Cooper v. United Air Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 March 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 13–cv–02870–JSC
• Citation: 82 F.Supp.3d 1084
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: Drucilla Cooper, Plaintiff, v. United Air Lines, Inc., Defendant.

82 F.Supp.3d 1084

Drucilla Cooper, Plaintiff

v.United Air Lines, Inc., Defendant.

Case No. 13–cv–02870–JSC

United States District Court, N.D. California.

Signed March 10, 2015

Dow Wakefield Patten, Spencer Freeman Smith, Damien Berkes Troutman, Smith Patten, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff.

M. Michael Cole, Tracy Thompson, Mani Sheik, Miller Law Group, A Professional Corporation, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 73

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Drucilla Cooper alleges that Defendant United Air Lines, Inc. (“United”) (1) violated the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206, et seq., by paying her less than her male counterparts, (2) demoted her from her position as a Supervisor of Security Officers at the San Francisco Airport maintenance facility in retaliation for complaints she made regarding these pay disparities, and (3) subjected her to discrimination on account of her age and disability. Now pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 73.) Having carefully considered the parties' filings and having had the benefit of oral argument on February 26, 2015, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE

Plaintiff was hired by United in 1997 as a security officer following her retirement from the Berkeley Police Department after 15 years of service. In January 2002, Plaintiff was promoted to Supervisor of Security Officers. Plaintiff was one of three supervisors for the security officers at the San Francisco Maintenance Hub, each of whom was assigned to supervise one of the three shifts. During the time period relevant here, Plaintiff supervised the day shift, while William Knight supervised the swing shift and Alex Martin Del Campo supervised the graveyard shift.

In the fall of 2010, United merged with Continental Airlines. Following the merger, many departments went through a Talent Selection or TAS Process. As a result of the TAS Process, some positions were eliminated, others were modified, and still others were largely unchanged. According to Defendant, it was up to each department to determine how the TAS Process would be implemented. (Dkt. No. 73–6 at ¶ 6 & Ex. 1.) Plaintiff's department experienced the TAS Process in the summer of 2011. The decision to institute the TAS Process was made by Darlene Marvin–Nilson who began supervising Plaintiff's department, initially on an interim basis, in the spring of 2011. Ms. Marvin–Nilson took over the position as Senior Manager—Base Maintenance Support Services when Plaintiff's long-time supervisor Bernard Peterson retired in April 2011. Ms. Marvin–Nilson previously held the position of Senior Manager—Base Distribution, Warehouse & Logistics, but was not selected to retain the position when that department went through the TAS Process. When Mr. Peterson retired, she applied for and was selected as his replacement.

The same month that Mr. Peterson retired, Plaintiff filed a complaint with Human Resources Associate Sandee Singer regarding a pay disparity between Plaintiff and the two other male supervisors. Mr. Singer forwarded the complaint to Wayne Slaughter, the then Manager of Fair Employment Practices and Diversity. Mr. Slaughter interviewed Plaintiff in connection with her complaint and conducted an investigation of her claims in April and May 2011. (Dkt. No. 73–15 at ¶¶ 4–5.) It is undisputed that Plaintiff was paid less than her male counterparts. However, as a result of his investigation, Mr. Slaughter concluded that there were legitimate business reasons for the pay differential; namely, that Employee 1 was an external hire and Employee 2 was previously in a higher paid position within United and took a pay cut when he assumed the Security Supervisor position. (Id. at ¶ 4.) Mr. Slaughter sent Plaintiff a letter to this effect closing her complaint on May 18, 2011. (Id. at Ex. 1.) Plaintiff also discussed, or at least mentioned, her concerns regarding the pay disparity to Ms. Marvin–Nilson sometime thereafter.¹

Also around this same time, Plaintiff requested an accommodation for her sleep apnea disability.² Plaintiff asked Ms. Marvin–Nilson n about accommodating her disability by restricting her working hours to daylight hours; although Plaintiff currently worked the day shift, she had concerns that Defendant might begin asking supervisors to rotate shifts. (Dkt. No. 75–4, Ex. C at 64:5–12; Dkt. No. 73–2, Ex. 1 at 334:23–335:7.) Ms. Marvin–Nilson responded via an email noting that Plaintiff was currently assigned the day shift and there had not yet been a decision to shift schedules, but that if they decided to implement a schedule which required Plaintiff to work nights, they would revisit her request for accommodation. (Dkt. No. 73–7, Ex. 10.)

