Cooper v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.

Decision Date25 February 1986
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 84-0379-A.
Citation628 F. Supp. 1488
PartiesMable COOPER, Administratrix of the Estate of Orville T. Cooper, Plaintiff, v. INGERSOLL RAND COMPANY, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

Charlie Jessee, Abingdon, Va., for plaintiff.

Adell Baker, Richmond, Va., Paul Drake, Fayetteville, W. Va., Stephen M. Hodges, Abingdon, Va., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GLEN M. WILLIAMS, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Mable Cooper, a Virginia resident filed a wrongful death action against defendants alleging they negligently designed, manufactured, serviced and rebuilt the Lee Norse 245 Continuous Miner (miner) and breached express and implied warranties which proximately caused the death of her husband, Orville Terry Cooper on October 20, 1982. The named defendants are Ingersoll-Rand Company, a New Jersey Corporation, Lee Norse Company, the wholly owned subsidiary of Ingersoll-Rand Company which later became Ingersoll-Rand Mining Machinery Group, and Shaffer Equipment Company, a West Virginia corporation. The court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The case is now before the court on defendants' motions for summary judgment.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Based on the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and other materials submitted by the parties, the essential facts in this case are undisputed.

Lee Norse built and sold its Model 245 Continuous Miner in 1973. The miner was returned to Lee Norse and rebuilt in 1976. Shaffer Equipment Company bought the miner in 1979 and sold it to Valor. Shaffer repossessed it and sold it to C.C. & P. Coal Company in November 1981. C.C. & P. operated a mine in Buchanan County, Virginia at that time. Problems with the miner arose during the time C.C. & P. used it and C.C. & P. electricians were able to make the repairs. The miner had been down for repairs up to four days prior to the accident. At that time it was believed that the trouble lay in the old insulation around the start-stop button in the control box on the operating deck. The wires would ground out at times causing the control switches to be ineffective. At the risk of oversimplifying, only three of the control mechanisms are pertinent to this case: (1) the on-off buttons near the ripperheads which control the pump motor, the conveyor motor and the rippers; (2) the on-off lever on the circuit breaker in the main control panel; and (3) the power center which connects the whole machine by electrical cable to the outside power terminal and transmission line. The miner was designed with a T-1 interlocking relay so that the ripperheads begin to rotate one and one-half (1½) seconds after the pump motor is started.

On the morning of October 20, 1982, the work crew arrived at the mine and began repairs under the direction of the foreman Rufus Baldwin who was a federally certified electrician. Baldwin directed Tim Elswick to disconnect the main power supply at the power center. Baldwin then removed the lid on the main control panel and repaired a methane monitor system. When the lid was replaced, the main circuit breaker operating lever was inadvertently positioned so that it did not connect with the main circuit breaker handle. Consequently the breaker lever was ineffective in controlling the current through the circuit breaker. The problem was not noticed at that time.

After this work was completed, the power cable was reconnected to the power center. Baldwin had directed Elswick, Gaudlin and Cooper to begin their repair — tightening the ripperhead chain — while he and Rose were installing new insulation in the start-stop control switch. Rose started the pump motor and maneuvered the ripperhead to rest upon the mine floor. Moments later as Baldwin was removing the switch from its mounting, the rippers suddenly started. Cooper who was bent over the chain was caught and trapped by the rippers and was rolled around the ripperhead of the machine. Realizing what had happened, Baldwin and Rose tried to use the circuit breaker lever to stop the machine. It did not work, so Baldwin immediately sent Rose to disconnect the power at the power center. Before he reached it, Baldwin stopped the rippers by pushing the ripper control switch. Federal inspectors were called and they conducted an investigation into the fatal accident pursuant to the Mine Safety and Health Act (MSHA) regulations.

