Cooke v. Bremond

• Decision Date: 01 January 1864
• Citation: 27 Tex. 457
• Parties: WM. N. COOKE AND OTHERS v. PAUL BREMOND.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

27 Tex. 457

WM. N. COOKE AND OTHERS

v.PAUL BREMOND.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1864.

The acquisitions of a husband and wife during their coverture, whether made by their joint labor or by the separate labor of each or either, become the property of the community; and, as a general rule deducible from this principle, all property acquired during the marriage by purchase or apparent onerous title, whether the conveyance be taken in the name of the husband, or that of the wife, or in their joint names, is held prima facie to belong to the community.

NOTE.--Smith v. Boquet, post, 507; Tucker v. Carr, 39 Tex., 98;Johnson v. Burford, 39 Tex., 242;Peters v. Clements, 46 Tex., 114.

Although in this state the legal import of such deeds, as between parties to them, their privies in blood, or vendees without value or with notice, may be affected by parol evidence, yet no principle is known upon which parol evidence can be received to so explain or modify such deeds as to engraft upon the property after it has passed to innocent purchasers a trust to their detriment.

Inspection of a deed charges a party with notice of those facts only which its contents import.

An inspection of a deed for land made to a married woman in 1846, which deed expressed on its face a valuable consideration, did not constitute notice that the land was the separate property of the wife; but, on the contrary, it authorized the inference that it was part of the community property of husband and wife, and as such, was subject to be disposed of by the husband alone.

The fact that a conveyance expressing a valuable consideration was taken in the name of a married woman, imposed no obligation on a purchaser from her husband to inquire whether there were equities between the husband and wife with regard to the property.

ERROR from Harris. Tried below before the Hon. P. W. Gray.

Suit by the plaintiffs in error, as heirs-at-law of Catherine N. Cooke, against the defendant in error for a cancellation of a deed to a block of lots in the city of Houston, made by Abner Cooke to the defendant on the 4th of September, 1846.

The plaintiffs alleged in their petition that they were the children and heirs-at-law of Catherine N. Cooke, who died intestate in October, 1848; that on the 17th of February, 1846, E. B. Nichols, in consideration of the natural love and affection which he bore to the said Catherine, who was his sister, made to her a deed of gift for the block in controversy, and others, expressing therein a nominal money consideration. That in point of fact there was no money or other consideration for said deed, other than such natural love and affection. That the said deed was duly recorded in Harris county, so that any prudent person could have had notice of the title and claim of said Catherine to said blocks as her separate property. That the said Catherine never conveyed or sold said block during her lifetime, or assented to its sale. That on or about the 4th of September, 1846, Abner Cooke, the father of plaintiffs and husband of said Catherine, without the knowledge or assent of his said wife, sold and conveyed the block in controversy to the defendant, Paul Bremond, for the sum of one hundred dollars; and that said Bremond had placed his deed from said Abner Cooke on the records of Harris county. And plaintiffs aver that at and before the death of their said mother, the title to said block was complete and perfect in her, and that at her death it descended to plaintiffs as her heirs. That notwithstanding they are thus the legal and equitable owners, and entitled to the possession of said property, yet the defendant is setting up title as aforesaid, but has never taken actual possession of the block. That though not bound so to do, yet plaintiffs offer to pay to said defendant, and hereby tender to him, the amount paid by him to said Abner Cooke, with interest, all taxes, etc. That the claim so set up by said defendant, and the deed so placed by him on record, is a cloud upon the title of the plaintiffs,...