Contreras, In re

Decision Date18 March 1952
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesIn re CONTRERAS. Civ. 4700.

Ibanez & Snider and Richard A. Ibanez, all of Hollywood, for appellant.

No appearance for respondent.

WHITE, Presiding Justice.

This is an appeal by the above named minor and his mother, Maria Luisa Contreras, from an order of the Supreme Court sitting in separate session as a juvenile court, declaring the aforesaid minor a ward thereof and committing him to the Youth Authority of the State of California and denying a motion to vacate and set aside the aforesaid order.

The original order declared said minor to be a person coming within the provisions of section 700(m) of the Welfare and Institutions Code in that, on March 19, 1951 he 'committed an assault upon the person of Henry Davila with a deadly weapon or instrument or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury'.

The findings and judgment set forth that the alleged assault was committed in the following manner: 'Minor participated in a gang fight, accompanied with other minors, in which said victim received a stab wound in the stomach inflicted by sharpedged instrument, and also received several abrasions about the face and head as a result of being kicked and beaten'.

After finding 'that minor's welfare requires that his custody be taken from his mother', the judgment directed that said minor be committed to the Youth Authority of the State of California.

On this appeal it is contended that the evidence fails to support the judgment declaring the minor herein a ward of the juvenile court and committing him to the Youth Authority.

The record reflects that in this proceeding five boys, including the minor Lupe Cardenas Contreras, were charged with engaging in a 'gang' fight during the course of which one Henry Davila was stabbed with a knife and otherwise set upon and beaten.

It appears that a the hearing in the juvenile court, proceedings were first had as to Salvadore Gill, one of the boys accused with the minor herein. These proceedings were had outside the presence of the minor with whom we are here concerned. Gill gave no testimony involving Contreras, whereupon the mother of the former, and Probation Officer Sorkin advised the court that the witness was 'afraid' and 'reluctant' to testify. The judge then said to the minor Gill, 'I am not going to tell any of these boys I got any information out of you. You don't need to worry about that. You can tell us anything you want to tell us. I also want you to know we already know what you told the officers, but we are not going to tell the rest of the boys that you told us anything. We are interested in finding out all we can about this matter so we can make sure we have the right guy and not the wrong fellows are accused in this difficulty. Let's get the record straight.'

With these assurances, the witness continued but did not incriminate Contreras. Officer McAuliffe, however, testified that the witness Gill had theretofore told him, 'He thought if anybody stabbed Davila, it was Contreras'. Producing a miniature baseball bat, the officer further testified, 'When Contreras was arrested * * * he had this. * * * I believe it was Salvadore (Gill) who saw somebody with something like this'. Gill denied making this statement.

Contreras, the minor herein, denied any participation in the fracas, stating that on the night in question he was riding in an automobile with two boys, Richard Marques and Frank Chavez. Both of these boys corroborated this statement but admitted having told Probation Officer Sorkin to the contrary, contending that they did so because of threats made against them by other boys.

Henry Davila, victim of the assault, testified that eight or nine boys 'jumped' on him as he was on his way to a drugstore. Salvadore Gill was the only one the victim recognized. With reference to the minor herein, the victim testified, 'I know him by looks and everything, but I didn't see him that night. Maybe he was there, and maybe he was not; I don't know'. (Emphasis added.)

Following this testimony Officer McAuliffe testified that the victim had previously told him, 'I think Contreras (the minor herein) cut me, he was the one who used the knife * * * it was Contreras who was on top of me, I am pretty sure that he is the one that used the knife * * *. I'll get them when I get out'. The officer also testified that 'anyone that was mentioned by anybody was apprehended'.

Section 736 of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides that 'An order adjudging a person to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of crime.' In consonance therewith it has been held that issues presented to the juvenile court may be determined upon the preponderance of the evidence, Matter of Cannon, 27 Cal.App. 549, 553, 150 P. 794. In the instant proceeding the minor was not represented by counsel upon the hearing at which he was adjudged a ward of the court. A reading of the transcript of the testimony taken immediately suggests the probability that had the minor been represented by counsel considerable of the evidence given would have been excluded through timely objections.

While the juvenile court law provides that adjudication of a minor to be a ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of crime, nevertheless, for all practical purposes, this is a legal fiction, presenting a challenge to credulity and doing violence to reason. Courts cannot and will not suit their eyes and ears to everyday contemporary happenings.

It is common knowledge that such an adjudication when based upon a charge of committing an act that amounts to a felony, is a blight upon the character of and is a serious impediment to the future of such minor. Let him attempt to enter the armed services of his country or obtain a position of honor and trust and he is immediately confronted with his juvenile court record. And further, as in this case, the minor is taken from his family, deprived of his liberty and...

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    ...term 'arrest' as applied to adults. (See In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. 1, 23--24, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527; In re Contreras (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 787, 789--790, 241 P.2d 631.) A juvenile who states that he has been either detained or arrested will be subjected to economic and other sanc......
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    ...v. Leary (1967) 20 N.Y.2d 309, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 229 N.E.2d 426.)21 Compare Welf. & Inst.Code, § 503, with In re Contreras (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 787, 789--791, 241 P.2d 631, and In re Holmes (1954) 379 Pa. 599, 615--616, 109 A.2d 523, 530 (dissenting opinion of Musmanno, J.); President's Co......
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    ...McDonald (D.C.Mun.App.1959), 153 A.2d 651.7. California. In re Castro (1966), 243 Cal.App.2d 402, 52 Cal.Rptr. 469; In re Contreras (1952), 109 Cal.App.2d 787, 241 P.2d 631.In addition to the foregoing authorities, decisions in 14 other jurisdictions are persuasive that the standard of a pr......
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