Coombs v. State

• Decision Date: 23 February 1898
• Parties: COOMBS v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

44 S.W. 854

COOMBS v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

February 23, 1898.

Appeal from Dallas county court; T. F. Nash, Judge.

Julia A. Coombs, alias Maud Shirley, was convicted in the county court of Dallas county, under an indictment charging her with keeping a disorderly house, and fined $200, from which judgment she appeals. Affirmed.

Stillwell H. Russell, A. P. Wozencraft, and T. A. Work, for appellant. W. E. Hawkins, R. L. Henry, and Mann Trice, for the State.

DAVIDSON, J.

Appellant was convicted in the county court of Dallas county, under an indictment charging her with keeping a disorderly house, her punishment being assessed at a fine of $200; hence this appeal.

When the case was called for trial, she filed a plea to the jurisdiction, alleging, in substance, that the county court could not exercise concurrent original jurisdiction with the justice of the peace over said offense, and that said county court could only exercise jurisdiction in such cases when appealed from said justice's court. It was also asserted in said plea that the city court of Dallas had jurisdiction over houses of prostitution, to the exclusion of the state courts; and, if it did not, then its jurisdiction was concurrent with that of the justice of the peace.

With reference to the first proposition, the question has been settled adversely to the appellant, and we do not care to further discuss it. See Woodward v. State, 5 Tex. App. 296; Jennings v. State, Id. 298; Solon v. State, Id. 301; Leatherwood v. State, 6 Tex. App. 244; Chaplain v. State, 7 Tex. App. 87; Ballew v. State, 26 Tex. App. 483, 9 S. W. 765. These decisions construe the provisions of the constitution of 1876 with reference to the concurrent original jurisdiction of county and justices of the peace courts in finable misdemeanors. The amended constitution of 1891 did not alter or change this jurisdiction.

The remaining questions suggested by said plea to the jurisdiction, with reference to the authority of the legislature to confer jurisdiction upon municipal courts, exclusive of or concurrent with the state courts, over violations of state laws, will be treated in a general way, without taking up said propositions separately.

