Cooper v. Sedgwick County, Kansas, CIV.A.01-1269-MLB.
| Decision Date | 07 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.01-1269-MLB.,CIV.A.01-1269-MLB. |
| Citation | 206 F.Supp.2d 1126 |
| Parties | Shari COOPER, Plaintiff, v. SEDGWICK COUNTY, KANSAS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Michael K. Lehr, Wichita, KS, for Plaintiff.
Alan L. Rupe, S. Douglas MacKay, Dwight David Fischer, Husch & Eppenberger, LLC, Wichita, KS, for Defendants.
Plaintiff filed this action against Sedgwick County and several of its employees, alleging defendants violated her rights under the United States Constitution, Title VII, and state tort laws. Doc. 2. Defendants moved to dismiss various claims. Doc. 13. On March 29, 2002, the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to the Title VII claim against the individual defendants. Doc. 30, p. 13. The court also expressed concern about the lack of clarity regarding the claims asserting constitutional and state tort violations against the various defendants. To this end, the court ordered plaintiff to clarify her claims so that it could (1) identify the claims asserted, (2) identify the elements necessary to stating each claim, and (3) determine whether plaintiff had sufficiently pled facts to support the purported claims. Doc. 30, pp. 16, 19.
In plaintiff's response, she set forth, in somewhat more detail, her constitutional claims against Sedgwick County and the individual defendants. Doc. 35.1 With plaintiff's positions clarified, a partial ruling upon defendants' original motion to dismiss is possible. Finding jurisdiction proper, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part defendants' motion subject to further rulings depending on additional clarification of certain of plaintiff's claims as ordered herein.
The standards this court utilizes upon a motion to dismiss were set forth in the March 29, 2002 Memorandum and Order. Doc. 30, p. 1-2.
The standards this court must utilize upon a motion to dismiss are well known. This court will dismiss a cause of action for a failure to state a claim only when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle legal relief or when an issue of law is dispositive. See Ford v. West, 222 F.3d 767, 771 (10th Cir.2000); Robinson v. Kansas, 117 F.Supp.2d 1124, 1129 (D.Kan.2000). All well-pleaded facts and the reasonable inferences derived from those facts are viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See Ford, 222 F.3d at 771; Davis v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 45 F.Supp.2d 1104, 1106 (D.Kan. 1998). Conclusory allegations, however, have no bearing upon this court's consideration. See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir.1989). In the end, the issue is not whether plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether she is entitled to offer evidence to support her claims. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 999, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Robinson, 117 F.Supp.2d at 1129.
In its March 29, 2002 Memorandum and Order, the court set forth the facts underlying plaintiff's claims in considerable detail. Doc. 30. These facts need not be fully set forth again due to the nature of the inquiry currently before the court. Only those facts pertaining to plaintiff's constitutional claims will be recited, in part, below.
Plaintiff is a female resident of Wichita, Kansas and former employee of the Sedgwick County Sheriff's Department ("the department"). Doc. 2, ¶¶ 4, 14. Plaintiff began her employment with the department as a detention deputy on June 15, 1998. Doc. 2, ¶ 14. By letter dated June 28, 2001, plaintiff was terminated. Doc. 23, Ex. B.
Plaintiff named several defendants in her complaint. Though their activity will be set forth in more detail below, identification of some defendants is necessary at the outset. To begin with, Sedgwick County, Kansas, a political subdivision of the State of Kansas, is the lead defendant. Doc. 2, ¶ 5. Sedgwick County is "vested with the government and management of ["the department"], and the Sedgwick County adult detention facility ["the detention facility"], and the supervision and protection of the employees of" the department. Doc. 2, ¶ 6. In addition to Sedgwick County, plaintiff named Mike Hill and Gary E. Steed, in their individual and official capacities as Sheriff of Sedgwick County. Doc. 2, ¶¶ 7, 8. Hill was Sheriff at all relevant dates through January 2001, at which time Steed became the Sheriff of Sedgwick County. Doc. 2, ¶¶ 7, 8. The Sedgwick County Sheriff is the commanding officer of all individual defendants. Doc. 2, ¶ 7.
. . . . .
Plaintiff's constitutional and state law claims appear to revolve around her connection to an investigation regarding the unlawful smuggling of cigarettes into the detention facility. As a precursor to the cigarette investigation, however, plaintiff states that Hill, Sedgwick County's Sheriff, observed her taking part in a "peaceful protest" outside of the detention facility in July of 2000.2 Doc. 2, ¶ 36. Less than a month after the protest, on July 27, 2000, a package of Camel cigarettes was found in the cell of Josh Matchett, an inmate at the detention facility. Doc. 2, ¶ 37. According to the department's policy and procedure, cigarettes are specifically prohibited from being in the possession of inmates within the facility. Doc. 2, ¶ 37. Employees of the detention facility may, however, personally use and possess cigarettes at the detention facility. Doc. 2, ¶¶ 49, 50.
