Cook v. Colby College

• Decision Date: 14 August 1959
• Citation: 154 A.2d 169,155 Me. 306
• Parties: Theola COOK v. COLBY COLLEGE and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 169

154 A.2d 169

155 Me. 306

Theola COOK v. COLBY COLLEGE and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Aug. 14, 1959.

Bird & Bird, Waterville, for claimant.

Robinson, Richardson & Leddy, Portland, for respondents.

Argued before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, TAPLEY, SULLIVAN, DUBORD and SIDDALL, JJ.

WILLIAMSON, Chief Justice.

This workmen's compensation case is before us on appeal from a pro forma decree in the Superior Court affirming the decision of the Industrial Accident Commission.

The issue is whether the Commission correctly held that the removal of an eye with 3 3/10% of normal vision resulting from a compensable accident was the 'loss of an eye' within the schedule of injuries of Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act entitling the claimant to compensation for presumed total incapacity for 100 weeks.

The facts are not in dispute. The parties stipulated and agreed:

'* * * that on April 20, 1957, just prior to her accident the Petitioner had a vision of not more than 20/400 in the right eye that was injured. This is three-and-three-tenths per cent vision or a loss of vision of 96.7 per cent.

'* * * that this amount of vision is much less than that needed for the capable performing of the ordinary functions of an eye. Light perception such as the Petitioner had enabled her only to distinguish the movements of objects within a radius of five or six feet of her but she was not able to distinguish what the objects were.

'* * * that the Petitioner on April 20th, 1957, received an industrial accident to the right eyeball in question which necessitated its removal. * * *'

We assume the parties intended to describe the permanent condition of the eye prior to the accident, and the extent of the vision 'with glasses'.

Without question, the claimant prior to the accident was practically blind in her right eye. The eye served no useful purpose to her in industry and was in the condition known as 'industrial blindness'.

The claimant has received compensation for her actual total incapacity from the date of the accident to her return to her regular work at regular pay, a period of ten weeks. All medical and hospital expenses, so far as is known to the Commission, have been paid by the employer or its insurers. These facts, however, have no bearing on the right to compensation for presumed total incapacity for 100 weeks if the injury comes within the schedule, except as the employer or insurance carrier may be entitled to credit for payments made.

No one belittles the severity of the injury to the claimant, or questions her right to compensation for actual total or partial incapacity. It should be noted, however, that there is no provision in our Act for an award for disfigurement.

The Workmen's Compensation Act (R.S. c. 31, § 13) reads:

'Sec. 13. Compensation for specified injuries; permanent impairment.--In cases of injuries included in the following schedule the incapacity in each such case shall be deemed to be total for the period specified; and after such specified period, if there be a total or partial incapacity for work resulting from the injury, the employee shall receive compensation while such total or partial incapacity continues under the provisions of sections 11 and 12 respectively. The specific periods during which compensation for presumed total incapacity is to be paid because of the injuries hereinafter specified shall be as follows:

'For the loss of a thumb, 50 weeks.

'(Provision for other members).

'For the loss of an eye, or the reduction of the sight of an eye, with glasses, to 1/10 of the normal vision, 100 weeks. ¹

'For the total and permanent loss of hearing in one ear, 50 weeks.

* * *

* * *

'In all other cases of injury to the above-mentioned members or eyes where the usefulness of any physical function thereof is permanently impaired, the specific compensable periods for presumed total incapacity on account thereof shall bear such relation to the periods above specified as the percentage of permanent impairment due to the injury to such members or eyes shall bear to the total loss thereof; and the commission upon petition therefor by either party shall determine such percentage.'

The position of the Commission is found in the findings and decision in these words:

'Did she have an eye to lose from a legal standpoint? * * * we find that she did have an eye prior to this accident and that as a result of this accident she lost it. The removal of her eye was a serious loss to her, as the sight which remained in that eye such as it was constituted a precious possession. It was admittedly not a good eye, but the law in question does not state the eye must be perfect, nor does it refer to any limitations for an impaired eye. The petitioner's eye was not entirely blind, sightless or dead. She could distinguish darkness from light and could get the shadow of objects within five or six feet from her and this we hold to be of value. She also was able to avoid the inconvenience, discomfort and cosmetic loss of wearing an artificial eye. She had a right to hope that with the advancement of medical science the sight in her eye might in the future be improved. The fact of being able to distinguish darkness from daylight had some value over a completely dead eye. The fact of being able to distinguish the shadow of objects within six feet of her, even though she could not tell what the objects were, we hold to be of some value from a safety standpoint and a value above and beyond that of a completely blind eye. In other words she had something of value present prior to this accident, and as a result of the accident she has lost it. She has sustained the 'loss of an eye."