As part of the TAS Process, Ms. Marvin–Nilson rewrote the job description for the supervisor of security officers and the position was posted on United's intranet in August 2011. Ms. Marvin–Nilson met with Plaintiff, and her fellow supervisors, Mr. Knight and Mr. Martin Del Campo, to inform them that the position was being posted. Plaintiff contends that she was never informed in writing that she would need to reapply for her job and that she only learned of the application period from a human resources representative who called her to tell she had one day to submit her application. (Dkt. No. 75–1 ¶ 25.) Four individuals applied for the position—the three current supervisors and Russ Faultner. Mr. Faultner was a Manager of the Base Distribution, Warehouse and Logistics Department—the department previously supervised by Ms. Marvin–Nilson—until he was furloughed from this position in July 2011.

Ms. Marvin–Nilson and Adam Calmis, a Senior Manager–Component Base Maintenance for United, conducted the interviews for the supervisor position on August 29, 2011. Mr. Calmis did not know any of the candidates prior to the interviews. The interviews were conducted utilizing a standard interview guide provided by United. (Dkt. No. 73–8 at ¶ 4.) Each applicant was asked the same predetermined set of questions and each interview lasted approximately 30 minutes. (Id. ) At the conclusion of each interview, Mr. Calmis and Ms. Marvin–Nilson discussed each candidate's responses and came up with a consensus score. (Id. at ¶ 5.) The scoring was performed on a scale of 1–5 with 5 being the highest. (Id. ) Mr. Calmis and Ms. Marvin–Nilson “were in general agreement regarding the scores we assigned to each candidate.” (Id. ; Dkt. No. 73–6 at ¶ 16.) Both Mr. Calmis and Ms. Marvin–Nilson agreed that Plaintiff's performance during the interview was poor and she was given the lowest score of all four candidates—a total of 13 out of 45 possible points. (Dkt. No. 73–8 at ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 73–6 at ¶ 17.) The next lowest ranked candidate received a total of 22 points. (Dkt. No. 73–6 at ¶ 17; Ex. 8.) Plaintiff was not selected for the supervisor position. The three supervisor positions were awarded to the two other incumbents, Mr. Knight who was 55, Mr. Martin Del Campo who was 50, and Mr. Faultner who was also 50.

Defendant notified Plaintiff that she was not selected to retain her position by letter dated September 9, 2011. (Dkt. No. 76–1, Ex. A–1.) The letter was titled “Reduction in Force Lay Off Notice.” Defendant contends that this is the standard letter that was provided to individuals not selected during the TAS Process. ( Dkt. No. 73–6 at ¶ 18.) The letter stated that Plaintiff could either return to her most recent union-represented position or accept a severance package and separate from United. Plaintiff elected to return to her position as a security officer. This demotion resulted in a significant pay cut. Plaintiff remains employed in this position today.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on April 16, 2012. (Dkt. No. 70 ¶ 52.) She was issued a Right to Sue on April 5, 2013 and filed the underlying action within 90 days. Plaintiff filed the governing First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in November 2014 asserting four claims (1) retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., (2) disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., (3) age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and (4) violation of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206. (Dkt. No. 70.) Defendant filed the underlying motion for summary judgment following the close of fact discovery.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a). The Court must draw “all reasonable inferences [and] resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the non-moving party.”Murphy v. Schneider Nat'l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir.2004). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and an issue is genuine if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). There can be “no genuine issue as to any material fact” when the moving party shows “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

On those claims on which Defendant does not carry the ultimate burden of persuasion (the discrimination and retaliation claims), Defendant, as the moving party, has the burden of producing evidence negating an essential element of each claim on which it seeks judgment or showing that Plaintiff cannot produce evidence sufficient to satisfy her burden of proof at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2000). O...