Cooper v. State
| Decision Date | 18 October 1920 |
| Docket Number | 176 |
| Citation | 224 S.W. 726,145 Ark. 403 |
| Parties | COOPER v. STATE |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Ouachita Circuit Court; C. W. Smith, Judge; affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
T. W Hardy and C. M. Martin, for appellant.
1. The record of the calling of the term of court was not sufficient. The record was incomplete and failed to comply with Kirby's Digest, § 1532, and the rule in 2 Ark 230.
2. The court should have given instruction "B" for defendant and it was not proper to permit the letter written to Mr. Fultz to be introduced in evidence. Defendant did not write it nor did he know what was in it and it was irrelevant. Nor should the letters, exhibit C, and the one to Hazel Jones, have been admitted. The remarks of the prosecuting attorney and the letters were prejudicial. The burden of proof was on defendant and he was entitled to open and close the argument. Kirby's Digest, § 2388.
John D Arbuckle, Attorney General, and Silas W. Rogers, Assistant, for appellee.
1. The record speaks for itself and shows that the order for the special term of court was in due form and properly signed and met all the requirements of Kirby's Digest, § 1532.
2. The indictment meets fully the requirements of § 2228 of Kirby's Digest and the proof shows that the crime was committed prior to the indictment. 67 Ark. 495; 65 Id. 559.
3. There is no error in giving nor refusing instructions, nor in the admission of testimony, and the burden of proof was on the State. 13 Ark. 474.
Appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree, and has prosecuted this appeal. He was indicted, tried and convicted at a special term of the circuit court, and as a ground of reversal insists that the court was not legally convened. On the morning the cause was called for trial an examination of the record of the court disclosed the fact that the judge's signature did not appear at the end of the order calling the court. The proclamation of the judge convening the special term was in proper form, and this proclamation was spread at large upon the record of the court except that it omitted the signature of the judge. Upon the hearing of the motion to quash the indictment the clerk was called as a witness, and testified that the name of the judge was signed to the order, and that he had copied the judge's name in the record, and later, and, after the convening of the court, he had erased the judge's name from the record. Thereupon the court ordered the clerk to restore the name of the judge as a part of the record, to which order of the court exceptions were saved.
Other grounds for the reversal of the judgment set out in the motion for a new trial are as follows: That the indictment alleged the killing to have occurred on July 26, 1920, that being the day on which the indictment was returned into court. That the court erred in refusing to give appellant's instruction B, and erred in admitting in evidence certain letters, and in refusing to permit appellant's counsel to open and close the argument before the jury. These assignments of error we discuss in the order stated.
It is not questioned that the circuit judge signed the written order convening the special term of court, and, if it be essential that this order be copied in full--including the signature of the judge--upon the records of the court, then it may be said that this was done, and the subsequent act of the clerk in erasing the name of the judge from the record could not defeat the jurisdiction of the court, which had vested before the erasure of the judge's name occurred.
What we have just said in no way conflicts with the opinion in the case of Reece v. State, 118 Ark. 310, 176 S.W. 165, where we reiterated the statement contained in several previous opinions of the court that the order of the circuit judge for a special term of court is jurisdictional and must be strictly complied with, and that every...
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Adams v. State
... ... State to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a ... reasonable doubt, and where reasonable doubt was properly ... defined. Rogers v. State, 163 Ark. 252, 260 ... S.W. 23; Bost v. State, 140 Ark. 254, 215 ... S.W. 615; Cooper v. State, 145 Ark. 403, ... 224 S.W. 726; Cummins v. State, 163 Ark ... 24, 258 S.W. 622; Barker v. State, 135 Ark ... 404, 205 S.W. 805; Garrett v. State, 171 ... Ark. 297, 284 S.W. 734; Rogers v. State, ... 163 Ark. 252, 260 S.W. 23." ... The ... ...
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Adams v. State
...doubt was properly defined. Rogers v. State, 163 Ark. 252, 260 S. W. 23; Bost v. State, 140 Ark. 254, 215 S. W. 615; Cooper v. State, 145 Ark. 403, 224 S. W. 726; Cummins v. State, 163 Ark. 24, 258 S. W. 622; Barker v. State, 135 Ark. 404, 205 S. W. 805; Garrett v. State, 171 Ark. 297, 284 ......
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Payne v. State
... ... instructed as to the burden of proof resting on the State to ... establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, ... and where reasonable doubt was properly defined ... Rogers v. State, 163 Ark. 252, 260 S.W. 23; ... Bost v. State, 140 Ark. 254, 215 S.W. 615; ... Cooper v. State, 145 Ark. 403, 224 S.W ... 726; Cummins v. State, 163 Ark. 24, 258 ... S.W. 622; Barker v. State, 135 Ark. 404, ... 205 S.W. 805; Garrett v. State, 171 Ark ... 297, 284 S.W. 734; Rogers v. State, 163 ... Ark. 252, 260 S.W. 23.' The above correctly declares the ... law, and it is ... ...
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Garrett v. State
... ... the defendant would be entitled to an acquittal, but, if this ... finding were made, then a verdict of guilty should be ... returned. The instruction as given conformed to this ... statement of the law, and was correct ... In the ... case of Cooper v. State, 145 Ark. 403, 224 ... S.W. 726, the accused requested an instruction which, if ... given, would have told the jury that, if there were two ... reasonable constructions which might be placed on the ... testimony, one tending to establish the defendant's guilt ... and the other his ... ...