Convenience v. Barr, Civil Action No. 18-2630 (ABJ)

• Decision Date: 08 April 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 18-2630 (ABJ)
• Citation: 453 F.Supp.3d 380
• Parties: ROSSVILLE CONVENIENCE & GAS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. William P. BARR, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

453 F.Supp.3d 380

ROSSVILLE CONVENIENCE & GAS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs,

v.William P. BARR, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-2630 (ABJ)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed April 8, 2020

Charles H. Kuck, Kuck Baxter Immigration LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs.

Kenneth A. Adebonojo, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AMY BERMAN JACKSON, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs Rossville Convenient & Gas, Inc. ("Rossville") and Mansoor N. Charaniya brought this action against William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States; Barbara Q. Velarde, Chief of Administrative Appeals at the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"); and several other officials within the Department of Homeland Security. They challenge a determination made by the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") of USCIS to dismiss their appeal of a USCIS decision to deny a Form I-140 Immigration Petition for Alien Worker. See generally Complaint [Dkt. # 1] ("Compl."). They seek declaratory, injunctive, and other forms of miscellaneous relief. Compl. at 8–9. Defendants have moved to transfer the case to the Northern or Southern Districts of Texas or, in the alternative, to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. See Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 8] ("Defs.' Mot"); Defs.' Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Transfer or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss [Dkt. # 8-1] (Defs.' Mem.). For the following reasons, the Court will deny defendants' motion to transfer, and it will dismiss plaintiffs' complaint, but without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

This lawsuit stems from plaintiffs' attempt to have Charaniya, a native and citizen of India, approved as an alien worker by the USCIS. Compl. ¶ 14. Charaniya was the beneficiary of a Department of Labor-approved Labor Certification filed by Rossville in 2002. Compl. ¶ 13. That Certification is required for an employer to file a Form I-140 petition – the petition for an alien worker visa. Defs.' Mem. at 4–5.

On November 5, 2003, Rossville submitted an I-140 petition on Charaniya's behalf. Compl. ¶ 14. On October 20, 2004, USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny plaintiffs' petition. Compl. ¶ 15. Plaintiffs responded to USCIS with "requested evidence." Compl. ¶ 15.

On March 15, 2017, USCIS denied plaintiffs' I-140 petition, Compl. ¶ 16, and plaintiffs filed a time appeal to the Administrative Appeals Office on May 10, 2017. Compl. ¶ 17. On August 16, 2018, the AAO dismissed plaintiffs' appeal. Compl. ¶ 18.

Plaintiffs filed the three count complaint in this matter on November 15, 2018. See Compl. ¶¶ 19–25. As relief, they seek a declaratory judgment that they properly established Charaniya's qualifications for an Form I-140 petition approval; Charaniya properly "ported" to his new employer; and they are entitled to the process that flows from a properly filed petition; and an order that defendants must a) reopen the Form I-140 petition, b) declare that their determination that Charaniya was not eligible to port was erroneous, and c) adjudicate and approve the Form I-140 petition. Compl. at 8–9. They also seek injunction prohibiting USCIS from relying on the information contained in its allegedly erroneous prior decision to deny plaintiffs' renewed petition, as well as attorneys' fees and costs, and other relief. Compl. at 9.

On March 29, 2019, defendants moved to transfer the case to the Northern or Southern Districts of Texas, which they contend are "more appropriate" venues than the District of Columbia. Defs.' Mem. at 7–12. Plaintiffs oppose the transfer. Pl.'s Mem. of P. & A. in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Transfer or Dismiss [Dkt. # 10] ("Pl.'s Opp.").¹ In the alternative, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. See generally Defs.' Mem. at 12–16.

ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Transfer

A. Standard of Review

"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Court has "broad discretion" to transfer a case under section 1404. In re Scott , 709 F.2d 717, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of establishing that transfer is proper. Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Bosworth , 180 F. Supp. 2d 124, 127 (D.D.C. 2001). The decision to transfer requires an "individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness." Van Dusen v. Barrack , 376 U.S. 612, 622, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964).

