Cooper v. Molko

Decision Date03 February 1981
Docket NumberNo. C-80-0633 TEH.,C-80-0633 TEH.
Citation512 F. Supp. 563
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California
PartiesWill COOPER, Plaintiff, v. David MOLKO, Gerard Terriault, Judy Stanley Powell, Virginia F. Mabry, Chris Carlson, Jim Knoblock, Jim "Zoe", Dr. George K. Cooper, June C. Cooper, "Phil" Folks, "Carl Cop," "Peter Police," One Through Twenty, "John Does" One Through Ten, and "Jane Does" One Through Ten, Defendants.

Bob Baker, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff.

Paul A. Teschner, Chicago, Ill., Leslie N. Duryea, II, Newport Beach, Cal., Stanley F. Leal, Kelly, Leal & Olimpia, Sunnyvale, Cal., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

HENDERSON, District Judge.

This matter came on for hearing on motions of Defendants Cooper to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue, and on motions of Defendants Cooper, Mabry, and Molko to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for attorney's fees. For the reasons set out below, all of Defendants' motions are denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Will Cooper, a member of the Unification Church, brings this suit against his parents,1 seven alleged "deprogrammers,"2 and various members of the Oakland and South San Francisco Police Departments,3 including Officers Folks and "Cop" of the Oakland Police Department. He charges that Defendants violated a variety of his federal and state rights in an unsuccessful attempt to "deprogram" him from his adherence to the Unification Church.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that his parents and the "deprogrammers" abducted him outside of a restaurant in Oakland, and took him to a motel in South San Francisco where he was held captive for about five days. While he was being held at the motel, the "deprogrammers" allegedly subjected Plaintiff to verbal abuse and threats of violence in an attempt to get him to renounce his belief in the Unification Church and its leader, the Rev. Moon. After Plaintiff feigned "capitulation," his parents took him on a meandering automobile trip back to their home in Illinois. In Arizona, however, Plaintiff escaped while his parents were sleeping and returned to his home in California the next day.

Plaintiff further alleges that Oakland and South San Francisco police officers knew of his abduction, but failed to take any action before, during, or after the event, pursuant to an agreement with the "deprogrammers." All of the Defendants are alleged to have entered into a conspiracy for the purpose of depriving Plaintiff of various rights.

Plaintiff has alleged that all Defendants conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights of freedom of religion, freedom of association, right of interstate travel, right to counsel, and equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), that this was done under color of law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the Defendant police officers failed to prevent this conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Plaintiff also asserts pendent state claims of false imprisonment and violation of the California Civil Rights Act (California Civil Code § 51.7) against all Defendants, and assault and battery against Defendant "deprogrammers." Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief.

II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Defendants Cooper first move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, contending in essence that they lack minimum contacts with California sufficient to justify jurisdiction over them in this Court. Where, as here, the claim arises out of defendants' forum-related activities, jurisdiction is proper when it is "reasonable," and:

The non-resident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposely avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.
Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977). Taking the allegations of the complaint as true, parents coming into the state, participating in a conspiracy to abduct their son, and holding him in a California motel for five days for "deprogramming" would seem more than ample contact to meet the test for personal jurisdiction.

Accordingly, Defendants Cooper's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied.

III. VENUE

Defendants Cooper second move to dismiss for improper venue. The applicable statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides as follows:

A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose....

While it is true that some of the acts described in the complaint did or may have taken place outside the Northern District of California, a fair reading of the complaint reveals that this district is quite clearly the locus of Plaintiff's claim. See id.; Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 99 S.Ct. 2710, 61 L.Ed.2d 464 (1979). We note, moreover, that most of the likely evidence, witnesses, and parties in this case are located within this district.

Accordingly, Defendants Cooper's motion to dismiss for improper venue is denied.

IV. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are considerably more substantial. Plaintiff predicates federal jurisdiction through 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights jurisdiction), on alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986. The question is whether the acts complained of are redressable through those statutes. As always when considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the allegations of the complaint are taken as true, Walker Process Equipment v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 86 S.Ct. 347, 15 L.Ed.2d 247 (1965), and we proceed on the principle that dismissal is inappropriate unless it appears beyond dispute that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See, e. g., McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 100 S.Ct. 502, 62 L.Ed.2d 441 (1980).

A. Section 1983

In order to prevail on the claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must prove both that defendants deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that Defendants acted "under color of state law." Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). "Under color of law" is the same as the "state action" required under the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1156 n.7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966). Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 claims on the ground that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged state involvement.

1. The police officers.

Plaintiff makes the following allegations concerning the conduct of the Defendant police officers:

Generally, all of the Defendants engaged in a conspiracy "for the purpose of depriving Plaintiff, by reason of his membership in the Unification Church, of the equal protection of the laws" and other constitutional rights. Complaint ¶ 19. The Defendants Oakland and South San Francisco police officers agreed to lend the color and support of the law to this conspiracy. Complaint ¶¶ 60, 62.

More specifically, Defendant Oakland police officers Folks and "Cop" were notified prior to Plaintiff's abduction that the "deprogrammers" had the restaurant where Plaintiff worked under surveillance. Complaint ¶ 58. Upon approaching the "deprogrammers", Folks and "Cop" learned of the "deprogrammers'" activities and their plan to abduct Plaintiff. Complaint ¶¶ 59-60. Because Plaintiff was a member of the Unification Church, Folks and "Cop" took no action to warn Plaintiff or otherwise prevent the planned abduction pursuant to a formal or implicit agreement with the "deprogrammers." Complaint ¶ 60. Folks and "Cop" communicated their agreement with and approval of the plan to other police officers and superiors. Complaint ¶ 61.

Following his abduction in Oakland, Plaintiff was taken to South San Francisco, where he was kept in a motel room against his will. Complaint ¶¶ 24-48. The Defendant South San Francisco police officers knew of this, but failed to take any action because of Plaintiff's association with the Unification Church. Complaint ¶ 62. The South San Francisco police officers had a formal or implicit agreement with the "deprogrammers" to support them by not interfering with their operation. Complaint ¶ 62.

Following his escape, Plaintiff informed the Oakland Police and the District Attorney of Alameda County of his abduction, but they refused to take any action because Plaintiff was a member of the Unification Church. Complaint ¶¶ 57, 63.

In short, Plaintiff has alleged that the Defendant police officers knew of his abduction, but failed to take any action because he was a member of the Unification Church. The question thus presented is whether these allegations of police inaction can constitute a violation of § 1983.

In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), while discussing whether a remedy under state law precludes a claim under § 1983, the Court stated:

It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.

Id. at 180, 81 S.Ct. at 480. And further:

While one main scourge of the evil — perhaps the leading one — was the Ku Klux Klan, the remedy created was not a remedy against it or its members but against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a
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