Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp.
Citation | 741 F. Supp. 1205 |
Decision Date | 28 February 1990 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 3:89-1476-15. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Parties | Stacey D. COOKE, Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, d/b/a The Park Apartments, Defendant. |
Joseph H. McCulloch, Jr., Swerling, Harpootlian & McCulloch, Columbia, S.C., for plaintiff.
Charles E. Hill, Robert A. Bernstein, Columbia, S.C., for defendant.
This action arises out of a criminal assault that occurred at approximately 3:00 a.m. on September 15, 1988. Plaintiff was asleep in her apartment at The Park apartment complex in Richland County, South Carolina when an intruder entered her apartment through the sliding glass door to the balcony. Plaintiff alleges that the attacker was able to reach the balcony of her second floor apartment by using a ladder left nearby. The attacker attempted to rape plaintiff and stabbed her several times before fleeing. Henry Mack Taylor, Jr. pled guilty to first degree burglary and attempted criminal sexual assault.
Plaintiff has brought this action against Allstate Management Corporation, the corporation that managed The Park apartment complex, alleging two causes of action: negligence and fraud. The matter is currently before the court on defendant's motion for summary judgment on both causes of action. After considering the arguments by the parties, the record, and the applicable law, this court has determined that summary judgment is appropriate on plaintiff's fraud claim and on all of plaintiff's allegations of negligence except the claim that by leaving an unsecured ladder nearby, defendant undertook an affirmative act that it did not perform with due care. Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.Proc.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent in:
Complaint, para. 14.
Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate on the negligence cause of action on following grounds: (1) Exculpatory Clause — The lease contained a provision relieving defendant of liability; (2) Duty — South Carolina law imposes no duty on a landlord to provide protection against the criminal activities of third parties; (3) Proximate Cause — Even if a duty did exist, the criminal activity of a third party constitutes, as a matter of law, a superseding cause, severing the chain of causation.
Lease, para. 10. Defendant, emphasizing plaintiff's education, argues that this exculpatory clause is enforceable and bars plaintiff's cause of action based on negligence. Plaintiff argues that the clause is unenforceable, or, alternatively, that the clause should be narrowly construed in such a way as to allow plaintiff's allegation of defendant's negligence.
South Carolina law on exculpatory clauses in contracts makes clear that such clauses are disfavored:
Contracts that seek to exculpate a party from liability for the party's own negligence are not favored by the law. An exculpatory clause ... is to be strictly construed against the party relying thereon. "It will never be construed ... to exempt a party from liability for his own negligence ... in the absence of explicit language clearly indicating that such was the intent of the parties.
In light of the extremes to which the South Carolina courts have gone to avoid enforcing a broad reading of an exculpatory clause, this court is confident that the clause does not bar plaintiff's negligence claim. A close reading of the clause reveals that the clause does not explicitly exculpate defendant from liability for its own allegedly negligent acts. The clause does mention the negligence of the lessee and of third parties, while glaringly omitting any reference to the negligence of defendant. Although it does mention criminal acts, the clause does not tie those criminal acts to any negligence of defendant. Because this is a form contract, plaintiff did not have equal bargaining power, and most importantly, the clause does not explicitly include the negligent acts of defendant, this clause does not bar plaintiff's negligence claims.
Plaintiff argues that the South Carolina Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (SCRLTA) imposes upon a landlord the duty to provide protection against criminal assault. Plaintiff points specifically to S.C. Code Ann. § 27-40-440(a)(2), which requires that a landlord "do whatever is reasonably necessary to put and keep the premises in fit and habitable condition." Onto that section, plaintiff superimposes S.C.Code Ann. § 27-40-20(a), which provides that the SCRLTA "must be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies," and S.C.Code Ann. § 27-40-20(b)(2), which encourages "landlords and tenants to maintain and improve the quality of housing." Plaintiff argues that these directives distinguish the S.C. Act from the acts of other jurisdictions in which arguments similar to plaintiff's have been rejected.
Defendant, on the basis of an interpretation of the Virginia Landlord/Tenant Act, argues that the duty of the landlord to keep the premises fit and habitable does not extend to protection against criminal activity. Defendant relies upon Deem v. Charles E. Smith Management, Inc., 799 F.2d 944 (4th Cir.1986), in which the court interpreted Va.Code § 55-248.13(a)(3). That section requires a landlord to "keep all common areas shared by two or more dwelling units of the premises in a clean and safe condition." The court interpreted the phrase "safe condition" as referring to the protection of the tenant "from injuries caused by failures of the building — collapsing stairs, faulty walls, dangerous windows." Id. at 946. The Act, the court concluded, did not impose any duty on the landlord to protect against criminal activity. Id.
The SCRLTA does not impose any duty on a landlord to protect tenants from criminal activity. The reasoning of the Deem court is sound, and applies to the S.C. Act. In fact, the word "safe," which was the basis of plaintiff's argument in Deem (, is absent from the SCRLTA. ) The S.C. Act uses the terms "fit" and "habitable." It is an even greater stretch to construe those terms to include protection against criminal activity than it was to so construe the word "safe." The South Carolina Residential Landlord and Tenant Act does not impose a duty on a landlord to provide protection to his tenants against criminal activity of third parties. See also Williams v. William J. Davis, Inc., 275 A.2d 231 (D.C. 1971); De Koven v. 780 West End Realty Co., 48 Misc.2d 951, 266 N.Y.S.2d 463 (...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips
...statements were anything more than nonactionable opinion statements by Fulcher, which he believed to be true. See Cooke v. Allstate Mgt. Corp., 741 F.Supp. 1205 (D.S.C.1990) (landlord's statement that apartment was "safe" was expression of opinion rather than fact); Goodwin v. Dawkins, 282 ......
-
Jack v. Fritts
...do not impart a duty upon the landlord to protect the tenants from the criminal acts of a third party. See Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp., 741 F.Supp. 1205 (D.S.C.1990); Williams v. William J. Davis, Inc., 275 A.2d 231 (D.C.1971); Pippin v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 78 Ill.2d 204, 35 Ill.Dec......
-
Williams v. Preiss–Wal Pat III, LLC, Civil Action No. 4:13–1667–MGL.
...invited. The criminal can be expected anywhere, any time, and has been a risk of life for a long time.” Cooke v. Allstate Mgmt. Corp., 741 F.Supp. 1205, 1213 (D.S.C.1990). The amended complaint does not contain any factual allegations from which the Court could reasonably infer that Defenda......
-
Estate of Butler v. Maharishi Univ. Of Management
...actionable representations"). MUM's representations are clearly distinct from the representations made in Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp., 741 F.Supp. 1205, 1215-16 (D.S.C.1990), and Anderson v. Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games, Inc., 261 Ga.App. 895, 584 S.E.2d 16, 21 (Ga.Ct.App.......