United States v. Crawley

• Decision Date: 23 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-7369,19-7369
• Parties: UNITED STATES Of America, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. Marcus CRAWLEY, a/k/a Holyfield, Defendant – Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

2 F.4th 257

UNITED STATES Of America, Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.Marcus CRAWLEY, a/k/a Holyfield, Defendant – Appellant.

No. 19-7369

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: March 9, 2021

Decided: June 23, 2021

ARGUED: Jenifer Hartley, Christopher Collum, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Saint Louis, Missouri, for Appellant. Aidan Taft Grano, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Daniel S. Harawa, Clark Gebhart, Student Counsel, Appellate Clinic, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Saint Louis, Missouri, for Appellant. G. Zachary Terwilliger, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Angela Mastandrea-Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before DIAZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Harris joined. Judge Thacker wrote a dissenting opinion.

DIAZ, Circuit Judge

Marcus Crawley filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion seeking to vacate his conviction and sentence for using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during crimes of violence and drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), because the conviction relied in part on a now invalid predicate offense. The district court denied relief, and also denied Crawley a certificate of appealability ("COA"). Crawley then turned to us for a COA, and we permitted formal briefing and oral argument on the matter.

We now grant Crawley's request for a COA, because he has made the requisite showing that "the District Court's decision was debatable." See Buck v. Davis , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 759, 774, 197 L.Ed.2d 1 (2017). But we conclusively settle the debate in the district court's favor, and hold that Crawley's § 924(c) conviction is sound because the second predicate offense alleged in the § 924(c) indictment remains valid.

I.

In 2007, Marcus Crawley and his two codefendants invaded a home and robbed an individual they believed to be a drug dealer. Three other victims were in the home during the robbery: a woman and two children, ages ten and two. The ten-year-old child witnessed most of the robbery and associated violence.

During the robbery, Crawley and his codefendants pistol-whipped and stabbed the man they suspected of dealing drugs, leaving the knife embedded in his leg as they fled. They stole a gun belonging to the woman that was in a vehicle, which they had forced her to unlock at gunpoint. Crawley and his codefendants also made off with cash and a shotgun, but they didn't find any drugs.

The woman called 911 to report the home invasion, and Crawley and his codefendants were arrested shortly thereafter during a traffic stop. Crawley had with him $2,198 in cash that was stolen from the victims’ home. He also had the male victim's blood on his shoes. The woman identified Crawley and his codefendants as the three robbers and told police that all three brandished firearms. Crawley also admitted to police that he committed the robbery to steal drug proceeds and half a kilogram of cocaine.

A federal grand jury indicted Crawley and his codefendants for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count One); attempt to possess with intent to distribute a Schedule II Controlled Substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count Two); using, carrying, and brandishing firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence and a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Three); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count Four).

Count Two of the indictment specifically alleged that Crawley attempted to possess "cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base, commonly known as ‘crack,’ " J.A. 15,¹ with the intent to distribute it, but didn't allege a specific drug weight. And Count Three alleged:

[Crawley and his codefendants] did knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully use, carry, and brandish firearms ... during and in relation to a crime of violence for which the defendants may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, to wit: Conspiracy to Interfere With Commerce by Threats and Violence pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951(a) and during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, to wit: Attempt to Possess with the Intent to Distribute a Schedule II controlled substance, to wit: cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base, commonly known as "crack," pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 846.

J.A. 15–16 (emphasis added).

As part of a plea agreement, Crawley pleaded guilty to Counts One and Three of the indictment and the government dismissed the remaining two Counts. During the plea colloquy, the district court asked Crawley: "Now, count three, do you understand that you are charged with having used, carried, and brandished a firearm or firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence and a drug-trafficking crime ? You understand that's the charge?" Supp. J.A. 72 (emphasis added). Crawley said yes. The court also asked Crawley whether he was pleading guilty to counts one and three, because he was, "in fact, guilty of what they say you did in each count[,]" and Crawley again said yes. Supp. J.A. 76.

The district court then asked Crawley whether he and others had, in fact, committed a home invasion of an individual he thought was a drug dealer, "the purpose of which was to rob him of money and narcotics and specifically cocaine," and during which he and his coconspirators ransacked the house seeking money and drugs, displayed firearms, stole cash and a shotgun, and stabbed and pistol-whipped the suspected drug dealer. Supp. J.A. 81–83. Crawley affirmed that these facts were correct.

Crawley admitted that he "committ[ed] the acts set forth in Counts One and Three of the pending superseding indictment ... knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully, without legal justification or excuse, and with the specific intent to do that which the law forbids, and not by mistake, accident, or any other reasons." J.A. 42. He further admitted that the government could prove the facts described in the statement of facts, and that those facts established his guilt of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

The district court sentenced Crawley to 150 months on Count One and 84 months on Count Three, to run consecutively. The court also sentenced Crawley to five years of supervised release.

Crawley didn't appeal but later moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court dismissed the motion as time-barred, and we denied a COA. United States v. Crawley , 474 F. App'x 213 (4th Cir. 2012).

We subsequently permitted Crawley to file a second § 2255 motion challenging his Count Three conviction and sentence in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Johnson v. United States , 576 U.S. 591, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is unconstitutionally vague. While Crawley's motion was pending in the district court, we concluded that (1) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery isn't a crime of violence under § 924(c) ’s force clause and (2) the crime of violence definition in § 924(c) ’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Simms , 914 F.3d 229, 233, 236 (4th Cir.) (en banc ), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 304, 205 L.Ed.2d 196 (2019) ; see also United States v. Davis , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019) (reaching the same conclusion as to the residual clause's definition of crime of violence).

The district court denied Crawley's second § 2255 motion. Though the court acknowledged Simms and Davis , it held that Crawley's conviction on Count Three remained valid because it was also predicated on the use, carrying, and brandishing of firearms during the drug trafficking crime charged in Count Two. United States v. Crawley , No. 3:07CR488, 2019 WL 4307868, at *2–*3 (E.D. Va. Sept. 11, 2019).

The district court noted that Count Three of the superseding indictment clearly indicated that the § 924(c) charge was predicated on the conduct charged in both Counts One and Two. Id. at *2. The court also pointed to (1) the statement of facts submitted as part of the plea agreement which, in its view, provided the factual support for the predicate offenses, and (2) Crawley's agreement during the plea colloquy that he understood the charges against him. Id.

This appeal followed.

II.

"[I]n an appeal relating to the denial of a § 2255 motion, we review a district court's legal conclusions de novo." United States v. Nicholson , 475 F.3d 241, 248 (4th Cir. 2007).

A.

Crawley argues that the district court erred in denying his second § 2255 motion because his § 924(c) conviction relied on the now-invalid predicate offense of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery.

He complains that: (1) the district court "scoured the record" and engaged in improper fact finding "by looking past the plea [a]greement and searching the statement of facts" to determine that Crawley was guilty of a crime that had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, Appellant's Br. at 14–15 (citing Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99, 114–16, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) ); (2) "the district court improperly relied on the Statement of Facts accompanying the Plea Agreement to support the § 924(c) conviction when the Supreme Court has made clear that a defendant pleads guilty only to the elements of the charged offense, not every fact proffered by the prosecution," Appellant's Br. at 15 (citing Descamps v. United States , 570 U.S. 254, 269–70, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013) ); (3) his guilty plea to a charge which alleged conjunctively the disjunctive components of § 924(c) meant that he pleaded guilty only to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, because it is, in Crawley's view, the less serious of the two offenses, ...