Conway v. Quinn

• Decision Date: 20 November 1942
• Docket Number: No. 26311.,26311.
• Citation: 168 S.W.2d 445
• Parties: CONWAY v. QUINN, Sheriff.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

168 S.W.2d 445

CONWAY v. QUINN, Sheriff.

No. 26311.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

November 20, 1942.

Rehearing Denied December 9, 1942.

Original habeas corpus proceeding by the State of Missouri ex parte Truman S. Conway against Thomas H. Quinn, as Sheriff of the City of St. Louis.

"Not to be reported in State Reports."

Petitioner discharged.

Clyde H. Snider, Asst. Circuit Atty., and Henry G. Morris, Acting Circuit Atty., both of St. Louis, for petitioner.

Louis B. Sher and David M. Grant, both of St. Louis, for respondent.

HUGHES, Presiding Judge.

In response to our writ of habeas corpus heretofore issued, Thomas H. Quinn, Sheriff of the City of St. Louis, makes return that petitioner, Truman S. Conway, was placed in his custody by virtue of a commitment issued November 9, 1942, out of Division 11 of the Circuit Court for the Eighth Judicial Circuit of Missouri, a circuit in and for the City of St. Louis, Missouri. That said Court had jurisdiction of and was administering the general criminal law, and on September 14, 1942, duly empaneled and charged a grand jury to investigate crime committed within the City of St. Louis, and that during their sessions the grand jury investigated the death of one Edward Melendes, who died while in the custody of the St. Louis Police Department; that during the sessions of the grand jury the petitioner was assigned to the grand jury by the acting Circuit Attorney, to take down and transcribe evidence before the grand jury; that petitioner had taken in shorthand notes of the evidence and proceedings before the grand jury in connection with the aforesaid investigation. That on October 20, 1942, an order was spread upon the minutes of said court by the judge thereof as follows: "It having come to the Court's attention that the stenographer for the September Term, 1942, Grand Jury, Mr. Truman Conway, has refused to transcribe and deliver to this court, or has been directed by Mr. Henry G. Morris, Acting Circuit Attorney for the City of St. Louis, Missouri, to withhold from this Court a transcription in legible English of his shorthand notes of the evidence and proceedings had and pending before it in connection with an investigation now pending before this Grand Jury, into the causes of the death of one Edward Melendes, a citizen of Mexico, and to place the responsibility therefor, if any, and the Court having determined to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction over the sessions of this Grand Jury in this matter, and treating them particularly as sessions of this Court, doth herewith order and direct the stenographer for this Grand Jury, Mr. Truman Conway, to transcribe forth-with all of his said notes of all of the evidence and proceedings had herein, in legible English, for use of the State of Missouri, and to deliver a copy of the same unto this Court forthwith or within a reasonable time and to abide this order and fail not herein at his peril."

There is no dispute as to the facts. The petitioner refused to comply with the above order, for the reason that the court had no authority under the law to make such order, and that petitioner was at all times acting as clerk and stenographer under appointment and direction of the acting Circuit Attorney, and by virtue of Section 12910, R.S.1939, Mo.R.S.A. § 12910. It further appears that at the time of said order the grand jury was engaged in a second investigation of the same matter, no indictment resulting from the former investigation.

Petitioner contends that the order of the circuit judge was in excess of his authority, and constitutes no lawful basis for the order of committment. This must be determined upon a consideration of the status and duties of petitioner, and of the functions and purposes of the grand jury, and the secrecy which necessarily surrounds all of its deliberations, as we find from the common law, with such modifications thereof as the Legislature has seen proper to make.

The institution of the grand jury is of ancient origin; it goes back many centuries, and is designed as a means not only of bringing to trial persons accused of public offences upon just grounds, but also as a means of protecting the citizen against unfounded accusation, whether it comes from government or be prompted by partisan passion or private enmity. 28 C. J. 763, § 4.

The law is further stated as follows: "All of its proceedings should be legally sealed against divulgence. The policy is to inspire the jurors with a confidence of security in the discharge of their responsible duties, so that they may deliberate and decide without apprehension of any detriment from an accused or any other person; * * to prevent perjury and subornation of perjury by withholding the knowledge of facts testified to before the grand jury, which, if known, would be for the interest of the accused or his confederates to attempt to disprove by procuring false testimony; and also to save the citizen the trouble, expense, and disgrace of being arraigned and tried in public on a criminal charge, unless there is sufficient cause for it." 24 Am.Jur. 865, § 47.

Another general principle of law is thus stated: "The language of the oath whereby grand jurors are sworn to keep secret the state's, their fellows', and their own counsel has obvious reference to all things which transpire in the grand jury room, and the principle underlying this injunction of secrecy extends equally to all persons required by law to be present before the grand jury. * * A trial judge, in the absence of statute permitting it, may make no inquiry into the proceedings of the grand jury to ascertain the number concurring or whether the number concurring included a disqualified member." 24 Am.Jur. 866, § 48; 12 R.C.L. 1037, § 22. And the following: "The rule of secrecy concerning matters transpiring in the grand jury room, it has been said, is not designed for the protection of witnesses before the grand jury, but for that of the grand jurors, and in furtherance of the public justice." 24 Am.Jur. 866, § 49.

The grand jury are so far an independent body that — "It has been held to be a manifest abuse of discretion for the court in its charge to the grand jury to express an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a person accused of crime to be investigated, to express an opinion that there is evidence warranting the indictment of parties for violation of particular laws, or specifically to direct the attention of the grand jury to any named person as a subject for investigation. And the court should not in its charge assume the function committed by law to the grand jury of determining that a crime has been committed." 28 C.J. 786, § 59.

These principles which have come down to us through the ages have been modified but slightly by our statutes. Rather they have been adhered to and safeguarded, as witness...