Coos Bay Lumber Co. v. Local 7-116, Intern. Woodworkers of America (CIO)

• Decision Date: 23 February 1955
• Citation: 280 P.2d 412,203 Or. 342
• Parties: , 36 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2306, 27 Lab.Cas. P 69,104 COOS BAY LUMBER COMPANY, a corporation, Respondent, v. Local 7-116, INTERNATIONAL WOODWORKERS OF AMERICA (CIO); Shirley Johnston and Howard Campbell, as President and Business Agent, respectively, of said Local, Appellants. A. L. County, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 412

280 P.2d 412

203 Or. 342, 36 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2306,

27 Lab.Cas. P 69,104

COOS BAY LUMBER COMPANY, a corporation, Respondent, v. Local 7-116, INTERNATIONAL WOODWORKERS OF AMERICA (CIO);

Shirley Johnston and Howard Campbell, as President

and Business Agent, respectively, of

said Local, Appellants.

A. L. County, Defendant-Respondent.

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Feb. 23, 1955.

A. L. Couty, Coos Bay, for the petition.

Before WARNER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, LUSK, BRAND, LATOURETTE and PERRY, Justices.

ROSSMAN, Justice.

The defendant-respondent, Arnold L. Couty, has filed a paper in this cause which we will treat as a petition for a rehearing. In it Mr. Couty expresses a belief that our decision, 279 P.2d 508, failed to give heed to the contentions which he contributed when he submitted his brief. The latter, scarcely seven pages long, was prepared by Mr. Couty, who is not a member of the bar.

We bestowed upon this appeal painstaking care before we reached our conclusion. When we stated in our decision the issues submitted by the appeal, we had in mind Mr. Couty's contentions, as well as those which came from the other parties. Before reaching our decision, we examined not only all of the contentions advanced by the parties, but carried our analysis beyond the scope of their briefs and citations. We inferred that this case might be a harbinger of others arising out of the recurring developments in the employer-employee relationship.

Mr. Couty believes that we overlooked the constitutional provisions upon which he depended. In his brief he said: 'One issue before the court is to determine whether or not the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement must be in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States.' Obviously, it must be.

Next, Mr. Couty's brief declared: 'A second issue before the court is the power of the courts of Oregon arising under Art. 6, of the Constitution.' At that point Mr. Couty quoted Article VI, which says, in part: 'This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land.' No one connected with this case has challenged the validity of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley), 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. We gave that act full effect as 'the supreme Law of the Land.' We do not understand that Mr. Couty claims that we misinterpreted the act.

Mr. Couty next declares: 'A third issue before the court is odd, indeed. An attempt to delegate the jurisdiction of justiciable cause, in this case over the employee's wages, to the collective bargaining agreement has been successful as evidenced by court decisions cited by counsel for the appellants. Such court decisions are in error.' Mr. Couty's brief contains no citations whatever to any court decisions, textbook or to any statute. We believe that the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 does not attempt to delegate to any union jurisdiction over any 'justiciable cause.' The part of it which is germane to this case manifests no concern whatever over any 'justiciable cause' but defines and places limitations upon the authority which may be...