The city charter of Dallas, in force at the time of the trial of this case in the court below, provides as follows (section 25): "The judicial power of the city of Dallas shall be, and the same is hereby, vested in a court to be known as the `Dallas City Court,' to be presided over by a judge, to be known as the `City Judge'; which court is hereby created and established with criminal jurisdiction as follows: To hear, determine and punish all misdemeanors over which the recorder's court of Dallas now has jurisdiction; to try, hear and determine and punish all misdemeanors arising under the provisions of this charter; to have concurrent jurisdiction with state courts over all misdemeanors against the state laws, committed within the city limits, except theft, swindling, aggravated assaults, and aggravated assaults and batteries; keeping or exhibiting such games as are prohibited by law, and those involving official misconduct; and to have exclusive jurisdiction over disorderly houses and female vagrants." In Leach's Case, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 248, 36 S. W. 471, we held that the legislature did not have authority to confer jurisdiction upon city courts to try violations of the Penal Code of the state. The same proposition was reaffirmed in Ex parte Knox (Tex. Cr. App.) 39 S. W. 670; and in the latter case it was further held that the legislature had no authority to confer upon corporation courts ex officio jurisdiction as justices of the peace. Since the rendition of those decisions, our supreme court seem to have taken a different view of the matter, and arrived at a different conclusion. It is to be regretted that courts of last resort, whose adjudications are final in matters coming before them, should disagree as to what the law is, or should be in the same character of cases or upon the same legal propositions. Were this a matter of personal discretion instead of one of high public duty, we might perhaps be justified in yielding our views; but, under our constitution, this court was created with final appellate jurisdiction in all criminal appeals; hence we cannot, if we felt inclined to do so, shirk the responsibility imposed by the constitution and laws of this state. In the consideration of a constitution, our supreme court said, in Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 44, 3 S. W. 252: "In the construction of a constitution, it is to be presumed that the language in which it was written was carefully selected, and made to express the will of the people, and that in adopting it they intended to give effect to every one of its provisions." See, also, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 188. The general proposition is well settled that, in creating the constitution, words were carefully used to convey the meaning of its framers. Where that language is plain and unambiguous, that meaning should be given to the words which the words themselves import, without recourse to extrinsic matters. But should such meaning and intent be involved in doubt, or there should be uncertainty about it, then recourse may be had to extraneous matters. And in this connection the history of the constitution itself, or those particular portions of it under investigation, may be taken into consideration. Every constitution has a history of its own, and ours is not an exception to this rule. Chief Justice Cooley said, in People v. Harding, 53 Mich. 485, 19 N. W. 156: "Every constitution has a history of its own, which is likely to be more or less peculiar, and, unless interpreted in the light of this history, is liable to express purposes which were never within the minds of the people when agreeing to it. This the court must keep in mind when called upon to interpret it; for it is their duty to enforce the law which the people have made, not some other law, which the words of the constitution may possibly be made to express." This rule applies with peculiar cogency to amended constitutions, or at least to the particular portions of such constitutions which may have been amended. In his work on Constitutional Limitations (page 75), Judge Cooley uses this language: "When a constitution is revised or amended, the new provisions come into operation at the same moment that those they take the place of cease to be in force; and if the new instrument re-enacts, in the same words, provisions which it supersedes, it is a reasonable presumption that the purpose was not to change the law in these particulars, but to continue it in uninterrupted operation. This is the rule in the case of statutes, and it sometimes becomes important where the rights had accrued before the amendment or revision took place. Its application to cases of an amended or revised constitution would seem to be unquestionable." This doctrine was fully concurred in by our supreme court in Muench v. Oppenheimer, 86 Tex. 568, 26 S. W. 496, and the rule was there indorsed that the interpretation of a constitution in this respect would be the same as that of statutory law. The authorities upon this proposition might be amplified indefinitely, but we deem it unnecessary.

Referring to the various constitutions of Texas with reference to our judicial system, we find that the constitution of the republic of Texas, made in 1836 (article 4, § 1), provides: "The judicial power of the government shall be vested in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as the congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Section 10 provided: "There shall be in each county, county courts, and such justices of the peace courts as the congress may from time to time establish." Section 12 provided: "There shall be appointed for each county a convenient number of justices of the peace," etc. Section 13 provided: "The congress shall as early as practicable introduce by statute the common law of England with such modifications as our circumstances in their judgment may require; and in all criminal cases, the common law shall be the rule of decision." It will be observed that this constitution marked out a judicial system, and did not grant power to congress to confer jurisdiction of violations of general laws upon the judicial officers of municipal corporations. In this connection it may be stated that in England the authority of municipal corporations to make by-laws did "not extend to acts criminal in their nature, and which are punishable by criminal statutes in force throughout the realm." 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 426. So, it would seem that the framers of the constitution of the republic of Texas did not intend to authorize congress to confer such jurisdiction upon municipal corporations. In fact, the entire constitution is silent upon the question of municipal courts or corporations. The above remarks are based upon the theory that the congress of the republic of Texas had the inherent power to create municipal corporations, and grant them charters, if such existed at common law. This may be taken, then, as an expression of the will of the framers of said constitution that violations of the penal laws of the republic should not be tried in municipal courts.

Looking to the provisions of the constitution of 1845, we find that article 4, § 1, provides: "The judicial power in this state shall be vested in one supreme court, in district courts, and in such inferior courts as the legislature may from time to time ordain and establish, and such jurisdiction may be vested in corporation courts as may be deemed necessary and be directed by law." Article 4, § 13, provides: "There shall be appointed in each county a convenient number of justices of the peace, who shall hold their offices for two years," etc. Now, it is apparent that said section 1 of article 4, above quoted, authorizes the legislature to confer...