Conway v. Alexander
| Decision Date | 20 October 1925 |
| Docket Number | 36736 |
| Citation | 205 N.W. 351,200 Iowa 705 |
| Parties | MATT CONWAY, Appellant, v. ERNEST C. ALEXANDER et al., Appellees |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Union District Court.--HOMER A. FULLER, Judge.
SUIT in replevin to obtain possession of a motor truck, under a chattel mortgage given thereon by the defendant to the plaintiff. There was an intervention by A. J. Alexander father of the defendant; claiming the right of possession of the same motor truck by virtue of his alleged ownership thereof. The defendant E. C. Alexander answered with (1) general denial; (2) an affirmative defense of fraud in obtaining the mortgage. He also averred, in support of his general denial, that the intervener was the owner of the property, and had the right of possession thereof. There was a trial to a jury, and a verdict rendered for the intervener and judgment entered thereon. The plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Higbee & McEniry, for appellant.
E. L Carroll, for appellees.
I.
The plaintiff was a local dealer in automobiles and motor trucks at Creston, Iowa. He sold the truck upon which he now has a mortgage. He claims to have sold it to the defendant E. C. Alexander, the mortgagor. The contrary claim by the intervener is that plaintiff sold the truck to the intervener, who then and there paid him the purchase price thereof in full. The dispute in the record is, who was the purchaser of the truck? Was it the father or the son? The son lived in Lenox in Taylor County. The father lived on a farm near Lenox, but in Adams County. The plaintiff's place of business was in Union County. The sale was made at Lenox. It was made on behalf of plaintiff by John Conway and one Gillan. The former was the brother of the plaintiff, and the latter was a traveling salesman for the manufacturing company. The defendant Alexander had once negotiated for the purchase of the truck, but was unable to make the first payment thereon, and the deal fell through. The defendant had no means or financial responsibility, and was not, in fact, able to purchase the truck. Its regular price was approximately $ 3,200. After the deal with the defendant fell through, the agents of the plaintiff sought to interest the father in the deal, and negotiated with him for the purchase. The intervener's testimony is that he offered to buy the truck at the price of $ 2,500. The negotiations extended over a couple of days, during which time the intervener had refused to consider any other price than $ 2,500, according to his testimony. The result of the negotiations was that the agents agreed to accept the $ 2,500, and the intervener then and there drew his check for that sum, payable to the plaintiff herein. He placed the check in the possession of his son, for delivery to the plaintiff upon delivery of the truck. The truck was to be delivered, and was delivered, at Council Bluffs. Upon receipt of the truck, the intervener's check was delivered to the plaintiff's agents. The dispute between the parties is one largely of inference and conclusion, rather than as to detailed facts. There is no dispute but that the father named the price at $ 2,500, and that he refused to consider any other price. Nor is there any dispute that the only payment made for or on the truck was the father's check for $ 2,500, payable directly to the plaintiff. The contention for the plaintiff is that the father in these negotiations was simply aiding his son; and that he bought the truck for his son, and allowed the son to take possession of the same and to use it; that the check for $ 2,500 was a partial payment only. The father was not present when the truck was actually delivered. It was after receiving the $ 2,500 check that the plaintiff's agents exacted a mortgage from the son for the alleged balance of the purchase price. There is no dispute in the evidence that this was done without the knowledge or consent of the father. Nor is there any dispute that the father was entirely ignorant of any claim by plaintiff for the balance of the purchase price, or of any arrangement, if any, between the plaintiff's agents and the son, for a mortgage for such alleged balance. The evidence is such that it would warrant the jury in finding that the intervener believed he was buying the truck for $ 2,500, and that the plaintiff's agents knew that he so believed. It would warrant also a finding that the arrangement between plaintiff's agents and the son for the mortgage for the alleged balance was clandestine, so far as the intervener was concerned.
The verdict of the jury was for the intervener. This was the equivalent of a finding that the intervener was the purchaser of the truck. The plaintiff moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the verdict had no support in the evidence, and renewed such ground in a motion for a new trial. The motion in each case was properly overruled. The evidence, as already indicated, was sufficient to support such a finding.
II. Complaint is directed to the instructions of the court on the ground that they laid an undue burden upon the plaintiff. The court directed the jury that the burden was upon the plaintiff to prove his case, by preponderance of the evidence. There can be no complaint of this. It appears however, that the defendant pleaded a defense of fraud, in that the plaintiff's agents caused him to become under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and obtained the mortgage from him under such circumstances. The court withdrew this issue of fraud from the jury. The plaintiff contends that the court should therefore have directed a verdict for the plaintiff against the defendant, in that the burden resting upon the plaintiff had thereby...
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