Cooper v. Morin

Decision Date05 August 1977
Citation91 Misc.2d 302,398 N.Y.S.2d 36
PartiesRegina COOPER, Julia Glenn, Carol Ann Lewin, Doris McNair, Elaine Reed, and Tracy Wright, for themselves, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Lucien A. MORIN, Individually and in his official capacity as County Manager of the County of Monroe, William Lombard, Individually and in his official capacity as the Sheriff of the County of Monroe, Robert Stanwick, Individually and in his official capacity as the Superintendent of the Monroe County Jail, Frank P. DiMarsico, Individually and in his official capacity as Jail Doctor of the Monroe County Jail, and County of Monroe, a Municipal Corporation, Defendants.
CourtNew York Supreme Court

Monroe County Legal Assistance Corp., for plaintiffs; David C. Leven, Executive Director, David W. Beier, III, Rochester, of counsel.

County of Monroe, Dept. of Law, William J. Stevens, County Atty., Rochester, for defendants; Michael K. Consedine, John D. Doyle, David VanVarick, Rochester, of counsel.

DECISION

EDWARD O. PROVENZANO, Justice.

Plaintiffs commenced this action in 1974 under § 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code (hereinafter called "section 1983"), commonly referred to as the Civil Rights Act of 1871. By order of Justice Patlow of this court, previously entered herein, Plaintiffs were granted class action status pursuant to Article 9 of the CPLR, the class to consist of "all women inmates of the Monroe County Jail from February 1974 until the resolution of this action".

Plaintiffs seek money damages, declaratory judgments, injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. In their complaint they alleged that each of the above-titled Defendants, acting separately and in concert, deprived members of the Plaintiff class of various constitutional rights in respect to the following matters:

(a) failure to provide adequate medical treatment;

(b) inadequacy of medical facilities;

(c) restrictions on incoming and outgoing mail (d) restrictions on receipt of books and publications;

(e) restrictions on visitation privileges;

(f) restrictions on use of telephones;

(g) improper conduct of disciplinary methods and proceedings;

(h) exclusion of women inmates from a particular vocational rehabilitation program;

(i) restrictions on use of the gymnasium and the exercise room;

(j) lack of paying jobs for women inmates;

(k) unsentenced inmates not allowed to participate in rehabilitation programs;

(l ) undersize jail cells;

(m) overcrowded housing facilities and insufficient number of cells;

(n) denial of bail to indigent pre-trial detainees.

By order of March 21, 1975 Justice Boehm of this court (1) granted Plaintiffs injunctive relief as to issues (d) and (g), supra, and (2) granted them a trial preference in connection with issue (e), supra, limited to determination of (i) whether any rational basis exists for distinguishing Plaintiffs' visiting rights from those of sentenced felons, and (ii) even if so, whether Plaintiffs are nevertheless entitled to summary judgment on such issue (e) as a matter of law.

By order of April 13, 1976 based on a stipulation of counsel, Justice Erwin of this court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims as to issue (a), supra, against each and all of the Defendants. Such dismissal was contingent upon payment, by the Defendant, County of Monroe, of $2,500.00 to the Plaintiffs' attorneys. (It appears that such payment was made on or about May 24, 1976.)

This case was assigned to me on April 13, 1976 for non-jury trial of all of the issues. The trial commenced on the following day. Prior to the receipt of evidence, the following proceedings took place:

(1) On joint motion of counsel, all causes of action against Defendant, Frank P. DiMarsico, were dismissed;

(2) Plaintiff, Julia Glenn, having died, all causes of action on her behalf were dismissed on joint motion of counsel;

(3) The Court took judicial notice of the prior order of Justice Wagner of this court, dismissing all causes of action on behalf of Plaintiffs, Regina Cooper and Tracy Wright, pursuant to CPLR 3126(3);

(4) The Court reserved decision on the motion of defense counsel to dismiss, on the face of the Complaint, the causes of action pleaded against Defendants, Morin, Lombard and Stanwick in their individual capacities. The Court now denies the said motion as to each of the said three Defendants.

Before the Plaintiffs rested their case, the Court signed a Consent Order (on April 21, 1976) which effectively removed issue (b), supra, from the lawsuit.

