Cook County Bd. of Review v. PTAB, No. 1-00-1183

• Decision Date: 20 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. 1-00-2595., No. 1-00-2238, No. 1-00-2213, No. 1-00-2239, No. 1-00-2237, No. 1-00-1183, No. 1-00-2228, No. 1-00-1184
• Citation: 274 Ill.Dec. 212,791 N.E.2d 8,339 Ill. App.3d 529
• Parties: The COOK COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD; Robert Bosch Corporation, Taxpayer; and Komarek School District No. 94, Taxing District, Respondents-Appellees. The Cook County Board of Review, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The Property Tax Appeal Board; Corporate Lakes of Matteson LLC, Taxpayer; Rich Township High School District No. 227, Taxing District; and Rich Township Elementary School District No. 159, Taxing District, Respondents-Appellees. The Cook County Board of Review, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The Property Tax Appeal Board; Lake Holiday Properties, Taxpayer; Union Ridge School District No. 86, Taxing District; and Board of Education of Ridgewood High School District No. 234, Taxing District, Respondents-Appellees. The Cook County Board of Review, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The Property Tax Appeal Board, and Kraft Foods, Inc., Taxpayer, Respondents-Appellees. The Cook County Board of Review, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The Property Tax Appeal Board, and J.C. Penney Company, Inc., Taxpayer, Respondents-Appellees. The Cook County Board of Review, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The Property Tax Appeal Board; Ace Hardware Corporation, Taxpayer; Board of Education Elementary School District No. 159, Taxing District; and Board of Education of Rich Township High School District No. 227, Taxing District, Respondents-Appellees. The Cook County Board of Review, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The Property Tax Appeal Board; and Krupp Realty Park Place, Chicago Limited Partnership, Taxpayer, Respondents-Appellees. The Cook County Board of Review, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The Property Tax Appeal Board; and W.W. Grainger, Inc., Taxpayer, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

791 N.E.2d 8

339 Ill. App.3d 529

274 Ill.Dec. 212

The COOK COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD; Robert Bosch Corporation, Taxpayer; and Komarek School District No. 94, Taxing District, Respondents-Appellees.

The Cook County Board of Review, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The Property Tax Appeal Board; Corporate Lakes of Matteson LLC, Taxpayer; Rich Township High School District No. 227, Taxing District; and Rich Township Elementary School District No. 159, Taxing District, Respondents-Appellees.

The Cook County Board of Review, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The Property Tax Appeal Board; Lake Holiday Properties, Taxpayer; Union Ridge School District No. 86, Taxing District; and Board of Education of Ridgewood High School District No. 234, Taxing District, Respondents-Appellees.

The Cook County Board of Review, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The Property Tax Appeal Board, and Kraft Foods, Inc., Taxpayer, Respondents-Appellees.

The Cook County Board of Review, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The Property Tax Appeal Board, and J.C. Penney Company, Inc., Taxpayer, Respondents-Appellees.

The Cook County Board of Review, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The Property Tax Appeal Board; Ace Hardware Corporation, Taxpayer; Board of Education Elementary School District No. 159, Taxing District; and Board of Education of Rich Township High School District No. 227, Taxing District, Respondents-Appellees.

The Cook County Board of Review, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The Property Tax Appeal Board; and Krupp Realty Park Place, Chicago Limited Partnership, Taxpayer, Respondents-Appellees.

The Cook County Board of Review, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The Property Tax Appeal Board; and W.W. Grainger, Inc., Taxpayer, Respondents-Appellees.

Nos. 1-00-1183, 1-00-1184, 1-00-2213, 1-00-2228, 1-00-2237, 1-00-2238, 1-00-2239, 1-00-2595.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

August 20, 2002.

As Modified Upon Denial of Rehearing June 30, 2003.

Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney of Cook County, Patrick Driscoll, Deputy State's Attorney, Chicago (Marie E. Smuda, Whitney Carlisle and Michael Prinzi, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for Appellant.

James C. Franczek, Jr., Michael J. Hernandez and Ares G. Dalianis, of Franczek Sullivan, P.C., Chicago, for Amicus Curiae Chicago Board of Education, in support of appellant.

Thomas R. Burney and J. David Ballinger, of Schain, Burney, Ross & Citron, Ltd., Chicago, for Amicus Curiae Village of Palatine, in support of appellant.

Judith N. Kolman and Peter M. Rosenthal, of Rosenthal, Murphy & Coblentz, Chicago, for Amicus Curiae Village of Rosemont, in support of appellant.

Michael G. Rosenberg, Chicago, for Amicus Curiae Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, in support of appellant.

William R. Quinlan, James R. Carroll and Brian J. Alesia, of Quinlan & Carroll, Ltd., Chicago, for Amicus Curiae John H. Stroger, Jr. and Board of Commissioners of Cook County, in support of appellant.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Joel Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Karen J. Dimond, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, for Appellee Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board.

David A. Epstein of David A. Epstein, Ltd., Chicago, for Amicus Curiae Chicagoland Chamber of Commerce, in support of the taxpayers and Illinois property Tax Appeal Board.

Gregory J. Lafakis of Doody and Lafakis, Ltd., Chicago, for Appellees Robert Bosch Corporation, Kraft Foods, Inc., Ace Hardware Corporation and W.W. Grainger Inc.

Shelly B. Kulwin and Jeffrey R. Kulwin, of Kulwin & Associates, Chicago, for Appellee Corporate Lakes of Matteson, LLC.

