Convention Center Coalition v. City of Seattle
| Decision Date | 11 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 52264-2,52264-2 |
| Citation | 107 Wn.2d 370,730 P.2d 636 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | CONVENTION CENTER COALITION, a Washington non-profit corporation, Appellant, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, a Washington municipal corporation; Washington State Convention and Trade Center, a public, non-profit corporation; Westside Federal Savings and Loan Association, a Federal Savings and Loan Association, Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation, and Industrial Indemnity Corp., Respondents. |
Peter Eglick, Seattle, for appellant.
Douglas Jewett, Seattle City Atty., James Fern, Jr., Asst., Seattle, for respondent City of Seattle.
Hillis, Cairncross, Clark & Martin, P.S., Jerome Hillis, Richard R. Wilson, Culp, Dwyer, Guterson & Grader, John Ebel, Seattle, for respondent Washington State Convention and Trade Center.
Roberts & Shefelman, Thomas M. Walsh, J. Tayloe Washburn, Lizbeth Englund, Perkins, Coie, Omar S. Parker, Jr., Seattle, for respondent Westside Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.
Was the Seattle City Council's enactment of a new housing preservation ordinance that exempted the Washington State Trade and Convention Center from certain housing replacement requirements a valid legislative act? The trial court answered yes. After direct review, we affirm.
Respondent Washington State Convention and Trade Center Corporation (WSCTC) is a public nonprofit corporation established pursuant to RCW 67.40 to acquire, construct and operate a state convention and trade facility (convention center) in Seattle. Appellant Convention Center Coalition (Coalition) is a Washington nonprofit corporation established to promote sound budgeting, siting and planning for the WSCTC project. The Coalition is particularly concerned with minimizing any adverse impacts of the convention center on the surrounding community.
WSCTC has begun construction of the convention center in downtown Seattle at a site spanning the Interstate 5 freeway corridor in downtown Seattle. The proposed project includes both public and private components. Originally, the private portion of the project was to be developed by CHG International, Inc. and CHG/Herfin Associates Seventh Avenue (collectively referred to as CHG), which owned substantial portions of the real estate on which the project is to be built. After CHG experienced financial difficulties, however, Westside Federal Savings and Loan Association acquired CHG's interest in the project. Westside Federal, in turn, also experienced financial difficulties. Finally, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board appointed respondent Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) as receiver for Westside Federal. By stipulation of the parties, FSLIC became a party defendant in lieu of Westside Federal.
WSCTC elected to comply voluntarily with respondent City of Seattle's local land use approval process. WSCTC first applied for zoning approval in 1983. In May 1984, the Seattle City Council (Council) amended the Seattle Municipal Code to allow construction of a convention center in certain zones. The Council enacted a related ordinance setting forth the criteria to be considered in establishing conditions as a part of the use permit for any facility approved.
In June 1984, WSCTC applied for a conditional use permit (permit) from the Council. After public hearings on WSCTC's application, a hearing examiner recommended that the Council grant the permit subject to certain conditions. In October 1984, the Council granted WSCTC's conditional use permit. The conditions imposed by the Council included specific housing replacement and mitigation provisions that WSCTC and CHG were obligated to satisfy. The Council made no reference in the permit to an existing housing preservation ordinance, although two references were made in the Council's findings and conclusions in support of its decision to grant the permit.
Several months after the Council issued the permit, a dispute arose concerning the intent of the permit housing mitigation provisions. Councilman Kraabel took the position that the permit was complete as passed with regard to the housing mitigation provisions. Councilman Street contended that the permit was meant to be supplemented by the existing housing preservation ordinance, and that the Council had intended that WSCTC and CHG comply with both the existing ordinance and the housing mitigation conditions in the permit. Compliance with both requirements would cost the convention center project more than $1 million for additional housing loss mitigation.
During this time, the Council was reviewing its housing preservation policies. On July 15, 1985, the Council repealed the existing ordinance and enacted a new housing preservation ordinance. The new ordinance established citywide housing preservation policies to be applied to various properties, buildings, and developments throughout the city. The new ordinance requires, among other things, that owners of certain buildings provide replacement housing when demolishing or changing the use of those buildings. The new ordinance also requires notice to tenants, protection against evictions, and relocation assistance. Section 12 of the new ordinance sets forth several exceptions to the housing replacement requirement. Section 12(D) sets forth the exemption at issue:
D. The housing replacement requirement shall not apply to the demolition or change of use of any housing unit in a building subject to and referenced in housing mitigation conditions included in a property use and development agreement or Council conditional use permit approved by the City prior to the effective date of [this Ordinance].
Seattle Municipal Code 22.210.170(D).
No public hearing was held in connection with the effect of section 12(D) on the WSCTC conditional use permit.
