Cooper v. Gunter
| Decision Date | 23 December 1908 |
| Citation | 114 S.W. 943,215 Mo. 558 |
| Parties | SAMUEL B. COOPER v. JOHN GUNTER, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Texas Circuit Court. -- Hon. W. E. Barton, Special Judge.
Affirmed.
Dooley & Salyer for appellant.
In an action under Sec. 650, R. S. 1899, when the validity of a judgment is called in question, the attack upon the judgment is collateral in its nature. Evarts v. Lumber & Mining Co., 193 Mo. 433; Johnson v. Realty Co., 167 Mo. 325. The rule in this State is that a judgment in a tax suit can not be collaterally attacked by one who was a defendant in that suit, and who was properly brought in by personal service or by publication, nor can the title of a purchaser under such a judgment be defeated by showing that the taxes for which the judgment was rendered had been paid before the institution of the suit, before the judgment was rendered or before the sale under the judgment. Evarts v Lumber Company, 193 Mo. 444; Hill v. Sherwood, 96 Mo. 125; Jones v. Driskill, 94 Mo. 190; Gibbs v. Southern, 116 Mo. 204. A judgment rendered by a court of general jurisdiction, having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, however erroneous or irregular, can not be impeached or attacked collaterally by a party to it. Brennan v. Maule, 108 Mo.App. 336; Burnside v. Wand, 108 Mo.App. 539; Bedford v Sykes, 168 Mo. 8; Warren v. Manwarring, 173 Mo 34; Talbot v. Roe, 171 Mo. 433; Morrison v. Turnbaugh, 192 Mo. 444; Randall v. Snyder, 112 S.W. 529. In applying the doctrine that a final judgment, rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, imports absolute verity, and is not open to inquiry in a collateral proceeding, it is often necessary to resort to the pleadings to clearly interpret what is spread upon the record as the judgment of the court. Burnside v. Wand, 108 Mo.App. 539; State ex rel. v. Hunter, 98 Mo. 386; Morrison v. Turnbaugh, 192 Mo. 445; Randall v. Snyder, 112 S.W. 529. In all suits for the collection of delinquent taxes, the general laws of the State as to practice and proceedings in civil cases shall apply, so far as applicable and not contrary to this chapter. R. S. 1899, sec. 9303. The judgment upon which the sheriff's deed to A. S. Cameron was executed, Cameron being a remote grantor of defendant, is in substantial compliance with Sec. 9304, R. S. 1899.
Lamar & Lamar for respondent.
This suit is aimed to come under section 650, Revised Statutes 1899, to quiet title to a quarter section of land in Texas county. The petition alleges that it is wild land in the possession of no one, that plaintiff is the owner in fee, that defendant claims title adverse to plaintiff, that both plaintiff and defendant claim from a common source, but that defendant's title comes through a sale for taxes which was illegal and void. The prayer is for a decree adjusting the title. The defendant in his answer does not assert title in himself but only denies that plaintiff has title. But the cause was tried by both parties as if by the pleadings each was asserting a title in conflict with the other, it was so treated by the court and so we will treat it.
On the trial the plaintiff as proof of his title introduced a warranty deed from Lamar dated June 3, 1899, to himself, and then he undertook to prove what the defendant's title was and to do so he introduced a sheriff's deed to one Cameron of date May 21, 1901, purporting to be the result of a sale under special execution on a judgment of the circuit court rendered November 21, 1900, for delinquent taxes for the year 1898, in a cause wherein the county collector was plaintiff and this plaintiff was defendant; then followed mesne conveyances from Cameron to the defendant. The plaintiff introduced evidence, over the defendant's objection, tending to show that the taxes on this land for the year 1898 were paid before the suit in which the judgment was rendered was begun, and he also introduced the judgment under which the sheriff's sale was made, which judgment did not state the year or years for which the taxes that were adjudged delinquent were found to be due. With that the plaintiff rested. Then the defendant, to show the source of the plaintiff's title, introduced a deed dated November 15, 1898, from the sheriff under special execution on a judgment in a tax suit against one Long and others conveying the land to Lamar, the plaintiff's grantor. There was no question raised as to the regularity of that proceeding, sale and deed. In defense of his own title defendant introduced evidence tending to show that the petition in the case in which the judgment under which he claims was rendered was lost and could not be found, but no effort was made to prove its contents, but defendant also introduced the order of publication against the plaintiff here, the defendant in that suit, as a non-resident, in which publication it was stated that the suit was to recover the taxes due for the year 1898. Defendant also introduced the sheriff's execution docket, the sheriff's notice of sale and the judge's docket. These last three offers were seemingly to help to supply the omission in the judgment to state the year for which the taxes were delinquent, but if so they do not, so far as we can see from the abstract, answer that purpose; they do not give that information. In the sheriff's notice of sale it is recited that the sale was "for certain delinquent taxes and interest thereon as set forth in a judgment," etc., giving the date of the judgment referred to, the court and the names of the parties, thus referring to the judgment itself for the necessary information. There was also some evidence tending to show that the taxes for 1898 were not paid. The finding and judgment of the court were for the plaintiff decreeing the fee simple title in him. Defendant appealed.
Defendant's main proposition is that he claims under the judgment in the tax suit against the plaintiff, that that judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is not subject to a collateral attack. The proposition as so stated is a correct declaration of law and is sustained by the cases cited in appellant's brief. [Evarts v Lumber & Mining Co., 193 Mo. 433, 92 S.W. 372; Johnson v. Stebbins-Thompson Realty Co., 167 Mo. 325, 66 S.W. 933; Jones v. Driskill, 94 Mo. 190, 7 S.W. 111.] But a judgment to be safe from a collateral attack must on its face or on the whole record appear to be lawful. When a court is proceeding to render a judgment in conformity with a statute authorizing a particular proceeding which was unknown to the common law, though it be a court of general jurisdiction and though the court be proceeding in accordance with the course of the common law, as far as it is applicable to the statutory proceeding, yet the judgment must conform to the requirements of the statute under the authority of which alone it is rendered, when the requirements of the statute are mandatory and when the points are essential. The statute says: "In all suits under this chapter, the general laws of the State as to practice and proceedings in civil cases shall apply, so far as applicable...
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