Cook v. Walters

• Decision Date: 28 March 2022
• Docket Number: 3:21-cv-00355
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio
• Parties: Johnnie D. Cook, Plaintiff v. Mr. Walters, et al., Defendants

Johnnie D. Cook, Plaintiff v. Mr. Walters, et al., Defendants

No. 3:21-cv-00355

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division

March 28, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JEFFREY J. HELMICK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. Introduction

Pro se Plaintiff Johnnie D. Cook, an Ohio prisoner currently incarcerated at Toledo Correctional Institution (“ToCI”), filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against “Mr. Walters” (“Walters”), Deputy Warden of Operations; Warden Harold May (“May”); “Mr. Robinson” (“Robinson”), Unit Management Chief; Annette Chambers-Smith (”Chambers-Smith”), Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”); and Governor Mike DeWine (“Governor DeWine”). Plaintiff has also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No 1), which I grant by separate order.

For the reasons stated below, I am dismissing Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Plaintiff's First Amendment claim is dismissed in part.

II. Background

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights as follows: by censoring his mail, retaliating against him for filing a complaint, acting with deliberate indifference to his health and safety by placing him at risk of contracting COVID-19, and failing to conduct contact tracing, enforce social distancing, and conduct mass testing for COVID-19.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Walters violated his right to free speech “when my mail was censored as I wrote a letter regarding the unconstitutional prison conditions.” Doc. No. 4 at 5. He also alleges that Walters retaliated against him for filing a grievance regarding the prison conditions. Id. at 7-9.

Plaintiff claims that each defendant violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments. He asserts that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference in failing to protect his health and safety by placing Plaintiff “at risk [of] getting COVID-19 virus” and by “fail[ing] to combat the spreading of the deadly virus.” See Doc. 4 at 9-17.

Specifically, he states that Walters allowed large groups “to be fed in the chow hall.” Id. at 9. He also alleges that Robinson knew that inmates attended recreation in areas that are “not properly sanitized, ” and “this was brought to the attention [of] Robinson whos[e] responsibility is to oversee all housing units, to provide cleaning supplies.” Id. at 10. Plaintiff states that Robinson “betrayed his responsibility of the Chief of Unit Management” by failing to comply with the institution's COVID-19 protocols regarding the “Quarantine and Care of Sick Prisoners.” Id. at 11. Plaintiff also states that May demonstrated deliberate indifference to his health and safety when he “failed to ensure that prison officials are complying with [the institution's COVID-19 protocols].” Id. at 13.

In the section of the Complaint concerning ODRC Director Chambers-Smith, Plaintiff alleges that the “ODRC failed to do mass testing, ” the “ODRC has failed to ensure that full compliance [with the health department's COVID-19 guidelines] were being followed, ” and the “ODRC knew and disregarded the excessive risk to the health and safety of myself and other inmates.” Id. at 14-16. Plaintiff also alleges that Governor DeWine failed to protect his health and safety “when he made a public announcement that inmates will not be tested unless that inmate shows symptoms” and he failed to conduct mass testing. Plaintiff states that “the Governor has enforcement authority over the ODRC policies and procedures that are unconstitutional.” Id. at 17.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. In support, he claims that Defendants failed to conduct contact tracing, enforce social distancing, and conduct mass testing. See id.

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief against all Defendants, finding Defendants violated the U.S. Constitution; injunctive relief against Director Chambers-Smith and Governor DeWine, requesting mass COVID-19 testing of all inmates at ToCI; injunctive relief against May, ordering hand sanitizer in all housing units above the sinks; and nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages against Walters, May, and Robinson “in their official and individual capacity.” Doc. No. 4 at 19.

III. Standard of Review

By separate order, I have granted Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. No. 1). Accordingly, because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis and is seeking redress from a governmental employee, Plaintiff's Complaint is before me for initial screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Under these statutes, I am expressly required to review all in forma pauperis actions and all complaints in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental officer or employee, and to dismiss before service any such action that I determine is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010).

To survive scrutiny under these statutes, a pro se complaint must set forth sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Id. at 471 (holding that the Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) governs dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A). The factual allegations in the pleading “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The Plaintiff must provide more than “an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). A court must read a pro se complaint indulgently. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). Courts are not required, however, to accept as true factual allegations that are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992)

A claim has facial plausibility when there is enough factual content present to allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When a claim lacks “plausibility in th[e] complaint, ” that cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564.

When reviewing a complaint, I must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996)). I am not required, however, to conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims against defendants on behalf of a pro se plaintiff. See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277-78 (4th Cir. 1985).

IV. Analysis

Plaintiff brings his claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that a person acting under state law deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988). Plaintiff must also allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 Fed.Appx. 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983)). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.

As an initial matter, it is not clear from the Complaint whether Plaintiff is suing Defendants in their official capacities, individual capacities, or both. Although Plaintiff appears to claim in the body of the Complaint that the defendants acted in their official capacity, Plaintiff requests relief against Defendants “in their official and individual capacity.” Due to Plaintiff's pro se status, however, I will liberally construe Plaintiff's Complaint as stating claims against Defendants in both their official and individual capacities.

A. Official Capacity Claims

The Supreme Court has held that “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office, ” which is “no different from a suit against the State.” Will v. Mich Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). See also Grinter, 532 F.3d at 572. As Walters, May, Robinson, and Chambers-Smith are employed by the ODRC, and thus state employees, Plaintiff's official capacity claims against these defendants are construed as claims against the State of Ohio. See Peace v. Mohr, N.D. Ohio No. 4:12CV2283, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190092, at *12 (Apr. 29, 2013). Likewise, as Defendant DeWine is Governor of the State of Ohio, and thus a state officer, Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Governor DeWine are also construed as claims against the State of Ohio. See Smith v. Dewine, 476...