We interpret the words 'loss of an eye' in the scheduled injuries of Section 13 to mean the removal or enucleation of an eye useful in industry with at least 1/10 of normal vision, with glasses. In short, an eye in the condition of industrial blindness is not an 'eye' within the schedule. It follows that the Commission erred in granting compensation for presumed total incapacity for a scheduled injury. In reaching this conclusion we are mindful of the legislative injunction that 'In interpreting this act (the Commission) shall construe it liberally and with a view to carrying out its general purpose.' R.S. c. 31, § 30.

The basic purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to provide compensation for loss of earning capacity from actual or legally presumed incapacity to work arising from accidents in industry. Fennessey's Case, 120 Me. 251, 113 A. 302. 'In compensation, unlike tort, the only injuries compensated for are those which produce disability and thereby presumably affect earning power.' Larson, Workmen's Compensation, § 2.40.

The function of the eye is sight or vision. Without vision, or without any efficient vision, the eye as an organ serves no useful purpose. Loss of earning capacity comes from loss of use, not from loss in the sense of removal of the eye.

The Legislature has recognized that the real injury which the Workmen's Compensation Act is designed to meet is blindness from industrial accident, not removal or enucleation of the eye as such. In Section 13 the measure of presumed total incapacity is identical 'for the loss of an eye, or the reduction of the sight of an eye, with glasses, to 1/10 of the normal vision, * * *'

The theory of the scheduled injuries is that the claimant 'has sustained a distinct loss of earning power in the near or not remote future.' Clark's Case, 120 Me. 133, 137, 113 A. 51, 52. Specified periods of presumed total incapacity designed to express the opinion of the Legislature upon the seriousness of the different types of loss are established, thereby facilitating the administration of the Act. Loss and loss of use of an eye to the extent noted are given equal weight, i. e., a presumed total incapacity of one hundred weeks, and thus are made equivalents.

'Loss' in the schedule means the severance or removal of a member, as a leg, or of an eye, and not loss of use from the partial or total permanent impairment of a leg or reduction in sight. The distinction between 'loss' and 'loss of use' has been maintained since the adoption of the Act. Merchant's Case, 118 Me. 96, 106 A. 117. Without doubt all scheduled injuries could be defined in terms of loss of use, but such has not been the history of the Act. Indeed, from 1915 to 1919 the only loss of use provisions in the schedule related to reduction of vision and loss of hearing.

In 1919 the Legislature first enacted the last paragraph of Section 13, supra, providing for periods of presumed total incapacity proportionate to loss of use of members. Laws 1919, c. 238, § 16. The paragraph was amended in 1929 to include loss of use of the eye, thus covering a partial loss of use not reached by the scheduled item on reduction of vision. Laws 1929, c. 300, § 13. See McLean's Case, 119 Me. 322, 111 A. 383, 18 A.L.R. 1348; Clark's Case, supra.

The relationship of loss to loss of use in terms of presumed total incapacity has thus been completely established since 1929. It is a further recognition that it is loss of use, not loss or removal in itself that brings about loss of earning capacity.

In the words 'with glasses, to 1/10 of the normal vision,' the Legislature adopted a reasonable standard of industrial blindness. In our view the Legislature intended thereby that 'eye' under the schedule must be an eye useful in industry. Whether industrial blindness may be reached as a fact with more than 10% vision, is not in issue. The statute does not more than establish that an eye with 10% or less vision is legally industrially blind.

The present decision is foreshadowed in Borello's Case, 125 Me. 395, 134 A. 374. The employee suffered loss of all efficient vision of an eye which prior to the injury had 64% vision. It was urged unsuccessfully that the compensation under the schedule should...