Coopersmith v. Gold

• Decision Date: 11 April 1991
• Parties: Sydelle C. COOPERSMITH, Respondent, v. Richard L. GOLD et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 250

568 N.Y.S.2d 250

172 A.D.2d 982

Sydelle C. COOPERSMITH, Respondent, v. Richard L. GOLD et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

April 11, 1991.

Callan, Regenstreich, Koster & Brady (Bruce M. Brady, of counsel), New York City, for appellants.

Birbower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. (Susan Corcoran, of counsel), New City City, for respondent.

Before MIKOLL, J.P., and YESAWICH, LEVINE, MERCURE and CREW, JJ.

CREW, Justice.

Appeal (transferred to this court by order of the Appellate Division, Second Department) from an order of the Supreme Court (Kelly, J.), entered March 13, 1990 in Rockland County, which denied defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff commenced this action against defendant Richard L. Gold (hereinafter defendant), a psychiatrist, as well as his corporate practice, for malpractice, fraud and battery all allegedly arising out of defendant's inappropriate treatment of plaintiff. After issue was joined and disclosure completed, defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff's causes of action were time barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations and that the complaint insofar as it alleged fraud and battery failed to state a cause of action. Supreme Court denied the motion in its entirety and this appeal ensued.

The pertinent facts necessary for resolution of the issues before us, as gleaned from the complaint, plaintiff's deposition and affidavit, and the affidavit of Burton August, plaintiff's attending psychiatrist, follow. Plaintiff consulted with defendant in October 1980 in connection with marital problems she was encountering. Defendant diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from anxiety reaction and began therapy. According to plaintiff, during an appointment in February 1981 defendant embraced plaintiff and kissed her passionately. Plaintiff experienced overwhelming romantic feelings toward defendant. The following day plaintiff asked defendant if she was experiencing "transference", a term she remembered from college psychology classes, and defendant responded that she was not. Plaintiff also claims that in the next therapy session she and defendant engaged in sexual relations and continued to do so during ensuing therapy sessions. It is unclear exactly when therapy terminated. Plaintiff testified that the physician-patient relationship terminated in February 1981 when the two kissed for the first time, but further testified that she continued to regard defendant as her therapist. Defendant averred that he last treated plaintiff on April 13, 1981 and denies any improper contact with plaintiff. In any event, plaintiff claimed that the sexual encounters continued until the spring of 1984. Thereafter, plaintiff stated that she and defendant saw each other weekly until September 1985 when plaintiff confronted defendant at his office insisting that he make clear his intentions toward her. Defendant denied their affair and had plaintiff thrown out of his office. Plaintiff commenced this action in March 1986.

Defendants contend that the cause of action for malpractice is time barred since the last treatment rendered by defendant was in April 1981. Plaintiff claims that defendants are equitably estopped from raising the Statute of Limitations defense. The Court of Appeals has held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is available to extend the period of limitations in medical malpractice actions (Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259, 377 N.E.2d 713). The burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the action was brought within a reasonable time after the facts giving rise to the estoppel have ceased to be operational (id., at 450, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259, 377 N.E.2d 713). Here, plaintiff's theory, supported by competent evidence in admissible evidentiary form, is that her affair with defendant was the result of a psychiatric phenomenon known as "transference". Plaintiff contends that defendant knew or should have known that her romantic feelings about him were borne out of transference but that he falsely advised her that such was not the case in order to exploit her sexually. Plaintiff also claims that she was unable to appreciate the "reality" of her situation and understand defendant's actions as malpractice until he finally denied their love affair in September 1985. Plaintiff has thus presented facts which, if credited by a jury, demonstrate that the long delay between the accrual of the cause of action and the...