Conway v. Mister Softee, Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 March 1968
• Docket Number: No. A--32,A--32
• Citation: 51 N.J. 254,239 A.2d 241
• Parties: Mary O. CONWAY, Petitioner, v. MISTER SOFTEE, INC., a Pennsylvania corporation, Respondent-Appellant, v. MISTER SOFTEE, INC., an Illinois corporation, Co-Respondent-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 254

51 N.J. 254

239 A.2d 241

Mary O. CONWAY, Petitioner, v. MISTER SOFTEE, INC., a Pennsylvania corporation, Respondent-Appellant, v. MISTER SOFTEE, INC., an Illinois corporation,

Co-Respondent-Respondent.

No. A--32.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Oct. 24, 1967.

Decided March 4, 1968.

George J. Kenny, Newark, for respondent-appellant, Mister Softee, Inc., a Pennsylvania corp. (Pindar, McElroy, Connell & Foley, Newark, attorneys, George J. Kenny, Newark, on the brief).

Edward Suski, Jr., Camden, for corespondent-respondent, Mister Softee, Inc., an Illinois corp. (Cahill & Wilinski, Camden, attorneys, Edward Suski, Jr., Camden, on the brief).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

PROCTOR, J.

Joseph P. Conway was killed in an automobile collision in the State of Illinois on April 12, 1961. His widow, Mary O. Conway, filed a dependency claim petition in the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Division against Mister Softee, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation (Pennsylvania), alleging that Pennsylvania was the decedent's employer at the time of his death. An award was entered in her favor and is not challenged here. Thereafter, Pennsylvania by its compensation carrier, Pennsylvania Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Company, filed a petition in the Workmen's Compensation Division alleging that Mister Softee of Illinois, Inc., an Illinois corporation (Illinois), was a joint employer of Joseph P. Conway at the time of his death. This petition, captioned in the original cause, sought contribution from Illinois, which was not a party to the original claim proceeding. Later, a motion was filed by Pennsylvania to reopen the compensation proceeding in order that Illinois might be joined and its liability as a joint employer established. ¹ The judge of compensation dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and denied the motion to reopen. On Pennsylvania's appeal to the County Court the judgment of the Division was sustained. 91 N.J.Super. 179, 219 A.2d 536 (Camden Co.Ct.1966). The Appellate Division affirmed. 93 N.J.Super. 286, 225 A.2d 707 (App.Div.1967). This Court granted Pennsylvania's petition for certification. 48 N.J. 578, 227 A.2d 136 (1967).

At the original hearing before the Workmen's Compensation Division it appeared that Pennsylvania is a manufacturer and distributor of mobile ice cream selling units with its plant and main offices at Runnemede, New Jersey. The judge of compensation found that in January 1961 the deceased, Joseph P Conway, was hired to represent Pennsylvania in the Chicago, Ill. area and to take over the operation of Illinois, a previously dormant corporation, as its president. The president of Pennsylvania, William Conway, a brother of the decedent, testified, that Illinois was formed to create new Mister Softee franchises in the Chicago area to expand the market for Pennsylvania's products. He stated, 'He (Joseph P. Conway) was hired as manager of the Chicago operation and he was proclaimed president of Mr. Softee of Illinois in order to have a proper status, and, also, the name Conway at the time was very synonymous with Mr. Softee, which was a new business venture and it was growing and the mobile business was growing and we figured in order to carry the name of Conway and Mr. Softee in the Midwest, we gave him the title of president in order to give us a better status there.' At the time of the fatal accident Joseph P. Conway was a passenger in a motor vehicle owned by Pennsylvania and operated by one of its employees. He was on his way to the closing of a sale of a Pennsylvania mobile ice cream unit. The sole issue before the Compensation Division at the original hearing was whether decedent was an employee of Pennsylvania at the time of his death. The judge found that the decedent was an employee of Pennsylvania but expressed the opinion that he was employed by both Pennsylvania and Illinois. This finding, of course, is not binding upon Illinois which was not a party to the proceeding.

