Cooper v. State
Decision Date | 16 February 2021 |
Docket Number | WD 82926 |
Citation | 621 S.W.3d 624 |
Parties | Richard V. COOPER, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Keith P. O'Connor, for Appellant.
Shaun Mackelprang, Jefferson City, for Respondent.
Division Two: W. Douglas Thomson, Presiding Judge, Lisa White Hardwick, Judge and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge
W. DOUGLAS THOMSON, JUDGE
Richard V. Cooper appeals from the Circuit Court of Jackson County's denial of his Rule 24.035 motion after an evidentiary hearing. In his first two points on appeal, Cooper contends that the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. In his third point, Cooper argues that the motion court clearly erred in disallowing his second amended motion by miscalculating the filing deadline, or alternatively, failing to apply the abandonment doctrine. We affirm.
In 2007, the State charged Richard Cooper ("Cooper") with the class A felony of murder in the first degree, three counts of the class A felony of assault in the first degree, four counts of the class A felony of assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree, and eight counts of the unclassified felony of armed criminal action.
During Cooper's two years in custody awaiting trial, Cooper's retained counsel noticed a serious deterioration in Cooper's mental fitness. In May 2010, counsel, citing an attempted suicide and other concerning behavior, requested a mental examination of Cooper, which the trial court granted. The examination reported a diagnosis of "Psychotic Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified" and opined that although Cooper was at that time incompetent to proceed, "there [was] a substantial probability that the defendant [would] be mentally fit to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future following an appropriate course of psychiatric treatment." The trial court found Cooper incompetent to proceed and ordered him to be committed to the department of mental health. On April 5, 2011, a second report evaluating Cooper's competence was issued. Its findings were similar to the first report, but the primary diagnosis included "Schizophrenia, Undifferentiated Type" and noted the need to rule out malingering. It also recommended that Cooper be found incompetent to proceed and remain at Fulton State Hospital for further treatment. This second evaluation also noted that "[i]f found unfit to proceed, there is a substantial probability that he will attain the mental fitness to proceed to trial in the reasonably foreseeable future."
On October 17, 2011, a third evaluation addressing Cooper's competence was issued. The report diagnosed Cooper with "Brief Psychotic Disorder, in Full Remission" and opined that Cooper was malingering. It reported that Cooper did not "currently suffer from a mental disease or defect" and that he had "the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and ... to assist his attorney in his own defense." The report recommended that Cooper "be allowed to proceed to trial for the disposition of the charges pending against him." On November 7, 2011, a motion to proceed was filed and the court accepted the report and without a hearing found Cooper competent to proceed.
On April 12, 2013,1 pursuant to plea negotiations, the State filed an amended information that reduced the charge of murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree and dismissed three counts of assault in the first degree and three counts of armed criminal action.2 At the guilty plea hearing, Cooper testified that he had previously been found incompetent to proceed. He testified, however, that he was now competent, that he understood the proceedings, and that he was there "[t]o take a plea." He testified that he was going to ask that all of his sentences run concurrently. Cooper testified that he understood that for each charge of assault of a law enforcement officer he could be sentenced to "[t]en to 30 to life." He stated that he understood that the minimum sentence for armed criminal action was three years and that the maximum was "[l]ife, 99." He stated that he understood that the charge of murder in the first degree would be reduced to murder in the second degree and that, instead of life without parole, he would be facing "ten years to 30 years or life."
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