At the close of their case, Plaintiffs moved pursuant to CPLR 3025(c) to amend the Complaint to conform to the proof so to state additional causes of action in respect to the following matters:

(o ) violation of Judge Boehm's aforesaid injunctive order of March 21, 1975 (Plaintiffs here seeking a judicial declaration to that effect);

(p) restrictions on use of personal stationery;

(q) restrictions on access to counsel;

(r) invalidity of regulations regarding punishment of inmates for infractions;

(s) failure to furnish inmates with personal hygiene items;

(t) lack of proper classification systems;

(u) undersize jail cells.

Having previously reserved decision on those motions to amend and add, the Court decides them now.

As to issue (o ), the motion is denied. Plaintiffs' counsel stated (Trial, 1240-1241) that the motion was based on "substantial evidence to show willful violation of a court order". Declaratory judgment to that effect would amount to an adjudication of Defendants' contempt without proof of prerequisite As to issues (p) through (t), supra, the motions to amend and add are granted. The defendants had ample opportunity to meet and litigate these matters within the framework of the issues originally pleaded.

statutory service (see CPLR 5104). Addition of such a cause of action would require an amended answer bringing into play defenses within the Judiciary Law processes which Defendants were unprepared to meet under the original pleadings. The same proof which Plaintiffs would offer to support issue (o ) would already entitle them, within the original pleadings, to possible declaratory relief and possible compensatory and punitive damages. See Smith v. Losee (10th Cir.), 485 F.2d 334, cert. den., 417 U.S. 908, 94 S.Ct. 2604; Caperci v. Huntoon (1st Cir.), 397 F.2d 799, cert. den., 393 U.S. 940, 89 S.Ct. 299, 21 L.Ed.2d 276.

As to issue (u), supra, the Court denies the motion on the ground that it was already pleaded (see issue (l ), supra), through paragraph 40 of the Complaint, in the "NINTH" denominated cause of action. (This issue was also pleaded in the Complaint's "TENTH" denominated cause of action. Plaintiffs pleaded parallel causes of action throughout the Complaint, alleging violations of both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of New York. The Court does not propose to adjudicate the claims of violations of the state Constitution for the following reasons: (1) on page 1 of their brief, Plaintiffs' counsel stated that the action was brought pursuant to § 1983; (2) liability under § 1983 is predicated solely on the violation of rights secured under the federal Constitution (Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405; Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561; Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444) and not on rights arising under the state laws (Ass'n for the Preservati of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Simon (2nd Cir.), 299 F.2d 212; Ortega v. Ragen (7th Cir.), 216 F.2d 561, cert. den. 349 U.S. 940, 75 S.Ct. 786, 99 L.Ed. 1268); (3) dual recovery is barred (Brody v. Leamy, 90 Misc.2d 1, 11, 393 N.Y.S.2d 243, 251) and (4) Plaintiffs have pointed to no relief available to them (and the Court is aware of none), as a consequence of violation of state constitutional rights, which they could not obtain under § 1983 as a consequence of violation of federal constitutional rights.)

At this time, the Court on its own motion is going to deem the Complaint amended to add two further causes of action, in respect to the following matters:

(v) lack of outdoor exercise;

(w) cells neither having windows nor facing windows.

The Court finds it proper that the Complaint be so amended, even though Plaintiffs made no motions therefor, since these matters were raised in the proof, were actually litigated by the parties and were within the broad framework of the original pleadings. See Tollin v. Elleby, 77 Misc.2d 708, 354 N.Y.S.2d 856; Purfield v. Kathrane, 73 Misc.2d 194, 341 N.Y.S.2d 376; Helman v. Dixon, 71 Misc.2d 1057, 338 N.Y.S.2d 139 (citing authorities). See also CPLR 3017(a).

On joint motion of counsel, prior to the presentation of Defendants' evidence, all causes of action against Defendant, Lucien Morin, in his individual capacity were dismissed. The trial was concluded on April 30, 1976 at which the time the court, together with counsel for the parties, toured the facilities of the Monroe County Jail, including the adjunctive women's section thereof (see (AA), infra).

The stenographic transcript of the trial testimony was delivered to the Court in October 1976. Following submission of briefs, change of personnel in the Monroe County Attorney's office and numerous requests by counsel for extensions of time to submit additional authorities, the matter was finally submitted to the Court on February 24, 1977.

Reaching the Court's present determinations required the examination of literally thousands of pages of testimony and other documentary evidence, hundreds of reported case authorities, dozens of statutes and regulations and numerous reports, articles,

surveys, texts and manuals. Plaintiffs' counsel alone cited over 120 cases for the Court's consideration.

DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MORIN

To hold a Defendant liable under § 1983, whether for money damages or for equitable relief, it must be shown that he had individual and personal...

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