The preliminary inquiry is whether the Workmen's Compensation Division and the courts below were correct in their conclusion that the Division was without jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by Pennsylvania against Illinois. Insofar as the petition represents an attempt to exercise a right to institute an original proceeding in the Division by one employer against another employer, we agreed that the Division was without jurisdiction. The Workmen's Compensation Division has only such jurisdiction as in conferred expressly by statute or such as is by fair implication incident to the authority expressly granted. P. Bronstein & Co., Inc. v. Hoffman, 117 N.J.L. 500, 507, 189 A. 121 (E. & A. 1937). Any reasonable doubt of the existence of a particular power in the Division is to be resolved against such power. Ibid.; Nagy v. Ford Motor Co., 6 N.J. 341, 349, 78 A.2d 709 (1951). We find nothing in the express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act which might confer jurisdiction over Pennsylvania's petition. Under the Act only a 'claimant for compensation under article 2 of this chapter (§ 34:15--7 et seq.)' may file a petition. N.J.S.A. 34:15--51. Pennsylvania's claim here is not for 'compensation,' nor is Pennsylvania a 'claimant under article 2' which article provides solely for benefits to an employee or his dependents. Nor do we find any provision of the Act which impliedly gives the Division the authority to entertain an independent action between employers. The exercise by the Division of jurisdiction over litigation Solely between two employers in no way would advance the purposes of the Compensation Act and cannot be considered an incident to the powers expressly granted by the Act. See Rosecrans v. Robert Reiner, Inc., 4 N.J.Misc 769 (N.J.Dept.Labor 1926); 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 92.40, p. 449 (1961). Cf. Dias v. N.J. Manuf. Casualty Ins. Co., 4 N.J.Misc. 102, 132 A. 101 (Sup.Ct.1926); Moore v. Derees, 97 N.J.L. 378, 117 A. 480 (Sup.Ct.1922).

Of course, when two or more alleged employers are brought before the Workmen's Compensation Division at the hearing on the employee's claim petition, the Division must determine whether one or more of the respondents should be liable for compensation. Del Peso v. H. A. Bar and Restaurant Co., Inc., 75 N.J.Super. 108, 182 A.2d 373 (App.Div.), certification denied, 38 N.J. 309, 184 A.2d 421 (1962). Further, if a finding of joint employment is made, one joint employer may sue a coemployer for contribution in the event it refused to pay its pro rata share. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Popovich, 18 N.J. 218, 113 A.2d 666 (1955). Although the Division does not have jurisdiction over a separate petition between employers, the Division has sole jurisdiction over workmen's compensation claims and as an incident thereto it has jurisdiction over claims between or among several alleged employers. The Division's adjudication of joint employment, however, must be made in the proceeding instituted by the employee. Cf. Stafford v. Pabco Products, Inc., 53 N.J.Super. 300, 305, 147 A.2d 286 (App.Div.1958).

Pennsylvania argues that under this view it would be without a remedy since the employee's widow did not join Illinois in the original proceeding. We agree that Pennsylvania could not establish its claim of joint employment against Illinois in any forum other than the Workmen's Compensation Division. However, Pennsylvania could have impleaded Illinois as a co-respondent in the compensation action. See Williams v. Bituminous Casualty Corporation, 51 N.J. 146, 238 A.2d 177 (1968). Permitting such an impleader is certainly 'by fair implication and intendment incident to' (P. Bronstein & Co., Inc. v. Hoffman, supra at 117 N.J.L. p. 507, 189 A. p. 125) the Division's duty to make a proper finding of employment before entering an award. Indeed, in the present case the judge of compensation said that whenever it appeared to him that there was a possibility of joint employment, he would require the petitioner to bring the alleged joint employer into the action. If, as Pennsylvania contends, this procedure adopted by the judge of compensation is too informal, the Director of the Division of Workmen's Compensation should...