Cooper v. State
| Decision Date | 28 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2012–CT–00460–SCT.,2012–CT–00460–SCT. |
| Citation | 145 So.3d 1164 |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | Tazarius COOPER a/k/a T.C. v. STATE of Mississippi. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Phillip Broadhead, Office of State Public Defender by George T. Holmes, attorneys for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Elliott George Flaggs, attorney for appellee.
EN BANC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
¶ 1. Based on a citizen's complaint that “young men ... young black men ... are standing out on the sidewalks, corners, selling drugs” at the 500 block of Union Street in Greenville, Mississippi, police proceeded to that area, where they spotted Tazarius Cooper, a young, black male. The police officer turned on his blue lights, exited his vehicle, and attempted to conduct an investigatory stop by ordering Cooper to “come here and let me talk to you.” Before the officers could restrain him in any way, Cooper ran. The officers gave chase, following Cooper into a home, where Cooper abandoned a bag containing a blue substance that tested positive for the drug known as ecstasy. The trial court denied Cooper's motion to suppress the evidence, and Cooper was convicted. We find that the citizen's complaint was insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion of Cooper, or to conduct a Terry stop. 1 But because Cooper was not stopped, and because Cooper lacked standing to challenge the search of a home which did not belong to him, we affirm the trial court's decision.
¶ 2. Joe Edney, an investigator for the Special Operations Unit of the Greenville Police Department, testified that Lieutenant Redmond 2 received a complaint from an anonymous caller that “young men, young black men, are standing out on the sidewalks, corners, selling drugs” at the 500 block of Union Street in Greenville, Mississippi. Edney was not informed of the anonymous caller's identity, merely that it was a call from a “concerned citizen.” At Redmond's direction, Edney and Investigator Charlton Smith 3 proceeded to Union Street in the unit's unmarked, black Ford F–250 truck.
¶ 3. Upon arrival at Union Street, Edney and Smith found two men standing “in the sidewalk area” in front of a house located on the 500 block. Edney recognized Cooper from prior narcotics calls. The officers activated the truck's blue lights and exited the vehicle, and Edney commanded Cooper to “come here and let me talk to you.” Cooper, however, began running toward the house, forced the door open, and continued inside. Edney chased Cooper. The other man—Cooper's friend, Dennis Wright—immediately dropped to his knees and was detained by Smith.
¶ 4. Edney testified that many of the structures on this block were rundown and dilapidated. In fact, he described this particular house as “very decrepit, [with] holes in the walls, holes in the floor, unlivable.” As Edney went up the stairs to enter the house in pursuit of Cooper, he saw Cooper throw a plastic baggie containing a blue substance into a hole in the wall inside the house. According to Edney, “you could see into the living room to where the drywall had either fallen off the wall or that somebody had intentionally took it down, but at that time I saw him throwing something in there.”
¶ 5. Edney entered the house and detained Cooper. He then retrieved the discarded bag from the hole in the wall and discovered that it contained twenty-one blue pills with dolphin imprints, which field-tested positive for ecstasy.
¶ 6. Edney arrested Cooper and charged him with possession with intent to distribute. Based upon Edney's hearing testimony and argument from counsel, the trial court denied Cooper's motion to suppress and ordered that “all evidence discovered during the search is admissible at trial.” The trial court did not support its conclusion with analysis on the record or in the written order.
¶ 7. Cooper was convicted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on appeal, finding that the anonymous tip was sufficient for Edney to make the initial investigatory stop.4 Analyzing the tip's reliability, the court found that the “anonymous tip contained sufficient evidence to warrant further investigation” because it “was based on fresh, first-hand information witnessed by the anonymous caller, who gave details about the race and sex of the suspects along with the criminal activity going on at the particular location on Union Street” and because the block was known for heavy drug-trafficking activity.5 According to the Court of Appeals, these facts, together with Edney's recognition of Cooper from prior drug-related complaints after arriving to investigate the tip, “corroborated the anonymous tip and gave the officers reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop.” 6 Further, the court found both exigent circumstances and probable cause to make the warrantless entry into the home, arrest Cooper, and seize the bag of ecstasy.7
¶ 8. Cooper filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals “incorrectly applied the law concerning ‘reasonable suspicion’ based on an anonymous tip sufficient to warrant an investigatory stop.” Because the Court of Appeals reached the correct result, but for the wrong reasons, we granted Cooper's petition.
¶ 9. We employ a mixed standard of review for Fourth Amendment claims. 8Determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause are subject to de novo review, while determinations of “historical facts [are] reviewed under the substantial evidence and clearly erroneous standards.” 9
¶ 10. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 3, Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution guarantee a person's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.10 This Court previously has found:
Police activity in preventing crime, detecting violations, making identifications, and in apprehending criminals may be divided into three types of action: (1) Voluntary conversation: An officer may approach a person for the purpose of engaging in a voluntary conversation no matter what facts are known to the officer since it involves no force and no detention of the person interviewed; (2) Investigative stop and temporary detention: To stop and temporarily detain is not an arrest, and the cases hold that given reasonable circumstances an officer may stop and detain a person to resolve an ambiguous situation without having sufficient knowledge to justify an arrest; (3) Arrest: An arrest may be made only when the officer has probable cause. 11
¶ 11. So it is clear that before conducting an investigatory, or Terry stop, officers are required to have “reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in a felony ... or ‘some objective manifestation that the person stopped is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.’ ” 12 Reasonable suspicion can arise from an officer's personal observations, a tip by a trusted police informant, or by anonymous tip. 13 And an anonymous tipster's “veracity,” “reliability,” and “basis of knowledge” are relevant considerations in establishing reasonable suspicion. 14
¶ 12. Although the U.S. Supreme Court previously has opined that “an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity,” 15 it also has held that “there are situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits ‘sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop.’ ” 16 We have held that 17
¶ 13. So we are left to determine whether an anonymous tip—“young men, young black men, are standing out on the sidewalks, corners, selling drugs” at the 500 block of Union Street—demonstrates the tipster's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge to support a finding of reasonable suspicion before Edney stopped Cooper. We find that it does not.
¶ 14. This Court previously has found anonymous tips providing police with much more detailed information than the tip in the instant case to be “vague” at the outset, but the officer's independent investigation and corroboration of the details— before stopping the suspect—established reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.18
¶ 15. For instance, in McClellan v. State, the Columbus police department received a tip that a white male and white female had purchased large quantities of pseudoephedrine (a main ingredient for methamphetamine) at the local Fred's Dollar Store.19 Officers further investigated the tip and gained a description of the vehicle, “an older-model blue Mustang with an Alabama tag ... traveling east on the Highway 82 bypass,” which then allowed them to locate and maintain surveillance on the suspects as they made additional purchases at other pharmacies.20 This Court observed that the initial description of the car “may have been somewhat vague,” but we held the stop was proper because the police accumulated many more details about the suspects and their activities before making the stop.21
¶ 16. Similarly, in Linson v. State, a case with facts similar to this case, police received a tip from a confidential informant that “three black males were selling drugs at the intersection of Kingsway Drive and Brooksdale Drive in Picayune,” an area known for illegal drug activity.22 Investigating the tip, a police officer found the three black men standing at the intersection as described.23 He then watched the men approach two different vehicles for brief meetings, after which the vehicles would drive away, consistent with drug-trafficking activity.24 Officers detained Linson, and a patdown revealed a .22 caliber revolver in Linson's pants pocket, which led...
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