Cooke v. United States
| Decision Date | 11 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:19CV150,Criminal Action 1:17CR63 |
| Parties | JARED COOKE, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
Pending is the pro se motion filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by the petitioner, Jared Cooke (“Cooke”), seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (1:17CR63, Dkt No. 99; 1:19CV150, Dkt. No. 1). For the reasons that follow the Court DENIES his motion and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Civil Action Number 1:19CV150.
On January 10, 2017, Cooke and his co-defendant forcibly entered a residence in Morgantown, West Virginia, with the intent to rob the occupants of their drugs and drug proceeds (Dkt. No. 126 at 33).[1] Once inside, Cooke located a shotgun and held the occupants at gunpoint, forcing them to comply with his demands. Id. at 33-34.
On November 7, 2017, a grand jury sitting in the Northern District of West Virginia indicted Cooke for conspiracy to violate federal firearms laws, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) (Count One); use of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Count Three); and aiding and abetting the possession of a stolen firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(j), 924(a)(2), and 2 (Count Four). After Cooke pleaded guilty to Count Three, the Court sentenced him to 84 months of imprisonment, the mandatory minimum sentence for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Dkt. Nos. 52, 61). Cooke did not appeal, and his conviction became final on August 30, 2018.
On August 9, 2019, Cooke filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, contending he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney (1) did not advise him of certain cases decided by or pending before the Supreme Court of the United States; (2) did not object to errors in the indictment; and (3) coerced him into accepting the plea agreement in this case (Dkt. No. 99).
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) permits a federal prisoner who is in custody to assert the right to be released if (1) “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, ” (2) “the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, ” or (3) “the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” A petitioner bears the burden of proving any of these grounds by a preponderance of the evidence. See Miller v. United States, 261 F.2d 546, 547 (4th Cir. 1958).
To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the “petitioner must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) ‘counsel's performance was deficient,' and (2) ‘the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.'” Beyle v. United States, 269 F.Supp.3d 716, 726 (E.D. Va. 2017) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “The [p]etitioner must ‘satisfy both prongs, and a failure of proof on either prong ends the matter.'” Beyle, 269 F.Supp.3d at 726 (quoting United States v. Roane, 378 F.3d 382, 404 (4th Cir. 2004)).
To satisfy the first prong, a petitioner must show that counsel's conduct “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. But “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential” because “[i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.” Id. at 689, 2064. “Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. . . .” Id.
To satisfy the second prong, the petitioner must show that his counsel's error was not harmless, but prejudicial to the outcome of the case. Id. at 694. When the petitioner has entered into a plea agreement, he “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Cooke first contends that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise him of certain cases decided by and pending before the Supreme Court of the United States, including Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018); and United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019) (Dkt. No. 120). According to Cooke, these cases invalidate his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
An offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) arises when a defendant uses or carries a firearm during or in relation to a “crime of violence.” See Mathis, 932 F.3d at 263. Section 924(c)(3) defines a crime of violence as a felony offense that:
Subsections 924(c)(3)(A) and (B) are commonly referred to as “the force clause” and “the residual clause, ” respectively. United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 498 (4th Cir. 2015).
Cooke is correct that, prior to his plea hearing on April 12, 2018, the Supreme Court had found the residual clauses of two similarly worded statutes to be unconstitutionally vague. See Johnson, 576 U.S. at 596-97 (); Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. at 1210 (invalidating the residual clause in the definition of “aggravated felony” in 18 U.S.C. § 16). He is also correct that, after his conviction became final on August 30, 2018, the Supreme Court, in Davis, invalidated the residual clause of § 924(c) as unconstitutionally vague. 139 S.Ct. at 2323. Nevertheless, Cooke's reliance on these cases is misplaced because the holdings in Johnson, Dimaya, or Davis do not affect his conviction under the force clause of § 924(c).
Cooke's belief that these cases impact his conviction arises from his misunderstanding of the predicate offense for his § 924(c) conviction. He contends that his predicate offense was conspiracy to violate federal firearms laws as charged in Count One of the indictment, which does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under the force clause (Dkt. No. 120 at 7). But a review of the record establishes that his § 924(c) conviction was predicated on substantive Hobbs Act robbery, a qualifying crime of violence under the force clause of § 924(c). See United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 265-66 (4th Cir. 2019) ().
“[P]roof of a predicate offense is an essential element of a § 924(c) violation, ” but the Government is not required to separately charge or convict the defendant of the predicate offense. United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195, 205, 208 (4th Cir. 1999). “Rather, to be valid, a § 924(c) conviction merely requires a ‘showing by the government that a reasonable jury could have convicted on the predicate . . . offense.'” United States v. Thompson, No. 19-7586, 2021 WL 4521111, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 4, 2021) (quoting United States v. Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 425 (4th Cir. 2002)). To determine whether the Government has made that showing, the court may look to the facts the defendant admitted through the plea agreement and plea colloquy. United States v. Crawley, 2 F.4th 257, 262-65 (4th Cir. 2021).
Here, for Hobbs Act Robbery to serve as the predicate offense for Cooke's § 924(c) conviction, the Government must have shown that a reasonable jury could have convicted him of this offense. Carter, 300 F.3d at 425. The Government met its burden through the language of the indictment, the terms of the plea agreement, and Cooke's testimony during his plea colloquy.
Although not required to do so, Randall, 171 F.3d at 205, 208, the Government specified Hobbs Act robbery as the predicate offense for Cooke's § 924(c) conviction in Count Three of the indictment, which states:
On or about January 10, 2017, in Monongalia County, within the Northern District of West Virginia, [Cooke], did knowingly use and carry a firearm . . . during and in relation to a crime of violence for which he may be prosecuted in a Court of the United States; to wit: Interference with Commerce by Threats or Violence (Hobbs Act); a felony prosecutable in the Court of the United States under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951(a); in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).
(Dkt. No. 1 at 4) (emphasis added). Cooke agreed to plead guilty to this charge in his plea agreement (Dkt. No. 52 at 1).
Further at the plea hearing, the Government proffered the factual basis for Cooke's guilty plea (Dkt. No. 126 at 33). Its account focused on the timeline of events during and after the robbery rather than on any acts in furtherance of the charged conspiracy or any agreement that may have existed between Cooke and his co-defendant to violate any federal firearms law. Id. at 33-34. Specifically, the...
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