II. PLEADINGS AND ISSUES

The complaint consists of four counts. The first count alleges that Ingersoll-Rand and Lee Norse improperly designed, manufactured and serviced the continuous mining machine and that Cooper was killed as a direct and proximate result of that negligence. The second count avers that by placing such a machine into the stream of commerce Ingersoll-Rand and Lee Norse created express and implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for the particular purpose for which the machine was intended to be used, and that such warranties extended to and were for the protection of the class of employees at C.C. & P. which included Cooper. Because of the alleged improper design, these warranties were breached. Count three charges that Shaffer Equipment Company negligently and carelessly overhauled and repaired the continuous miner and that as a direct and proximate result Cooper was killed. In count four plaintiff alleges that Shaffer breached express and implied warranties upon selling the allegedly negligently repaired miner to C.C. & P. Coal Company, Cooper's employer, and because Cooper relied upon those warranties, his death was a direct and proximate result.

In their pleadings, the defendants contend that Cooper's death was caused by the acts and omissions of others for whom they are not responsible. Both defendants have set out five affirmative defenses to the negligence and breach of warranty counts. Both defendants have moved this court for summary judgment. All parties have submitted pleadings, discovery materials, briefs and interrogatories with answers thereto.

At the hearing on the motion, both defendants argued that there were three independent intervening causes which proximately lead to Cooper's death and thereby superseded any antecedent negligence on their part. First, the mine foreman violated mandatory federal safety regulations (30 C.F.R. §§ 75-509, 75.511 and 75.1725(c)) by undertaking repairs on an energized mining machine. Defendants contend that under Virginia law this was negligence per se, and under the circumstances was an intervening and superseding cause of the accident precluding defendants' liability. Second, the miner had been substantially altered after it left defendant's (Ingersoll-Rand) control — specifically, that the T-1 relay system had been by-passed. Third, that the mine owner negligently permitted untrained personnel to work in the mine in violation of federal safety regulations and that was a proximate cause of the accident. Defendants point out that although Cooper was an experienced miner, he had been working at C.C. & P. for several weeks without having had the requisite federal training course, 30 C.F.R. § 48.6.

Plaintiff argued that the cause of the accident was the defective and improper design of the machine, specifically the main lever in the circuit breaker and the on-off switch near the ripperheads. Plaintiff contends that it was foreseeable that workers might undertake repairs on the mining machinery without first disconnecting it from the power center; if this were foreseeable there could be no intervening superseding cause. Plaintiff further argued that the first act of negligence was defendant's (Lee Norse) improper design and but for that negligence the accident would never have occurred. Plaintiff maintains that to constitute actionable negligence, there must be a direct causal connection and such issue should be submitted to the jury.

The primary issue in this motion for summary judgment is whether, as a matter of law, defendants' alleged negligence and breaches of warranties were superseded by an independent and intervening act of negligence which proximately caused the fatal accident. Attendant to this issue are three legal points: (1) whether the failure to follow applicable federal safety regulations was negligence per se; (2) whether this act or omission was the proximate cause of the fatal accident; and (3) as a consequence, whether that act or omission was sufficient intervention in the course of events on October 20, 1982 to relieve both defendants of liability for their antecedent negligence.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The parties are in agreement that Virginia law applies in this action based on negligence. See Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), Graves v. Associated Transport, 344 F.2d 894, 896 (4th Cir.1965).

A. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

According to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment should be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." It is not the purpose of the hearing on a motion for summary judgment to resolve factual disputes. Rather, it is to determine whether there are factual issues to be tried. 6 J. Moore, J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice Part 2, ¶ 56.117 (2d ed. 1985).

The burden of showing both the absence of a genuine issue of fact and that judgment is warranted as a matter of law is upon the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The burden on the party opposing the motion to show the existence of a factual dispute is not fulfilled merely by asserting that a genuine issue exists for trial. West v. Costen, 558 F.Supp. 564, 574 (W.D.Va.1983). The rule in this circuit is that summary judgment

should be granted only where it is perfectly clear that no
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