Cooney v. Society of Mt. Carmel

Decision Date03 April 1979
Docket NumberNo. 50992,50992
Citation27 Ill.Dec. 485,389 N.E.2d 549,75 Ill.2d 430
Parties, 27 Ill.Dec. 485 Gary Dean COONEY, Appellee, v. SOCIETY OF MT. CARMEL et al. Appeal of Society of Mt. Carmel.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Purcell & Wardrope Chartered, Chicago (Sidney Z. Karasik, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

James J. Reidy, Ltd., Chicago (Maureen J. McGann, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

KLUCZYNSKI, Justice:

The issue here is whether the notice requirement of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 85, par. 8-102) is applicable to private schools.

In 1969 plaintiff, Gary Dean Cooney, was a 13-year-old student at Mt. Carmel High School in Chicago, a private, Roman Catholic school owned and operated by defendant Society of Mt. Carmel (Society). On November 28, 1975, after plaintiff had reached his majority, he filed a two-count complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against the Society and two physical education instructors employed by it. Count I alleged that in February 1969 the two instructors were negligent in refusing to excuse plaintiff from certain physical education classes. Count II charged that the instructors exhibited wilful and wanton misconduct that proximately caused injury to plaintiff.

The Society moved to dismiss count I on the ground that the School Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 122, par. 24-24) barred negligence actions against private schools. The trial court granted the motion, and no appeal was taken from that order. The Society also moved to dismiss count II on the ground that the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act applies to private schools and that plaintiff had failed to serve the school with a presuit notice of injury as required by that act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 85, par. 8-102). The trial court granted the motion to dismiss count II. The appellate court reversed, holding that the General Assembly did not intend that the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act should apply to private schools. (61 Ill.App.3d 108, 18 Ill.Dec. 464, 377 N.E.2d 1100.) We granted the Society's petition for leave to appeal (65 Ill.2d R. 315).

We agree with the appellate court. Plaintiff's failure to comply with the presuit notice provisions of the Act therefore does not bar his action against a private, parochial school.

The Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act applies to any "local public entity" as that phrase is used in the statute:

" 'Local public entity' includes a county, township, municipality, municipal corporation, school district, school board, forest preserve district, park district, fire protection district, sanitary district, and all other local governmental bodies." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 85, par. 1-206.)

Absent is any express inclusion of private schools. The full title of the Act, the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, gives no indication that the liability of private schools is included in the subject matter of the Act or connected with it. (See People ex rel. Ogilvie v. Lewis (1971), 49 Ill.2d 476, 487, 274 N.E.2d 87.) To the contrary, the use of the word "Governmental" suggests that private entities are not within the Act's provisions.

Consideration of the Act's objectives also convinces us that it was not the legislature's intent that the Act should apply to private schools. It was enacted to restore, in a constitutionally permissible manner and to the specified degree, the principle of local governmental immunity rejected by this court in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89. (See Cleary v. Catholic Diocese (1974), 57 Ill.2d 384, 386-87, 312 N.E.2d 635; Note, Illinois School Tort Immunity: 1959 to the Present, 2 Loy.Chi.L.J. 131, 142-43 (1971).) That is a purpose to which the liability of private schools bears no relation.

We reject the Society's contention that the presence of both the term "school board" and the term "school district" indicates that the Act draws a distinction between private and public schools, respectively, and is therefore applicable to both. The terms are contained in a list which concludes with the phrase "all other local Governmental Bodies" (emphasis added) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 85, par. 1-206), an indication that both terms refer to public schools. Nor is the inclusion of both terms superfluous (see People ex rel. Barrett v. Barrett (1964), 31 Ill.2d 360, 364-65, 201 N.E.2d 849), since the term "school district" refers to a geographical area and the term "school board" refers to a group of persons (Black's Law Dictionary 1512 (4th ed. 1968)).

In sum, a review of the statutory language and purpose of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act clearly indicates that it does not apply to private, parochial schools. While private schools serve the public good by educating children, the performance of that beneficial function does not transform such schools from private into public entities.

In support of its argument that private schools are entitled to the same presuit notice as are public schools, the Society cites Harvey v. Clyde Park District (1964), 32 Ill.2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573. That case is inapplicable since it was concerned with disparities in the statutory treatment of public entities performing the same function. It did not focus on variations in the statutory treatment of public and private entities. Lorton v. Brown County Community Unit School District No. 1 (1966), 35 Ill.2d 362, 220 N.E.2d 161, and Treece v. Shawnee Community Unit School District No. 84 (1968), 39 Ill.2d 136, 233 N.E.2d 549 which relied on the rationale in Harvey, are similarly inapplicable. They struck down limitations on the tort liability of public schools which were not made applicable to other public entities.

The Society has also placed extensive reliance on ...

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15 cases
  • Henrich v. Libertyville High School
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • December 3, 1998
    ...216 Ill.Dec. 550, 665 N.E.2d 808 (1996). The Tort Immunity Act does not apply to private schools. Cooney v. Society of Mt. Carmel, 75 Ill.2d 430, 434, 27 Ill.Dec. 485, 389 N.E.2d 549 (1979). The question presented for review is which statute's immunity controls in a case involving the failu......
  • Arteman v. CLINTON COM. UNIT SCHOOL DIST.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • January 25, 2002
    ...immunity provisions of the School Code and the Tort Immunity Act are "independent enactments." Cooney v. Society of Mt. Carmel, 75 Ill.2d 430, 434, 27 Ill.Dec. 485, 389 N.E.2d 549 (1979); accord Henrich, 186 Ill.2d at 389, 238 Ill. Dec. 576, 712 N.E.2d 298 ("the immunity provided by section......
  • Medina as next friend for N.M. v. Izquierdo
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • March 28, 2022
    ...it appears that SEDOL cannot be sued. An Illinois school district is merely a geographic area. See Cooney v. Soc'y of Mount Carmel , 75 Ill.2d 430, 27 Ill.Dec. 485, 389 N.E.2d 549, 551 (1979) ; 105 ILCS 5/1-3. Illinois courts have held that Illinois’ school code "expressly authorizes a boar......
  • Vilardo v. Barrington Cmty. Sch. Dist. 220
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 20, 2010
    ...‘independent enactments.’ ” Arteman, 198 Ill.2d at 483, 261 Ill.Dec. 507, 763 N.E.2d 756, quoting Cooney v. Society of Mt. Carmel, 75 Ill.2d 430, 434, 27 Ill.Dec. 485, 389 N.E.2d 549 (1979). Thus, the supreme court has held that if the Act immunizes a school district from liability for negl......
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