The threshold question under section 1404(a) is whether the action "might have been brought" in the transferee district. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). This limitation imposes two prerequisites: (1) "venue must be proper in the transferee district;" and (2) "the defendants must be subject to the process of the federal court in the transferee district at the time the action was originally filed." Relf v. Gasch , 511 F.2d 804, 806–07 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

Venue in a civil case is proper in:

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

If the threshold requirement of venue has been met, the Court must then go on to balance case-specific private interest and public interest factors to determine whether transfer is appropriate. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Babbitt , 104 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12 (D.D.C. 2000). Private interest considerations include:

(1) the plaintiffs' choice of forum, unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of the defendants;

(2) the defendants' choice of forum;

(3) whether the claim arose elsewhere;

(4) the convenience of the parties;

(5) the convenience of the witnesses of the plaintiff and defendant but only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora; and

(6) the ease of access to sources of proof.

Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Dep't of Agric. , 944 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C. 1996). And the public interest considerations include:

(1) the transferee's familiarity with the governing laws;

(2) the relative congestion of the calendars of the potential transferee and transferor courts; and

(3) the local interest in deciding local controversies at home.

Id.

B. The case will not be transferred to the Northern or Southern Districts of Texas.

Defendants seek to transfer the case to either the Northern or Southern Districts of Texas, which they characterize as "infinitely more appropriate venues than this judicial district," Defs.' Mem. at 7, because "plaintiffs are located" there, and the case was administratively adjudicated there. Defs.' Mem. at 7. They do not argue that venue is not proper in the District of Columbia.

Based on the fact that the March 15, 2017 decision to deny plaintiffs' I-140 petition was issued in the Northern District of Texas, see Ex. D to Compl. [Dkt. # 1-5] ("I-140 Denial Letter") at 1,² plaintiffs could have brought the action in that jurisdiction. However, just because a case can be brought in one venue does not necessarily mean that it was not properly brought in another.³

A plaintiff is not required to "bring suit in the district where the most substantial portion of the relevant events occurred," Modaressi v. Vedadi , 441 F. Supp. 2d 51, 57 (D.D.C. 2006) ; courts are directed to undertake a "common sense appraisal" of the "events having operative significance in the case," Lamont v. Haig , 590 F.2d 1124, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1978), to determine where venue is proper.

Plaintiffs identifies several reasons why venue is equally or more appropriate in the District of Columbia: defendant Barbara Q. Velarde, the Chief of the Administrative Appeals Office of USCIS resides in Washington, D.C.; both Charaniya's residence and Rossville's primary place of business are in Tennessee, which is closer to the District of Columbia than Texas; the case does not involve Texas state law; the district court caseloads in Texas are greater than in the District of Columbia; and it is "unlikely ... extensive discovery of evidence" will be uncovered in Texas. Pls.' Opp. at 11. Furthermore, the final ruling to dismiss plaintiffs' appeal by the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office was issued in Washington, D.C., where the Department of Homeland Security is headquartered. See Ex. F to Compl. [Dkt. # 1-10] ("Dismissal Letter") at 1. Based on these reasons, plaintiffs submit that their choice to bring the case in the District of Columbia should be upheld. Pls.' Opp. at 16.

The Court will decline to transfer the case because the public and private interests weigh more heavily against transferring the case.

1. The private factors

i. Plaintiffs' choice of forum

Plaintiffs chose to bring the case in the District of Columbia, and the D.C. Circuit has long held that "a plaintiff's choice of forum will rarely be disturbed ... unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of the defendant." Gross v. Owen , 221 F.2d 94, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Although the initial denial of plaintiffs' I-140 petition was decided in Texas, the decision on which this case is based – the dismissal of plaintiffs' appeal of the I-140 petition denial – was issued in the District of Columbia, where the Department of Homeland Security is located. Indeed, defendant Velarde, who issued the dismissal and is sued in her official capacity as a USCIS employee, resides in the District of Columbia. These factors, along with the deference accorded to plaintiffs' choice of venue, weigh...