Cooper v. Cooper
Decision Date | 09 February 1918 |
Docket Number | 21,045 |
Citation | 171 P. 5,102 Kan. 378 |
Parties | HALLIE COOPER, Appellee, v. J. A. COOPER and CYNTHIA COOPER, Appellants |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Decided January, 1918.
Appeal from Allen district court; OSCAR FOUST, judge.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.
1. ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS--Duty of Parents towards Son's Wife. The parents of a nineteen-year old son owe no legal duty towards that son's wife, except not to meddle intentionally with their son's affections for his wife.
2. SAME--Insufficient Evidence against Mother-in-law. A mother-in-law is not guilty of alienating her infant son's affections for his wife merely because she disliked the wife and regretted her son's marriage, and expressed her belief that because of his extreme youth he was not fitted for the responsibilities and duties of a married man.
3. SAME--Insufficient Evidence against Father-in-law. A father-in-law is not guilty of alienating his infant son's affections for his wife merely because he gives his son financial assistance to attend school after the wife has refused to live with the son on account of his inability to support her, and when in good faith the father sought to improve his son's earning capacity by improving his education.
4. SAME--Judgment Not Sustained by Evidence. Evidence examined and held insufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of plaintiff against her parents-in-law for the alienation of her husband's affections.
R. E Cullison, Frank R. Forrest, and B. E. Clifford, all of Iola, for the appellants.
F. J. Oyler, of Iola, for the appellee.
OPINION
The plaintiff recovered a judgment for damages against her father-in-law and mother-in-law for alienating her husband's affections.
On March 10, 1914, the plaintiff, a girl of twenty, married the defendants' son, a youth who was about a month under nineteen years of age. The young husband had no means of supporting his bride, so he brought her to the home of his parents, with whom they resided for some weeks. About May 1, 1914, the defendants permitted plaintiff and her husband to take up their abode on defendants' farm and to use their furniture. Early in June the plaintiff and her husband went on a month's visit to Illinois, and on their return they stayed a week on the farm, and then they moved into furnished rooms in Moran, where they resided until November 12, 1914, when the plaintiff went to Illinois to attend her invalid grandmother. Plaintiff gave birth to a child in Illinois and remained there many months. During her long absence in Illinois she and her husband had become estranged; and he, with some financial aid from his father, had entered school at Emporia. Plaintiff returned to Moran in October, 1915, and on demand of plaintiff the defendant Cooper recalled his son from school, but the young people never resumed relations as husband and wife. Plaintiff caused her husband's arrest for nonsupport, but he was discharged by the examining magistrate. Then she instituted a suit against him for alimony, and commenced this action against the defendants. Issues were joined and the cause was tried to a jury, which gave a verdict for plaintiff for $ 5,000 against both defendants. Several unimportant questions were answered by the jury, and also the following:
. . . .
A long assignment of errors is presented, the chief of which is that there was no evidence upon which to base the verdict of the jury. To aid the court in testing the correctness of this contention, we have an abstract of 160 pages by appellant and a counter-abstract of 92 pages by the appellee. Both of these bulky compilations have been studied with care. Both are cumbered with an interminable mass of more or less irrelevant matter, designed apparently to show what the defendants did and did not do towards establishing the young people in housekeeping and in business; and what the defendants did and failed to do to show their affection for plaintiff and her baby, which was the offspring of this marriage, and defendants' grandchild. There is also in the record a plethora of letters from plaintiff to her husband while she was in Illinois. The first of these was affectionate in tone, but her later letters were filled with faultfinding, with exasperation at the young husband's failure to pay his bills, his failure to launch himself in some sort of paying business which would enable him to support his wife and child; and between occasional terms of endearment she called him a cad, a calf and a jackass, etc. The letters contained also an occasional allusion to her husband's mother, whom she conceived to be the cause of her young husband's lack of enterprise. The trial court admonished counsel for both parties that much of this correspondence was inadmissible under ordinary rules of evidence, but it all went in by consent or waiver of counsel. (21 Cyc. 1625.)
The law does not require anything whatever from the hands of parents-in-law, except that they do not meddle with the domestic felicity and affections of their son and his wife. The parents may hold aloof, decline to recognize the wife, show no interest in her or her children, or cut off their son without a penny for marrying without their approval. Wise parents-in-law, of course, do none of these things. They usually consider the daughter-in-law an accession to their family, take her into their hearts and affections, and re-live the joys of their own youth in the marital happiness of their children; and when grandchildren come there is commonly a continuous and delightful contest between the youthful parents and the grandparents for first place in the affections of the grandchildren. That is the way it ought to be. Happy the grandparents who view the matter in that light! But if they fail to do so, they are not to be penalized in damages, unless they are guilty of some intentional acts which tend to alienate their son's affection for his wife.
To support an action against parents-in-law for alienating their son's affections for his wife a much stronger and clearer case is required to be established than against a stranger. ( Powers v. Sumbler, 83 Kan. 1, 5, 110 P. 97; Multer v. Knibbs, 193 Mass. 556, 9 L. R. A., n. s., 322, 79 N.E. 762, and note; Brown v. Brown, 124 N.C. 19, 70 Am. St. Rep. 575, 32 S.E. 320; Beisel v. Gerlach, 221 Pa. 232, 18 L. R. A., n. s., 516, 70 A. 721; 13 R. C. L. 1471-1475.)
As to Mrs. Cooper, senior, there was no substantial evidence that she meddled with the domestic felicity of her son and daughter-in-law. True, she admonished them against showing an excess of their affections before third parties who might talk about them or laugh at them, and there was some evidence that she disliked the plaintiff. But her relations with her daughter-in-law were very limited. She went visiting in western Kansas and in Colorado for most of the summer and autumn, and, consequently, saw little of her son and plaintiff during the time they lived together. Doubtless Mrs Cooper, senior, greatly regretted her son's marriage, because of his extreme youth and immature fitness for marital responsibilities, but what mother would do otherwise? All the evidence tends to show that the general conduct of Mr. Cooper, senior, towards plaintiff was kindly, discreet, and tactful. Disregarding the evidence in his behalf and which tended to show that he was disposed to help make the plaintiff's and his son's marriage a success (for the jury might disbelieve that evidence), all that appellee can show is that during plaintiff's prolonged and voluntary absence in Illinois he advanced money to his son to go to school, and that because of his presence at some interviews...
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