John M. Izzo and Joel R. DeTella, of Scariano, Ellch, Himes, Sraga & Petrarca, Chtd., Chicago Heights, for Appellees Boards of Education of Rich Township High School District No. 227 and of Rich Township Elementary School District No. 159.

Chicago Limited Partnership, Robert M. Sarnoff, Michael F. Baccash and Steven Kandelman, of Sarnoff & Baccash, Chicago, for Appellees Lake Holiday Properties and Krupp Realty Park Place.

Terrence J. Griffin and Eugene P. Griffin, of Eugene L. Griffin & Associates, Ltd., Chicago, for Appellee J.C. Penney Company, Inc.

MODIFIED ON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING

Justice CAHILL delivered the opinion of the court:

We review eight consolidated appeals brought by the Cook County Board of Review (the Board), challenging decisions of the state Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB). In each case PTAB first rejected a level of assessment percentage on commercial property mandated by the Cook County Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance (Cook County ordinance or the ordinance) (Cook County Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance, Ord. No. 80-0-14 (amended November 6, 1997)). PTAB then used a median level assessment percentage derived from sales ratio studies prepared by the Illinois Department of Revenue (the Department).

The decision of our supreme court in Walsh v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 181 Ill.2d 228, 229 Ill.Dec. 487, 692 N.E.2d 260 (1998), is brief, clear and relevant to a consideration of the cases before us. Here are two excerpts that inform our response:

"The Illinois property tax scheme is grounded in article IX, section 4, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which provides in pertinent part that real estate taxes `shall be levied uniformly by valuation ascertained as the General Assembly shall provide by law.' Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 4(a). Uniformity requires equality in the burden of taxation. Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131 Ill.2d 1, 20, 136 Ill.Dec. 76, 544 N.E.2d 762 (1989). This, in turn, requires equality of taxation in proportion to the value of the property taxed. Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395, 401, 169 N.E.2d 769 (1960). Thus, taxing officials may not value the same kinds of properties within the same taxing boundary at different proportions of their true value. Kankakee County Board of Review, 131 Ill.2d at 20, 136 Ill.Dec. 76, 544 N.E.2d 762. The party objecting to an assessment on lack of uniformity grounds bears the burden of proving the disparity by clear and convincing evidence. Kankakee County Board of Review, 131 Ill.2d at 22, 136 Ill.Dec. 76, 544 N.E.2d 762.

* * *

`[The] great central and dominant idea of the constitution is uniformity of taxation, and no power exists or should exist in any corporate authority to go counter to this command of the fundamental law. Therefore one person cannot be compelled to pay a greater proportion of taxes, according to the value of his property, than another, and where assessors have disregarded the injunction of the law and made an assessment of property far below its real cash value, their misconduct must also follow the principle of uniformity and their assessments of all persons must be at the same proportional value.' (Emphasis added.) People's Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Stuckart, 286 Ill. 164, 173, 121 N.E. 629 (1918).

To hold otherwise would sanction assessed valuations on different proportions of like properties in direct contravention of the uniformity clause. Ill. Const.1970, art. IX, § 4(a); Kankakee County Board of Review, 131 Ill.2d at 20, 136 Ill.Dec. 76, 544 N.E.2d 762." Walsh, 181 Ill.2d at 234-37, 229 Ill.Dec. 487, 692 N.E.2d 260.

With Walsh in mind, we stress at the outset that the issue the parties would like us to decide, and the first issue raised by the Board—whether PTAB has the power to determine in an appropriate case that the percentages mandated by the Cook County ordinance for commercial property have not been uniformly applied—cannot be reached for two reasons: (1) the taxpayers never raised the issue of uniformity in six of the eight cases; and (2) in two cases, the evidence tendered by the taxpayers is wholly inadequate for meaningful appellate review. In concluding that the issue of PTAB's power to deviate from the Cook County ordinance need not be reached, we do not mean to suggest that the records and briefs before us are otherwise adequate to fairly address the issue. We know that administrative agencies lack the authority to invalidate a statute on constitutional grounds or even to question its validity. Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill.2d 262, 230 Ill.Dec. 991, 695 N.E.2d 481 (1998). None of the parties raised this issue, nor would we address it unless necessary for a resolution of the case after full and fair briefing.

The Board raises the following issues on appeal in all eight cases:

(1) PTAB lacked authority to substitute median levels of assessment based on Department of Revenue sales ratio studies for those contained in the Cook County ordinance.

(2) The taxpayers did not raise the issue of uniformity and failed to present evidence on the issue in six cases, and presented untimely or insufficient evidence in two cases.

(3) PTAB took "official" notice of evidence not introduced by the taxpayers— the Department of Revenue sales ratio studies—contravening its own rules and in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/1-1 et seq. (West 1998)).

(4) The PTAB decisions in all eight cases were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

(5) In four of the eight cases the fair market value of the property set by PTAB is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

In response, PTAB argues that: (1) PTAB has the authority and duty under the Illinois constitutional requirement of uniformity to apply a median level of assessment derived from the Department of Revenue's sales ratio studies; (2) PTAB may take judicial notice of the studies even though the parties did not introduce them in evidence; and (3) the Board waived the argument that PTAB lacked authority to apply a median level of assessment.

In the course of this opinion we conclude that the second and third issues raised by the Board are dispositive and that PTAB's orders substituting median level percentages for those codified...