The Coalition filed suit on July 1, 1985, alleging that the Council's enactment of section 12(D) was special legislation that improperly changed its prior quasi-judicial decision to grant the permit subject to conditions. Contending that the Council's action had denied its members due process and equal protection under the state and federal constitutions, the Coalition sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as writs of mandamus and prohibition. The trial court found that the Coalition had standing to assert its claims, but entered summary judgment for defendants on all issues.
The Coalition appeals the trial court's judgment. Respondents cross-appeal the trial court's finding that the Coalition had standing to assert equal protection claims. FSLIC has filed a motion to dismiss the Coalition's claims for lack of jurisdiction.
The Coalition argues that because the permit was unclear as to whether the housing replacement requirements in the old ordinance supplemented the permit, i.e., imposed additional requirements, the Council should have reopened quasi-judicial proceedings to clarify the permit. Instead the Council chose to pass section 12(D), exempting the project from the housing replacement requirements in the new ordinance, thereby limiting requirements to those in the permit, rather than the permit requirements plus the ordinance requirements. The Coalition concludes that the Council, in effect, legislatively changed its prior quasi-judicial decision granting the permit and improperly circumvented quasi-judicial due process requirements. The Coalition asserts that conflicting statements made by council members after the permit was granted, along with the Council's findings and conclusions made before granting the permit, showed that the permit was unclear as to whether the housing replacement requirements in the old ordinance applied. We disagree.
The Coalition cannot rely upon the council members' statements to show the Council's intent. What may have been the intent of an individual legislator may not have been the intent of the legislative body that passed the act. Johnson v. Continental West, 99 Wash.2d 555, 560-61, 663 P.2d 482 (1983). Moreover, the Council's findings and conclusions do not show that the Council meant to include the old ordinance requirements within the permit. Instead, they show that the Council contemplated the general housing impacts of downtown development as a whole. City Council finding 17, for example, says that the City's housing preservation ordinance will replace housing lost as a result of "development induced by the Convention Center". Clerk's Papers, at 70. Similarly, City Council conclusion 6 states that the ordinance will partially mitigate the impacts of "Convention Center related development". Clerk's Papers, at 71. This evidence does not render the permit ambiguous. If the Council had intended to incorporate the old ordinance requirements, it could have done so. The Council did, for example, specifically include conditions requiring the WSCTC project to incorporate certain features of the State Energy Code and the Seattle Code for Energy Conservation. The Coalition has failed to show any evidence that the permit was intended to incorporate additional conditions. We hold that section 12(D) did not change or amend the permit.
The Coalition also argues that the Council improperly enacted section 12(D). The Coalition alleges that section 12(D) is a specific exemption of the WSCTC project which the Council should have enacted through quasi-judicial rather than legislative proceedings. The authorities cited by the Coalition do not support this argument.
In the first case relied on by the Coalition, the issue was the character of a city council's action denying a special use permit. Pentagram Corp. v. Seattle, 28 Wash.App. 219, 622 P.2d 892 (1981). The Council was authorized by the City's building code to review the permits in question. The court noted that the Council acted legislatively when adopting the enabling section of the building code, but quasi-judicially in reviewing the permit pursuant to the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
O'Day v. King County
... ... Raymond, Deputy, Seattle, for petitioners ... Burns & Hammerly, ... See Convention Center Coalition v. Seattle, 107 Wash.2d 370, 378, 730 P.2d ... The Bittner court ruled that the city could not use the fact of a prior criminal conviction as ... ...
-
Griffin v. Eller
... ... Garrett, Bellingham, Jeffrey L. Needle, Seattle on behalf of Washington Employment Lawyers Association and ... Rose, Seattle, on behalf of Northwest Women's Law Center, for amicus curiae ... Marilyn J ... Unlike Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wash.2d 97, 922 P.2d 43 (1996), we are here ... Convention Ctr. Coalition v. City of Seattle, 107 Wash.2d 370, 378-79, ... ...
-
CLEAN v. State
... ... John Scannell, Seattle, for Appellant John Scannell ... Norm ... See, e.g., Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 420 Pa. 14, 215 A.2d 894, 896 (1966) ("A ... the primary purpose of legislation--to increase convention and sports activity in the St. Louis City-County area"); ... Convention Ctr. Coalition v. City of Seattle, 107 Wash.2d 370, 380, 730 P.2d 636 ... ...
-
American Network, Inc. v. Washington Utilities and Transp. Com'n
...601 P.2d 936 (1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 979, 100 S.Ct. 2958, 64 L.Ed.2d 835 (1980)). See also Convention Ctr. Coalition v. Seattle, 107 Wash.2d 370, 378, 730 P.2d 636 (1986). In Paulson, this court also ruled that under the minimum scrutiny test, the classification need only (1) app......