Docket Number: No. 60,60
• Citation: 48 L.Ed. 119,24 S.Ct. 54,191 U.S. 119
• Parties: CONTINENTAL NATIONAL BANK OF MEMPHIS, Tennessee, Plff. in Err., v. G. C. BUFORD
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

191 U.S. 119

24 S.Ct. 54

48 L.Ed. 119

CONTINENTAL NATIONAL BANK OF MEMPHIS, Tennessee, Plff. in Err.,

v G. C. BUFORD.

No. 60.

Argued and submitted November 6, 1903.

Decided November 16, 1903.

Mr. Rhea P. Cary for plaintiff in error.

Mr. W. J. Orr for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court:

Has this court authority to review the judgment of the circuit court of appeals in this case?

This question arises upon the face of the record, and cannot be ignored; for, the rule is well established that, 'on every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes.' Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382, 28 L. ed. 462, 464, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 510; King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U. S. 225, 30 L. ed. 623, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552; Gerling v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 151 U. S. 673, 690, 38 L. ed. 311, 317, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533; Powers v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 169 U. S. 92, 98, 42 L. ed. 673, 675, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264; Great Southern Fire-Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 449, 453, 44 L. ed. 842, 844, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690.

The plaintiff in error, plaintiff below,—the Continental National Bank, organized under the acts of Congress, and located for purposes of business at Memphis, Tennessee,—alleged in its complaint that the Bank of Mammoth Springs, an Arkansas corporation, was indebted to it in a named sum, and it sought by this action to hold the defendant liable for the amount of such debt.

The action was based upon certain sections of the statutes of Arkansas (Sandels' & Hill's Digest), as follows:

'§ 1337. The president and secretary of every corporation organized under the provisions of this act shall annually make a certificate showing the condition of the affairs of such corporation, as nearly as the same can be ascertained, on the 1st day of January or of July next preceding the time of making such certificate, in the following particulars, viz.: The amount of capital actually paid in; the cash value of its real estate; the cash value of its personal estate; the cash value of its credits; the amount of its debts; the name and number of shares of each stockholder; which certificate shall be deposited on or before the 15th day of February or of August with the county clerk of the county in which said corporation transacts its business, who shall record the same at length in a book to be kept by him for that purpose.'

'§ 1346. The certificates required by §§ 1334, 1337, 1343, and 1344, except certificates of transfers of stock, shall be made under oath or affirmation by the person subscribing the same; and if any person shall knowingly swear or affirm falsely as to any material facts he shall be deemed guilty of perjury, and be punished accordingly.

'§ 1347. If the president or secretary of any such corporation shall neglect or refuse to comply with the provisions of § 1337, and to perform the duties required of them respectively, the persons so neglecting or refusing shall jointly and severally be liable to an action founded on this statute for all debts of such corporation contracted during the period of any such neglect or refusal.'

The complaint alleged that during the entire period of his term of office as president of the Bank of Mammoth Springs, that is, from June 9th, 1891, to June 9th, 1896, the defendant Buford 'wholly neglected to comply with the provisions and perform the duties required of him by said §§ 1337 and 1346, by making, swearing to, and causing to be filed, the statement or certificate required thereby.'

The defendant demurred to the complaint on various grounds; one being that the plaintiff's action appeared to be barred by the statute of limitations of Arkansas. The circuit court sustained the demurrer, it being of opinion that the complaint did not show any cause of action; also, that a suit for the debt in question was barred by the statute of limitations of Arkansas. The plaintiff declining to amend, the suit was dismissed. That judgment was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals, 53 C. C. A. 14, 114 Fed. 290, and from that judgment the present writ of error was prosecuted.

By the very terms of the judiciary act of March 3d, 1891, 26 Stat. at L. 826, chap. 517 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 488, 547), the judgment of a circuit court of appeals of the United States is final where the jurisdiction of the circuit court depended entirely upon the diverse citizenship of the parties. No ground whatever of jurisdiction in the circuit court appears in the complaint or elsewhere in the record, other than diversity in the citizenship of the parties, unless it can be said that by reason alone of the plaintiff bank having been organized under an act of Congress the suit is one arlsing under the laws of the United States. This, however, could not be said of the present suit, if regard be had to the acts of Congress defining and regulating the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.

The judiciary act of March 3d, 1875, for the first time invested the circuit courts of the United States, without reference to the citizenship of the parties, with original jurisdiction of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeded a prescribed sum, and the suit was one 'arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.' [18 Stat. at L. 470, chap. 137 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 508).] Referring to that statute, this court, in Petri v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 142 U. S. 644, 648, 35 L. ed. 1144, 1145, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 325, 326, said: 'Suits by or against national banks might therefore be brought or removed upon the ground of diverse citizenship, or of subjectmatter, since, as they were created by Congress, and could acquire no right, make no contract, and bring no suit, which was not authorized by a law of the United States, a suit by or against them was necessarily a suit arising under the laws of the United States. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. ed. 204; Leather Mfrs. Nat. Bank v. Cooper, 120 U. S. 778, 30 L. ed. 816, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 777; Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1, 29 L. ed. 319, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1113. And, of course, national banks as well as state banks and individuals, might bring or remove suits otherwise arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.'

But, in respect of national bank associations, a radical change was introduced by subsequent acts of Congress.

By the act of July 12th, 1882, chap. 290, it was provided: 'That the jurisdiction for suits hereafter...