One day prior to the discovery of cigarettes in Matchett's cell, Sergeant Sharon Willits, an employee of the department, forwarded a report to Lieutenant Houston stating that two deputies had approached her and informed her that the word among the inmates was that plaintiff was bringing in cigarettes for inmates in exchange for money. Doc. 2, ¶ 38. The two deputies wanted to remain anonymous but Willits considered them to be reliable sources of information. Doc. 2, ¶ 38. According to the deputies, they had been approached by inmates requesting cigarettes in exchange for money and cited plaintiff as an example of a "cool" deputy who would do such things for money. Doc. 2, ¶ 38. Willits was also informed that at least two inmates made similar allegations about plaintiff's willingness to engage in this illicit activity. Doc. 2, ¶ 38. Based upon the report from the deputies and the inmates, Willits believed that further investigation was required. Doc. 2, ¶ 38. From Willits, the report was sent to Lieutenant White, to Lieutenant Woods, and then finally assigned to the professional standards unit. Doc. 2, ¶ 39.
On July 28, 2000, detective Amy Tracy, an employee of the department, was assigned to investigate how the cigarettes got into Matchett's cell and which, if any, employee of the detention facility was responsible. Doc. 2, ¶ 40. Tracy first interviewed Matchett. During this interview, only a portion of which was audiotaped, Matchett claimed that he received the Camel's from plaintiff and that he had paid plaintiff $20 for the contraband.3 Doc. 2, ¶ 41. Tracy was also assisted by detectives Greg Pollack and Greg Lathrop.4 Doc. 2, ¶ 44. In total, Tracy, Pollack, and Lathrop interviewed seventeen inmates and fourteen detention deputies, in addition to plaintiff. Doc. 2, ¶ 45. Plaintiff was identified as the culprit by the inmates only— no detention facility employee ever confirmed plaintiff was responsible for selling or otherwise providing cigarette's to inmates. Doc. 2, ¶ 46.
Not surprisingly, plaintiff has many disagreements with the manner in which the investigation was conducted. For example, plaintiff claims that Tracy and her investigatory team never reviewed plaintiff's work schedule to determine if plaintiff was working at the detention facility on the days in which the cigarettes were found. Doc. 2, ¶ 47. Similarly, plaintiff avers that "numerous names" of detention deputies were mentioned by both inmates and other detention deputies as engaging in the contraband trade but none of them were ever charged with criminal conduct. Doc. 2, ¶ 48.
On August 15, 2000, Tracy wrote an "Affidavit of Probable Cause" in support of filing criminal charges against plaintiff for selling or otherwise providing cigarettes to the inmates at the detention facility. Doc. 2, ¶ 52. At or near this time, criminal charges were filed against plaintiff in Sedgwick County District Court. Doc. 2, ¶ 53. Plaintiff was charged with trafficking in contraband in a correctional institution in violation of KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3826. Doc. 2, ¶ 53. Later that same day, plaintiff was arrested by Tracy and booked into the detention facility as an inmate. Doc. 2, ¶ 54 "While being held within the [detention facility,] plaintiff was subjected to a strip search and other humiliating and embarrassing actions by detention facility personnel against her person." Doc. 2, ¶ 54. Plaintiff was strip searched despite the fact that "[o]ther deputies of [the department] who have been arrested have never been subjected to a strip search while being held within [the detention facility."] Doc. 2, ¶ 55. Following her arrest, plaintiff was suspended without pay by defendant Hill. Doc. 2, ¶ 57. A copy of this letter was sent to defendant Steed and defendant Daniel Bardezbain. Doc. 2, ¶ 57.
Plaintiff's first preliminary hearing occurred on August 30, 2000. Doc. 2, ¶ 57. The first witness was Joshua Matchett, the inmate in whose cell the cigarettes were found. Despite previously telling Tracy that plaintiff provided the cigarettes to him, Matchett denied he had engaged in such a transaction with plaintiff. Doc. 2, ¶ 58. Matchett stated on the record that his earlier statement incriminating plaintiff was the result of Tracy's promise not to place him in "the hole" for possessing contraband.5 Doc. 2, ¶ 58; Doc. 2, ¶ 42. At the conclusion of Matchett's...
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