Cook v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
| Decision Date | 15 January 1941 |
| Docket Number | 15203. |
| Citation | 13 S.E.2d 1,196 S.C. 230 |
| Parties | COOK v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. et al. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Clarendon County; Wm. H Grimball, Judge.
Action by H. B. Cook against Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company and another, for consequential damages to plaintiff for the loss of his wife's society, companionship, and services and for damages suffered by reason of having to pay money for hospital expenses and medical attendance as result of collision between automobile in which plaintiff's wife was riding and a train at a crossing. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Charlton DuRant, of Manning, and Woods & Woods, of Marion, for appellants.
John G. Dinkins, of Manning, for respondent.
The wife of the plaintiff was one of eight persons--all women, including the driver--riding in an automobile which was in collision with one of defendant's freight trains on June 25, 1937, at a railroad crossing in the unincorporated town of Cades. As a result of the collision the plaintiff's wife, who rode in the back seat, received grave and permanent injuries, which, it is alleged, were caused by the negligence of the railroad company and its engineer and co-defendant, B. S. Artopee. The plaintiff instituted this action for the recovery of consequential damages for the loss of his wife's society, companionship, and services; and for damages suffered by reason of having to pay out considerable sums of money for hospital expense and medical attendance. At the time of the accident Mrs. Cook was fifty years of age, was in good health, and was the mother of six children. The trial resulted in a verdict against the defendants in the sum of $10,000.
This court is asked to reverse the judgment in this case on the ground that the plaintiff's wife and the driver of the car, Mrs. Bryan Cook, were guilty of such contributory negligence that the Court below should have directed a verdict. It will aid in the decision of the case to state the following facts:
All of the occupants of the automobile lived within a radius of seven miles of Cades, and were more or less familiar with the railroad crossing where the accident occurred, having used this crossing from time to time. At the crossing the railroad consisted of three tracks running North and South. The Hebron-Cades public highway which intersected it at right angles, runs East and West. The ladies had attended a religious meeting at Cades, and were returning to their several homes about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, in an automobile driven by Mrs. Bryan Cook. They traveled upon a road which was adjacent to and parallel with the railroad, which was on their left as they proceeded to the crossing. On reaching the crossing the driver stopped the car to await the passing of a freight train running South. The automobile at the point where it was stopped, was turned at a slight angle to the left, and had just entered the Hebron-Cades highway. When the freight train, which was more than three-quarters of a mile long, had passed, the driver of the automobile, the plaintiff's wife, and some of the other occupants of the car, according to their testimony, looked and listened to ascertain whether or not another train was approaching. They looked in both directions, north and south, but neither saw nor heard any other train. The driver thereupon proceeded upon the crossing. Just as the automobile got upon the first railroad track, one of its occupants saw a north-bound freight train to their left, which was practically upon them. The driver increased her speed, but did not escape the impending collision. The train hit the rear end of the automobile, resulting in permanent injury to plaintiff's wife.
The parallel road traveled by the automobile while approaching the crossing was about three feet below the level of the railroad track which ran to its left, until a point was reached about forty feet from the crossing, where it ascended to the track level. There was testimony from many witnesses that the defendants failed to give the statutory crossing signals. The testimony also showed that there was considerable dust and smoke at the crossing left by the South-bound freight train which had just passed. The plaintiff claims, too, that the North-bound freight train which collided with the automobile and which approached from its left, could not be seen from the place where the car was stopped because of certain obstructions on the right of way. On this point considerable testimony was taken, and two diagrams and certain photographs were introduced in evidence showing the location and extent of the obstructions.
A witness for the plaintiff, a Mr. Floyd, an experienced surveyor and engineer, made a map of the locus, and testified in detail to the presence and location of the obstructions. He and another witness said that for a distance of 878 feet from the crossing looking toward the South, the view was open, but that from that point on a train could not be seen. He testified that the first obstruction to meet the eye of one at the crossing looking to the South, was a block signal which consisted of a concrete base twelve inches or more in width and five feet high, which supported a six inch staff. This was 278 feet to the south of the crossing. At a point 795 feet south of the crossing there was a mail crane, at the base of which were four posts, so arranged as to constitute successive steps to reach the top of the crane, and these posts were 8x8 inches in size. A pump house eighty three feet farther to the South constituted the first main obstruction. It presented a blank wall 8x8 feet, about 10 feet high, the gable ends being parallel with the track. Beyond the pump house was located a water tank, 1,532 feet to the South of the crossing, which was supported by six substantial wooden pillars. Between the pump house and the water tank were five electric light poles of the usual size. All of these alleged obstructions were about ten feet away from the railroad track, and between the track and the parallel road along which the automobile had traveled. It is undisputed that there was a slight curve in the track between the pump house and the crossing.
The witness, Floyd, testified that he placed himself at the crossing in the same position occupied by the automobile before it attempted to cross the railroad, and looked back and to his left, and that his line of vision was obstructed by the mail crane, the pump house, the telephone poles, and the water tank. That looking to the south from where the car was stopped at the crossing, these obstructions "lined up," and from the pump house on presented practically a solid wall. As stated, another witness testified to the same effect, having demonstrated this by sitting in an automobile in the driver's seat at the point where Mrs. Cook stopped her car.
Testimony for the defendants tended to show that the obstructions referred to were minor, and would not blot out the view of a train coming from the south. According to some of the witnesses, the speed of the train was about thirty-five miles per hour. There was also testimony which permitted the inference that the train was running at a speed of about fifty-five miles per hour. If it had been running at the latter rate of speed it would have traveled the distance from the pump house to the crossing in about eleven or twelve seconds.
The defendants urge that the failure of the driver of the automobile, Mrs. Bryan Cook, to see the approaching train in time to avoid a collision, was wholly and plainly without justification, and was due to such gross, wilful and reckless negligence on her part as to defeat any right to recover damages for any injury. It is argued that the plaintiff's wife would have had no cause of action, and therefore he has none.
It is rare that negligence or contributory negligence is dependent on a single fact. On the contrary, it is to be determined by a consideration of all the relevant surrounding circumstances. One fact, separate from others, may have little or no bearing, and, by the process of elimination, all ground for the contention that negligence exists on the part of the plaintiff or defendant may be removed; when, if all the circumstances are considered together, the inference of negligence is manifest.
As shown by the evidence, when the automobile stopped at the entrance of the Hebron-Cades highway before attempting to cross the first railroad track, the driver and the plaintiff's wife looked and listened, but did not see or hear the north-bound freight train approaching from the south. It will be recalled that the long south-bound freight train which had temporarily blocked the crossing, had just passed, with its attendant dust, smoke, noise and vibration; and as it passed the north-bound train was approaching. The witness for the plaintiff testified, as stated, that from the point where the driver sat in the automobile her view to the south was obstructed by the pump house, and from that point on an approaching train could not be seen.
This being a motion for a directed verdict, it will be assumed, although the testimony is in conflict, that the statutory crossing signals were not given, and that the railroad company was guilty of negligence per se by failing to blow the whistle or ring the bell. Also, in recognition of the familiar rule in considering whether a motion for a directed verdict should have been granted against the plaintiff, testimony and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom must be taken in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Under the specific terms of the signal statute, the common-law defense of...
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