Contreras ex rel. Her Minor Child A.L. v. Dona Ana Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs
| Decision Date | 07 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 18-156 GBW/GJF |
| Parties | KATHY CONTRERAS, on behalf of her minor child A.L., Plaintiff, v. DONA ANA COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, d/b/a Doña Ana County Detention Center, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion and Supporting Memorandum for Qualified Immunity and Summary Judgment. Doc. 47. Having reviewed the Motion, the attendant briefing and oral argument (docs. 52, 57, 60, 61, 64), and being otherwise fully advised regarding relevant case law, the Court will GRANT Defendants' motion.
This case stems from events surrounding an assault on Plaintiff's minor child, A.L., in the juvenile pod of the Doña Ana County Detention Center ("DACDC"). Doc. 1. Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of A.L. in this Court on February 15, 2018. Id. In her Complaint, Plaintiff brings federal and state law claims against the Doña Ana County Board of County Commissioners, doing business as DACDC, and on-duty guards Paco Luna, Jaime Casado, and Shaylene Platero ("the Individual Defendants"). Id. Particularly, Plaintiff brings (1) claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities for violating A.L.'s Fourteenth Amendment due process right to reasonable safety under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) a §1983 municipal liability claim against DACDC, (3) state law claims against Defendants for negligence and negligent operation of a building or equipment, and (4) claims against Defendants under the New Mexico Constitution for the alleged violation of humane conditions of confinement. Id.
On July 13, 2018, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was fully briefed on August 21, 2018. Docs. 47, 52, 57, 60. In the Motion, Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claims on the basis of qualified immunity.1 See doc. 47 at 7-17. The Court held oral argument on the Motion on August 28, 2018. Doc. 64. During the hearing, the Court permitted the parties an additional week to file supplemental case citations and parentheticals relevant to the "cross-pollination of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment analyses" and the "delegation of policy" arguments discussed by counsel during the hearing. Id. In response, Plaintiff filed her Notice of Additional Authority on August 30, 2018. Doc. 61. Defendants similarly filed a Notice of Additional Authority on August 31, 2018. Doc. 62. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is now before the Court.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), this Court must "grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of "show[ing] 'that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.'" Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). Once the movant meets this burden, the non-moving party is required to designate specific facts showing that "there are . . . genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
Notably, however, summary judgment motions based upon the defense of qualified immunity are reviewed differently from other summary judgment motions. Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009). "When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established." Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009)). This is a "strict two-part test" that must be met before the defendant asserting qualifiedimmunity again "bear[s] the traditional burden of the movant for summary judgment—showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Clark v. Edmunds, 513 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Nelson v. McMullen, 207 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted). The Court may address the two prongs of the test in any order. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
"Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right." Id. at 232 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). "A Government official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, '[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear' that every 'reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.'" Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640). "We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Id. (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). "Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains." Clark v. Wilson, 625 F.3d 686, 690 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).
In determining whether the plaintiff has met its burden, the Court still construes the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving party. See Scott v.Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007). In so doing, the Court must keep in mind three principles. First, the Court's role is not to weigh the evidence, but to assess the threshold issue of whether a genuine issue exists as to material facts requiring a trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Thom v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). Second, the Court must resolve all reasonable inferences and doubts in favor of the non-moving party and construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 550-55 (1999). Third, the court cannot decide any issues of credibility. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. "[T]o survive the . . . motion, [the nonmovant] need only present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor." Id. at 257. Nonetheless, at the summary judgment stage, "a plaintiff's version of the facts must find support in the record." Thomson v. Salt Lake County, 584 F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 2009).
The Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause governs pre-adjudication detainee suits against jails. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979). The Supreme Court has heldthe following with respect to §1983 liability in cases that allege a failure to protect inmates from other inmates, such as the one at bar.
[P]rison officials . . . must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. [Particularly,] prison officials have a duty...to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. . . . It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety. . . . First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, [and] the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. [S]econd[,] a prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind. . . .that [of] deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. . . . [A]cting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk. We hold. . . that a prison official cannot be found liable. . . for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-36 (1970) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Turning to the liability of supervisors in particular, to meet his or her supervisory liability burden under §1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the supervisor:
To continue reading
Request your trial