Cooksey v. State

• Decision Date: 27 June 1900
• Citation: 58 S.W. 103
• Parties: COOKSEY v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

58 S.W. 103

COOKSEY v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 27, 1900.

Appeal from district court, Armstrong county; H. H. Wallace, Judge.

Rufus Cooksey was convicted of rape, and appeals. Affirmed.

D. B. Hill and Cook & Cook, for appellant. Robt. A. John, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HENDERSON, J.

Appellant was convicted of rape, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for a term of seven years; hence this appeal.

Appellant insists that Armstrong county (where the conviction occurred) did not have jurisdiction of the offense. The proof shows the offense was committed in Hall county which is situated in the Forty-Sixth judicial district. The evidence also shows in this connection that Memphis, the county seat of Hall county, is three miles nearer Amarillo, where the judge of the Forty-Seventh judicial district resides, than Vernon, where the judge of the Forty-Sixth judicial district resides, and that Armstrong county is in the Forty-Seventh judicial district. The district judge has appended an explanation as to this matter in connection with an indictment for a similar offense against appellant presented in Donley county; and shows that he only learned of the offense here charged after the adjournment of the district court in Donley county, and that the indictment in said Donley county is still pending. We think the jurisdiction is sufficiently proven; that is, the evidence shows to a reasonable certainty that Amarillo, in Potter county, where the judge of the Forty-Seventh judicial district resides, is situated nearer to the county seat of Hall county, where the offense was committed, than it is to the residence of any other district judge.

Appellant objected to the action of the court excluding certain testimony offered by him from the witness Gertie Cooksey as to the reason assigned to her by Nellie Capps for leaving home, to wit, that she left home because her father had ruined her, etc. It was contended by appellant that this testimony was admissible as a part of the res gestæ, and also to prove the motive of defendant in taking said Nellie Capps from her home to the place where it is alleged the offense was committed. We do not believe there was any error in the action of the court rejecting this testimony.

Nor was it competent to contradict Nellie Capps, as was attempted by appellant, she being his own witness; and she made no damaging statement against him. She appears to have testified as was expected by appellant when she was placed on the stand.

Appellant excepted to the charge of the court on various grounds. There is only one which it occurs to us was erroneous, the same being the third paragraph of the court's charge, as follows: "The state has introduced evidence tending to show that the defendant had had carnal knowledge of the said Nellie Capps prior to the time of the act alleged in the indictment, in the town of Clarendon. The court instructs you that you cannot...