Cooley v. Rankin

• Decision Date: 31 July 1848
• Citation: 11 Mo. 642
• Parties: COOLEY v. RANKIN.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

11 Mo. 642

COOLEY

v.RANKIN.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

July Term, 1848.

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT.

GARLAND & KING, for Appellant.

FRISSELL, for Appellee.

1. The plaintiff has been in quiet possession of the premises under the contract with Bryant, and the deed of his administrators, for nearly fourteen years, and has failed to show an eviction, or any serious defect in Bryant's title. Bumpas v. Platner, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 212; Abbott v. Allen, 2 Johns. Ch. R. 519; 1 Fonb. 270. 2. The plaintiff has failed to show any fraud. 2 Johns. Ch. R. 256; Sess. acts 1847, p. 95, § 8. 3. All the defect he has shown in the title to the land, was cured before bill filed.

NAPTON, J.

This was a bill in chancery to enjoin a judgment at law, upon the foreclosure of a mortgage, against the complainant, Cooley, for about three thousand dollars. The administrators of David Bryant obtained a judgment against Cooley, in 1846, and an injunction was granted by the Circuit Court, in that year; but at the hearing, the injunction was dissolved and the bill dismissed.

From the bill, answers and exhibits, the following facts appeared undisputed. On the 19th February, 1834, David Bryant and Lawson Cooley entered into an agreement, by which Bryant sold to Cooley his farm on Sandy Creek, including all the improvements. Cooley agreed to pay on the 10th March, $1,500; and on the 1st October, $500; and on the 1st March, 1835, $875; and on the 1st March, 1836, $875, with six per cent. on the several installments, from the 10th March until paid. It was agreed by Bryant, that on the payment of the $500 due on the 1st October, “he would make over and convey by a good and sufficient deed in fee simple, with a warranty,” the land thus sold. The farm was supposed to contain about 547 acres. Cooley further agreed to give Bryant a mortgage to secure the payment of the remaining installments. Cooley went into possession under the agreement. Before the installment of $500 was due, upon the payment of which a deed was to be made, Bryant died. C. S. Rankin & Eve Bryant became his administrators. In 1836, suit was brought upon this agreement, all the installments being due. This suit was compromised on the following terms: The administrators agreed to withdraw the suit, provided Cooley would pay $1,000, and give his notes for the balance, bearing ten per cent. interest. It was further agreed, that a deed should be executed by the administrators, to Cooley, under an order of court, and that Cooley should execute a mortgage to secure the remaining payments. These stipulations were carried into effect by both parties. Cooley applied to the County Court for a deed, and it was ordered and executed in accordance with the provisions of the act. This deed contained a covenant of warranty binding the administrators so far as assets should come to hand. Cooley paid the $1,000, and interest upon the remainder at 6 per cent. up to the 25th April, 1837, and he executed his notes for the balance, one for $834 46 1/4, payable in fifteen months, and the other for the same sum, payable in two years, both bearing ten per cent interest. Cooley also executed a mortgage to secure the payment of these notes. In 1845, the administrators foreclosed this mortgage; and in 1846, before the writ was executed, this bill was filed. The bill prayed an injunction against the collection of the money due on the mortgage; that the contract be rescinded, and that the purchase-money, already paid, should be refunded.

The grounds upon which this relief was asked, were: 1, that Bryant was guilty of fraud, in representing to the complainant, at the date of the contract above set forth, that he had a good title to the premises he contracted to convey; 2, that the title to a portion of the land was defective; 3, that the administrators overreached the complainant in their compromise with him, by exacting ten per cent interest; and, 4, because the deed executed by the administrators did not contain such a warranty as under the original contract with Bryant the complainant had a right to expect and demand. In relation to the fraud, there was no evidence, and it was denied by the answers.

The objections to the title, as it appears from the bill and exhibits, were these: About 148 acres of the land was conveyed by Bryant, in 1816, to George Horine. In 1828, Horine conveyed this land to Bryant, to secure the payment of about $250; the deed gave a power of sale to Bryant, upon a failure of payment. In May, 1834, Daniel Bryant, as trustee, made a conveyance to himself as purchaser at the sale, recited to have been made under the mortgage or deed of trust executed in 1828. In 1838, the administrators of David Bryant instituted proceedings in the Circuit Court of Jefferson county, against the administrators and heirs of George Horine, for the foreclosure of this mortgage. A judgment of foreclosure was obtained, and an order of sale made. C. S. Rankin became the purchaser, and on the 28th May, 1845, said Rankin conveyed all his interest to the complainant. It appears upon the record, that previous to the hearing, the widow of George Horine was dead.

Another objection to the title of another portion of the land was, that the deed executed by Paul Kingston and wife to David Bryant, was not properly acknowledged. The deed was made in 1816, and was acknowledged before a justice of the peace of St. Clair county, in the territory of Illinois, and authenticated under the seal of the territory, by the secretary of the territory. The deed, with its acknowledgments and authentication, was recorded in St. Louis county in 1817.

In relation to the charge of fraud in the administrators in their contract with the complainant in 1836, there was no evidence. The answer stated, that the assets of the estate amounted to $20,000.

There is a charge in the bill, and some evidence in relation to it, that the complainant lost an opportunity of making an advantageous sale of the farm by reason of the supposed defects in the title. The answer denies, that the title constituted the real obstacle to the completion of this bargain. The evidence on this point, it is not deemed material to state. This is an application on the part of a purchaser of land to be relieved from the payment of the purchase-money. The grounds upon which the application is based, are, fraud on the part of the vendor; the insufficiency of the deed executed, as a compliance with the original contract; a partial failure of consideration, by reason of the want of title to a portion of the land; and improper and oppressive conduct by the defendants, who are the personal representatives of the vendor.

The bill charges, that the vendor, Bryant, committed “a grievous and notorious fraud, to wit: in representing that he was the owner of all the land contracted to be conveyed, and that he had a good title to the same; and the complainant avers that he, relying on this statement, entered into said contract, and that the said Bryant, to conceal from the complainant his meditated fraud, agreed to make him a conveyance by a good and sufficient deed in fee simple, with a warranty.”

The complainant then avers, that in truth and in fact, said Bryant did not own all of said land, and proceeds to show wherein the title was defective.

It is quite obvious, that although fraud is charged in general terms, the facts stated, and which are alleged to constitute the fraud, do not of themselves amount to fraud. The vendor is alleged to be guilty of fraud, to wit: in representing that he had title, when he had none. If this be fraud, then every breach of warranty must be attended with fraud. The sufficiency of a title to land, will frequently depend upon questions of law, about which the most learned may differ, and it would be strange, if men who have not made the law their profession, were exempt from errors in their opinions and representations on such a subject. There is no principle of equity which holds men responsible for such representations, if made in good faith.

But if the charge in the bill be regarded as a sufficient allegation of fraud, there is no proof to sustain it. There is no proof on the subject in...