Cook v. State, 90-440

• Decision Date: 16 October 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-440,90-440
• Citation: 476 N.W.2d 617
• Parties: Carl Richard COOK, Appellee, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 617

476 N.W.2d 617

Carl Richard COOK, Appellee, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellant.

No. 90-440.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 16, 1991.

Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., John R. Perkins, Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard E. Mull and David A. Ferree, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellant.

Rick L. Olson, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LARSON, CARTER, SNELL and ANDREASEN, JJ.

CARTER, Justice.

The State appeals from an adverse judgment following trial to the court of the tort claim of plaintiff, Carl Richard Cook. This trial followed reversal of an earlier judgment for plaintiff in the same case. Cook v. State, 431 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 1988). The facts of the accident, detailed in our earlier opinion, will not be again set forth in detail.

After considering the issues raised on the present appeal, we reverse the district court's apportionment of fault on the ground that it considered a specification of negligence not supported by substantial evidence in the record. We remand the action to the district court for a new apportionment of aggregate fault on the existing record, preferably by the same judge who presided at the second trial.

At the first trial, which involved a bifurcated determination of liability and damages, the district court found that the State was negligent in failing to place "Stop Ahead" signs on both sides of the roadway where the accident causing plaintiff's injuries occurred. The court also found negligence by the State in placing warning signs an improper distance from the intersection. Plaintiff was found to be negligent to some degree in the manner he operated his motor vehicle. The court apportioned ninety percent of the aggregate fault to the State and ten percent to the plaintiff.

We reversed a judgment for the plaintiff based on these findings because of our conclusion that the court had failed to consider the speed at which plaintiff was operating his motor vehicle and his lookout for intersecting roadways and vehicles operating on those roadways. We also determined that the district court's findings following the first trial were inadequate with respect to the claim that the plaintiff was operating his motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

Following the second trial, at which a different judge presided, the district court found the State was negligent in placing a "Stop Ahead" sign too far from the intersection, in failing to place "Stop Ahead" signs on both sides of the roadway, and in failing to provide an oversized, forty-eight-inch-square sign, warning of the duty to stop. The court also found the State was negligent in failing to construct rumble strips on the approach to this intersection.

The court found plaintiff was negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout, operating at an excessive speed under the circumstances, and in failing to stop and yield at the intersection. The court found the State failed to establish that plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. As part of that finding, the court concluded that a blood alcohol test, taken when plaintiff was hospitalized following the accident, was inconsistent with clinical findings made at that time and that gaps existed in the chain of identification for the blood sample. The court apportioned seventy percent of the aggregate fault to the State and thirty percent to plaintiff. It denied the State's claim for thirty percent contribution from plaintiff for sums it had paid to settle claims of other persons involved in the accident.

The State does not challenge the findings made with respect to the inadequacy of the placement, size, and number of warning signs. It does challenge the findings concerning the necessity for installing rumble strips on the approach to the intersection and evidentiary rulings relating to that issue. The State also assigns error with respect to (1) improper expert testimony concerning plaintiff's pattern of driving immediately prior to the accident, (2) evidentiary issues concerning the issue of plaintiff's alleged intoxication and inadequacy of the court's findings with respect to same, and (3) failure of the district court to sustain the State's contribution claim based on the percentage of fault allocated to plaintiff. We consider each of these matters.

I. Expert Testimony Concerning Plaintiff's Pattern of Driving Immediately Prior to the Accident.

The State contends that the district court improperly allowed testimony by plaintiff's expert witnesses Slade Hulbert and Dr. George Brown concerning plaintiff's pattern of driving, perception, and reaction immediately prior to the accident. Hulbert is an expert in the field of "human factors analysis." He testified concerning the reasonableness of plaintiff's behavior based upon assumptions gleaned from testimony in a prior criminal proceeding concerning plaintiff's conduct in passing another motor vehicle shortly before reaching the intersection where the accident occurred. Hulbert opined what plaintiff's conduct and reactions might reasonably have been in the course of the passing maneuver and immediately thereafter when the intersection first came into view.

Iowa Rule of Evidence 702 allows the admission of expert opinions if such opinions will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining certain factual issues. Rule 703 governs the bases upon which an expert opinion may be premised. It provides:

The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the trial or hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.

Id. This court has long been committed to a liberal view which allows opinion testimony if it will aid the jury and is based on special training, experience, and knowledge with respect to the issue in question. Mermigis v. Servicemaster Indus., Inc., 437 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 1989).

Hulbert's qualifications were recognized in our prior opinion in this case. Cook, 431 N.W.2d at 804. Applying the standards of rule 702 and rule 703 to his qualifications and the data upon which his opinions were based, we do not believe that the district court abused its broad discretion in admitting this testimony. Our conclusions in this regard are buttressed by the fact that the jury, based on other evidence, ultimately found that plaintiff had not been adequately prewarned by the existing traffic control instrumentalities, a factor upon which Hulbert's conclusions were at least partially based. We reach a similar conclusion as to the admissibility of the testimony of Dr. George Brown with respect to plaintiff's reactions under the circumstances shown by the evidence. The district court did not err in allowing the testimony of Hulbert and Brown.

II. Evidentiary Issues Concerning Plaintiff's Alleged Intoxication and Claimed Inadequacy of the Court's Findings on this Issue.

We next consider the State's argument that the trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff to offer, in the guise of rebuttal testimony, the testimony of two expert witnesses concerning the reliability of a blood alcohol test conducted when plaintiff was hospitalized following the accident. These witnesses had not been disclosed to the State prior to trial. Although we believe that the court might have excluded this evidence in its discretion, had it believed that plaintiff was attempting to surprise the State on an issue that both he and the State knew to be involved in the case, we cannot say that the court's rather broad discretion to admit such evidence was abused. See, e.g., Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 116 (Iowa 1986).

The State also challenges the admission of evidence by one of plaintiff's expert witnesses on the ground that that witness, as State Medical Examiner, should not have been permitted to testify against the interests of the State by reason of Iowa Code section 68B.6 (1989). This statute provides as follows:

No official, employee, or legislative employee shall receive, directly or indirectly, or enter into any agreement, express or implied, for any compensation, in whatever form, for the appearance or rendition of services by that person or another against the interest of the state in relation to any case, proceeding, application, or other matter before any state agency, any court of the state of Iowa, any federal court, or any federal bureau, agency, commission or department.

Id. Our reading of this statute suggests that, whatever its scope, it does not constitute a rule for the exclusion of evidence. It is, rather, a rule against accepting compensation. Whatever ramifications it may have within the latter context, it provides no basis for establishing error in the admission of the challenged testimony.

Finally, with respect to the evidence and findings surrounding plaintiff's alleged intoxication, the State asserts that the district court's findings on the question of intoxication or impairment do not provide the degree of specificity mandated by our opinion in the earlier appeal. We disagree. The court's findings were very detailed as to those factors which were found to negate the validity of the chemical testing. The findings were also detailed with respect to plaintiff's driving patterns immediately prior to the accident. Implicit in these findings was the ultimate conclusion that plaintiff's driving was not impaired to a significant degree. Further detail in the court's findings was not required by our decision on the prior appeal.

III. Evidence and Findings Concerning Failure of the State to Install Rumble Strips.

The State challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding that it was negligent in not installing rumble strips on the approach to the stop intersection where plaintiff was injured....